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1. INTRODUCTION
Issues in Energy Conservation R&D
Large scale federal support for research and development (R&D) on
energy conservation technologies seems now to be one of the few features
of national energy policy upon which there is wide popular support. From
fiscal years 1975 to 1978 the federal energy conservation R&D budget
increased by a factor of 9, a tremendous rise even by comparison to all
energy R&D, which slightly more than doubled (1-1, p. 33). Yet there
remain important conceptual and analytical issues which raise serious
questions about government policy in this area. This report addresses a
number of these questions as they arise with respect to one particular
set of energy conservation technologies: advanced automotive power
systems.
Some of the key policy questions are the following:
(1) Is energy conservation R&D a reasonable target for expenditure of
taxpayers' dollars at all? If our private market system is working
efficiently, then, aside from those in fundamental research areas, most
worthwhile R&D projects on technologies likely to be utilized within the
economic and regulatory environment of the future will be supported by
private firms. Thus government funding would either be spent on
technologies not likely ever to be introduced into the marketplace, or it
would serve principally to merely substitute public dollars for private
ones. In the case of alternative automotive powerplants, the vast
technical and financial resources of three of the nation's largest dozen
firms are potentially available for R&D, and in fact the pace of
technology change in the automotive sector is more rapid now than at any
time since the introduction of the Ford Model T.
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(2) If our economic system is failing to provide sufficient
incentives for energy conservation R&D because it is failing to provide
sufficient incentives for energy conservation, how should R&D be
planned? Federally supported R&D cannot change the behavior of buyers in
the marketplace for a new product. However, other government policy
measures can. Should federal support go to products whose ultimate
acceptance is contingent upon some change in a related price or product
regulation which is not under the control of R&D planners? In the
automotive case, petroleum product price controls and air pollutant
emissions control regulations may be crucial in determining the future
viability of some powerplants.
(3) How should energy conservation technologies be valued? Much of
present American social attitudes and political behavior with respect to
energy policy can be described as attaching an implicit value to energy
which is higher than its market price. If this is truly the case, then
somehow this social value of energy must be estimated and used in
analyses of energy conservation technologies. In the automotive case the
value of automobile fuel economy increases should be based on some
concept of the social value of automotive fuels.
(4) How should problems of the process of adjusting to new
technologies be analyzed and dealt with? Very often technology analysis
focuses on the value of a new technology in place in some long-run
equilibrium. The technology itself and the related parts of the economic
structure are assumed to have materially adjusted to take maximum
advantages of the features of the new technology. Whether the system
could or would in fact adapt and attain this equilibrium is not
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considered. Substantively, the R&D program itself generally does not
address the transition problem. In the automotive case, new socially
desirable powerplants may be economic only if new fuels and new vehicle
structures accompany them into the transport system. But the behavior of
the automotive and petroleum industries in providing these important
accompaniments is difficult to analyze, at best. Further it is not clear
how a federally supported R&D program might deal with this transition
problem, or whether it should attempt to.
(5) How can the government arrange its contractual arrangements with
industry in order to avoid merely substituting its own dollars for
private industry's? Most attractive energy conservation R&D projects
will be related to technologies which have at least some market value and
thus the R&D itself will be at least somewhat attractive to the relevant
private firms. Very often these technologies will be controlled by one
or a small number of firms through patents or to barriers to entry.
Cost-sharing R&D agreements between the government and the firm will be
the logical and mutually desirable outcome in such cases. Two problems
will arise. First, only the firm will know with certainty what R&D
activities it would undertake without government help. Second, the firm
will have better information than the government about the potential
future value of the technology. The government will thus be at a
substantial disadvantage at the bargaining table. In the automotive
powerplant case these problems are quite apparent.
This is hardly a complete set of the important policy analysis issues
arising with respect to federally supported energy conservation, but it
describes some of the most difficult. The case of federally supported
R&D on advanced automotive power systems is in some ways a representative
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case, and in some ways it is unique. Each.of these issues is addressed
in this report for that case. The depth of treatment varies from
strictly descriptive to somewhat formal analysis, depending on the
tractability and importance of the issue.
Contents of This Report and Relation to Previous Work
Over the period June 1974 to March 1976, the MIT Energy Laboratory
conducted a study, for the National Science Foundation's Office of Energy
R&D Policy, entitled "The Role for Federal R&D on Alternative Automotive
Power Systems." The study was conducted in two phases. In Phase I the
critical issues were laid out and discussed, the key features of the
relevant technologies were described, the various possible objectives for
federally supported R&D were analyzed, and the present government and
industry programs and policies were discussed and evaluated (1-2).
In Phase II, federal support with the explicit objective of advancing
the relevant technology was addressed. This is the most expensive,
controversial, and difficult to analyze, of the four possible objectives
identified in Phase I. The analysis of the resulting report, "Federal
Support for the Development of Alternative Automotive Power Systems,"
("Federal Support," 1-3), proceeded as follows. First, the process by
which major technological product changes are made in the automobile
industry was examined. The general aspects of the federal R&D decision
were then addressed, including the question of whether or not federal
support is justified at all, and the issues of project choice and program
design. A forecast of the advances to be expected in the internal
combustion engine (ICE) was made. Finally, the potential federal role in
advancing three of the possible alternative power systems -- the
Stirling, diesel, and electric systems -- was analyzed (1-3).
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The present report builds on and extends the previous efforts in
three areas. Each has been made desirable by events and trends occurring
over the past two years.
In Chapter 2 below we examine the impact of two changes in the
structure of federal regulation on the incentives that the automotive
industry has for R&D in this area. The first occurred in December 1975.
This was the passage, and signature into law, of the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, which mandates fleet-wide fuel economy standards for
the automobile manufacturers. This significantly affects the incentives
to the manufacturers to invest in R&D on alternative powerplants. Just
how, though, is not immediately obvious. The passage of the Act took
place too late to be incorporated into the previous effort. The second
was in August 1977, when the Clean Air Act was amended once again, and a
new schedule of emission standards became law. The Clean Air Act is one
of the major determinants of the extent and direction of R&D in
automotive power systems.
In Federal Support (1-3, Sect. 3.2) a detailed analysis concluded
that there was solid ground for government support for R&D on alternative
automotive power systems due, in significant measure, to the unintended
effects of government regulations. They result in a disparity between
the social and private benefits of long-range R&D due to: (1) the
disparity between the value of automotive fuels and their market price,
caused principally by a national goal for security from dependence on
foreign supplies not reflected in the market price and government price
controls which hold the market price of automotive fuel well below its
value to the nation, and (2) the Clean Air Act, which forces the industry
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to focus its R&D resources on technology available in the very near term,
thus reinforcing its natural predilection toward small and evolutionary
changes, and which adds risk to long-term investments due to
uncertainties in the standards of the regulated air pollutants, the
possibility and unpredictable level of standards for presently
unregulated air pollutants, and possible government response to the
availability of new technology.
The second area of extension in the present report is an examination
of federally supported R&D on the automotive gas turbine. In August
1975, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) published its comprehensive
analysis of the alternative engine technologies (1-4). It recommended a
major national effort to develop two "advanced" automotive powerplants,
the gas turbine and Stirling systems, with the goal of bringing one or
both of them into production by the mid-1980s. Similarly, over the last
year, the Department of Energy has begun to focus its attention on these
two systems as the most promising for government support. This is
consistent with the results of Federal Support (1-3, Chap. 5), which
recommended government funding for the Stirling engine, but that study
did not examine the gas turbine. Due to project funding limitations, the
Stirling engine was chosen to represent the general class of advanced
heat engines. In Chapter Three of this report, the previous work is
extended to the gas turbine system. In contrast to the JPL analysis,
which is principally technological, the MIT analysis focuses on economic,
public policy, and organizational issues.
A framework similar to that used for the analysis of the Stirling
engine is presented in Chapter 3 for examining the gas turbine. The
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Stirling engine work proceeded in the following manner. First, the state
of the technology and present R&D programs were examined. Then a simple
social cost-benefit analysis for government investment in Stirling R&D
was performed. This required simple models of the operating economics of
Stirling-powered vehicles, the change of the engine's attributes during
the R&D process and the impact of increased investment on the probability
of R&D success. The principal conclusions of the social economic
analysis were that: (1) the uncertainty in the maximum allowable premium
of engine cost over the ICE (for positive total social operating
benefits), the engine attribute on which R&D efforts are focused, is
about as large as its likely level -- up to 50% or so; (2) the magnitude
of the likely total social operating benefits is similarly uncertain, up
to several tenths of a cent per mile, thus making cost-benefit
calculations extremely tenuous; (3) the status of present R&D programs is
such that the incremental impact of government funding on the probability
of R&D success is significant; and finally (4) that an investment of
several hundred million dollars over five to ten years is likely to be a
very good gamble. Next the process by which the Stirling engine would be
introduced into commercial utilization was examined; an analysis of the
disparities between the economics when examined socially and privately
indicated how a socially beneficial engine might not meet private
decision criteria, and the implications of this for the government
programs were discussed. Finally, the proposal by the Ford Motor Company
for support of their Stirling R&D effort was considered and it was
concluded that such a shared-cost program was likely to be a good
framework for the support of Stirling engine R&D.
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The differences in the technological status, and the direction and
rate of change of that status, between the Stirling and gas turbine are
significant enough that neither the framework nor the conclusion would
carry over directly. For example, in contrast to the Stirling, the
gas turbine offers a substantial improvement in power density over the
ICE. This would seem to indicate that a special vehicle body would have
to be developed and produced to take advantage of this property.
However, this is not consistent with the normal process of technology
development and production in the automotive industry (1-3, Chap. 2). It
has implications for the ultimate commercialization of the gas turbine,
and is incorporated into the analysis reported here.
Finally, in Chapter 4 below we examine the set of issues of federal
research strategy. The previous MIT analysis focused on the issue of
whether or not the government should support the development of these
systems. Resources were not available for detailed study at a lower
hierarchical level of "strategic" decisions -- the number of different
types of engines to be supported, the number of different firms to be in-
volved, etc. This set of questions is defined and examined in Chapter 4.
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2. INCENTIVES FOR R&D IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY1
I. _ . . . _ , , , , ,m ,_ . ....,,,,,
As in most other areas of the private economy, the traditional
pattern in our society has been to leave to private industry the task of
researching and developing new product lines for sale in commercial
markets. So long as markets function well, this pattern is rarely
questioned, and indeed the great bulk of the R&D carried out in the
United States takes place quite outside the direct concern of the Federal
Government. However, problems arise when markets do not function
properly - when markets "fail." In the most general terms, this
"failure" occurs when the social evaluation of the costs and benefits of
a particular action are not fully reflected in the private costs and
benefits to which corporations and individual consumers respond, i.e.
there are "externalities" involved. Where the incentives to private
behavior are judged socially undesirable or inadequate, intervention by
the government, as the agent of society as a whole, may he called for to
correct the imbalance.
It is relatively easy to find some sort of failure in most any
market, and there are good arguments (discussed below) as to why the
private incentives for the performance of R&D are always inadequate.
There is a tendency to cite them in passing and proceed to "iustify"
government investment in R&D, without examining the government's other,
sometimes extensive interventions in a given market and their impact on
the incentives for R&D. In this section we therefore undertake an
lIn order to provide a presentation here which is fairly complete, some
material from Federal Support (2-1, Section 3.2) is repeated.
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examination of the possible disparities between the social and private
incentives for R&D in the automotive market, including the government
interventions presently extant. We will attempt to confine ourselves to
those features of the market which are related to R&D on alternative
powerplants; e.g., we will not look at other issues such as safety,
damagability, support of road construction, etc.
First we will discuss the economies of R&D from the traditional
approach of welfare economics. Next, problems of market structure will
be examined. However, as important as are the traditional economic
arguments under competitive markets or the special circumstances in
oligopolistic markets, there is in the automotive case a host of
non-market forces that are introduced by government regulation. Three
areas of present government regulation are significantly affecting the
incentives for R&D in alternative automotive powerplants, and each is
examined in turn.
Traditional Economic Arguments
One set of conditions that justifies government intervention in the
process of technology development occurs when various "failures" arise in
the performance of economic markets, even when those markets are
perfectly competitive. For example, certain types of technical
developments may have the character of a "public good" where the
knowledge, once developed, costs nothing for others to use. Very often
in such cases the benefits of such knowledge are "inappropriable," i.e.,
competitors, or consumers, receive the benefits, and there is
insufficient advantage to anv one competitor to expend the funds to carry
out the technical development. Much of basic research -- which is
devoted to the increase of human knowledge rather than the development of
specific technological procedures -- has this character, and it is for
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this reason that a great deal of basic research is justifiably carried
out with some involvement of public funds. (It should be emphasized, of
course, that a great deal of basic research is supported by private
corporations as well). At some level this argument holds for all markets
and technologies, and might be cited to support, for example, research on
less expensive washing machines. A unique feature of the automotive
market, however, is its vast economic size, so that very small changes in
automotive technology make very large differences in social welfare when
used over the roughly one trillion miles driven annually by the American
passenger car fleet. Thus the "public good" argument applies with
particular quantitative strength in the automotive case.
The case of advanced automotive power systems offers, we believe, a
potentially important case of appropriability difficulties. They are
associated with the development of ceramics for use in advanced heat
engines. Ceramics have the potential to replace metallic superalloys
where a material is required to endure and resist a load at high
temperature. If the peak cycle temperature of a heat engine can be
raised, it can be made more efficient. Furthermore, ceramic components
may be less expensive than their superalloy counterparts. Below in
Chapter 3 we will discuss at some length the potentially large benefits
of the availability of ceramic components for the advanced automotive
engine. However, they will have important and often
unforseeable effects in many areas of modern mechanical technology. It
seems very unlikely that a significant fraction of the benefits of the
availability of high-temperature load-bearing ceramic components can be
captured by any present economic decision-making unit short of the nation
as a whole. Research on basic ceramics processing, and possibly the
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development of the related automotive engine technology as well, may be
suffering under the usual economic incentives.
Another circumstance that may call for government intervention arises
when there are "externalities" of one type or another. An externality
occurs when an economic decision-maker -- be he a supplier or consumer --
is not faced with the full costs (or does not receive the full benefits)
of the actions he takes. That is, market prices fail to reflect the full
range of impacts of a particular decision. A clear example is automotive
air pollution, where the operating costs of an "uncontrolled" vehicle did
not reflect the damage being done to others through tailpipe emissions;
thus clearly justifying some sort of regulatory performance standards,
such as those of the Clean Air Act. These regulations deal directly with
the pollution externality. They may, or may not, provide an incentive to
manufacturers to carry out needed R&D. In the case of the Clean Air Act,
the regulations have brought both dramatic reductions in emissions from
present automotive systems. However, they have turned out to be very
crude instruments from the standpoint of spurring the development of new
technology to reduce the externalities. Thus, in spite of the
regulation, a sound reason may exist for the involvement of public bodies
in research to find ways to reduce the external affects; this will be
addressed in more detail below.
Another externality of automotive operation, though less obvious than
that involved with air pollutant emissions, is that the present high
level of consumption of gasoline (and all other petroleum products)
exposes the nation to pressure by the Arab oil producers. That is, there
is a value to the reduction of petroleum imports that is higher than the
avoided cost of the petroleum itself. Thus the price of automotive fuel
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is too low by (at least) a "national security premium." One rationale
for estimating this premium is suggested in Section 3.4 below. The
premium is estimated at 4% of the value of crude oil, or about 1.5C/gal.
Even given that this is an extremely crude approximation, we can conclude
that the national security premium is not quantitatively significant.
Still another example of a market failure, though more controversial
than the ones above, is that which occurs when the relevant private
decision-maker has a degree of risk aversion which is significantly
different from that of the society at large. In essence, the government
is capable of spreading the risk of particular technological experiments
over a very large pool of alternative activity. A private corporation,
on the other hand, may be limited in its ability to diversify the risk of
a large investment (say in a new technology) even in the corporation's
estimate of the expected value of the investment is the same as that of
the government.
Now, of course it is argued that a variety of financial measures
exist within our market system to allow a private corporation (or
individual stockholders) to diversify risks of this kind, and therefore
that the risk aversion of the private corporation should be no different
than that of a public body. But once again these arguments depend on the
efficient working of financial markets, and to the extent these markets
"fail" in one way or another, the private and public perceptions of risk
may be different. This will happen, for example, when the formation of
various types of risk pools is retarded by various government
restrictions on the market, such as are imposed by the antitrust laws.
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Thus it might very well be the case that an expensive venture on the
part of Ford or General Motors may involve a degree of risk to the
corporation which mitigates against its adoption, while at the same time
the society as a whole could well afford to bear the risk given its
capacity to spread risk over the body politic as a whole. In these
circumstances there is a justification for govenment involvement in
carrying out such experiments. In fact, on the basis of a 1969 consent
decree between the automobile manufacturers and the U.S. Justice
Department, the manufacturers are specifically forbidden from
collaborating on R&D related to air pollution control. There is a
trade-off here between the ability to form risk-bearing consortia and the
need to maintain competition that is beyond the scope of this
discussion. The fact remains, however, that, with ventures of the size
involved in the development and introduction of an alternative powerplant,
the risk as perceived by a manufacturer and its management may well be
much larger than when calculated socially.
Problems of Market Structure
Another circumstance which also leads to a concern for government
involvement in technological development concerns the structure of the
automobile industry itself. All of the previous arguments in this
chapter hold when the market is made up of large numbers of sellers and
buyers. However, the supply of automobiles to the American market is
dominated by the "Big Three," with a fringe consisting of one
"independent" and a number of importers. In such a circumstance there
are good reasons to suspect that the full play of competitive forces is
not brought to bear. There are really two questons here: the large
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scale necessary for the economic mass production of motor vehicles
through the extensive use of automated machinery; and the small number of
sellers that has resulted from the development of firms probably beyond
the size required for these economies. The former may result in a more
than optimal degree of sluggishness to technological change. The latter
may reduce the degree of competition, but, on the other hand, the
existence of such huge industrial organizations and their associated
financial power gives opportunities for R&D that might not exist were the
industry made up of much smaller units.
So therefore, on balance, it is not easy to argue whether more or
less R&D on new technical options takes place under current market
structure or some alternative. Debate on this issue has been hot and
heavy, both within the academic community (on the general topic ) and
among those involved in automotive policy. It is impossible to resolve
this issue as it bears on government support of alternative powerplant
R&D.
Petroleum Price Controls
Present federal price controls hold the price of automotive fuels
well below their marginal cost. The legal price of gasoline (and all
other petroleum products) is based on an "average" cost of crude oil,
where the average includes imports at a price determined by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, "old"
domestic oil at a much lower price, presumably related to its old "cost,"
and "new" domestic oil, at an intermediate price. The problem is that
production of domestic crude is relatively fixed, so that any gallon of
crude that is not consumed results (roughly speaking) in a gallon of
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crude not imported. But, because price controls hold the cost of
automotive fuels well below their cost based on the cost of imported
crude (i.e., their marginal cost), the savings privately received in not
consuming a gallon of automotive fuel are substantially lower than the
savings received by the nation as a whole in not having to import the
extra unit of expensive international crude oil. This will be discussed
further in the following chapter, but as long as petroleum price controls
are continued, then (as in the case of the "security premium" discussed
above), all investment in fuel-conserving technology will be undervalued
in private decisions; specifically, this includes investment in R&D on
alternative automotive powerplants which consume less fuel than the ICE.
Quantitative estimates of the importance of this effect on the valuation
of automotive gas turbine engines are presented in Section 3.4 below. At
this writing the Congress is considering a tax program (the "Crude Oil
Equalization Tax") for raising the average domestic price of crude oil to
the international price, eliminating this source of government-induced
market failure.
Air Pollutant Emissions Regulation
The second important regulatory program in this category is the Clean
Air Act, which, in its structure, and its history and administration, has
in the past biased investments in R&D on technology to control air
pollution -- away from major technological changes (such as alternative
powerplants) and towards smaller, "evolutionary" technological changes.
The history and basic structure of the Clean Air Act and its
implementation will not be repeated here; rather the impact of its key
features on the incentives for alternative powerplant R&D will be
addressed.
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Before proceeding, however, it is worthwhile summarizing the effects
of the Act as we perceived them before the passage of the latest
amendments in August of this year. Several features of the Act and its
administration have been important. The standards of the Clean Air Act,
in spite of the tough language of the Act, have had to be adjusted
several times to levels that could be met by the ICE without drastic
performance degradation or cost increase, or increase in emissions of
unregulated pollutants. There has therefore been little advantage to a
manufacturer in introducing a powerplant which offers lower emissions at
a cost premium. Thus the social benefits of reduced emissions had not
been effectively internalized and provide a limited incentive to
alternative powerplant R&D.
The uncertainties inherent in the administration of the Act have
inhibited investments in alternative powerplants by making them riskier.
For example, the long-term standard for oxides of nitrogen has never been
well known, due to the number of credible alternatives to the former
statutory 0.4 gm/mi standard. The underlying problem is the lack of a
solid technical justification. A similar problem has arisen with respect
to standards for emissions of a number of presently unregulated
pollutants which are emitted by some of the alternative powerplants. For
example, an emission standard for particulates would probably be imposed
if the diesel engine were to become widely used. The standard might
result in significant costs added to the diesel vehicle, or it might not,
but the uncertainty inhibits private investment in the system.
The requirement that each of the vehicles produced in any one year
must meet the same standard means that there is no mechanism whereby a
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vehicle with an advanced engine, whose emissions are superior to those of
the ICE, can be gradually introduced, providing a significant obstacle to
any major technological change. This feature of the law reflects the
industry's traditional annual model change, and it encourages exactly
the type of innovations made in the model change, namely, incremental
ones. Major technological innovations take much longer than one year
to diffuse across the industry's product lines.
Finally, the year-by-year approach for strengthening, then
postponing, the standards, has forced the manufacturers to concentrate
their resources on short-term modificatons which can be rapidly
introduced. It has consistently been the case that only one to three
years into the future at any given time were standards that were
generally conceded to be impossible to attain at acceptable levels of
cost or quality degradation with known technology. Uncertainty over the
levels that actually would obtain has been the case. This type of
uncertainty is totally inconsistent with the type of planning necessary
in capital-intensive industries, and again inhibits investments in
long-range emissions-related R&D.
In summary the Clean Air Act and its history and administraton, as
the results of Congress' desire for haste in reducing air pollution
levels, has significantly biased the industry away from major
technological changes such as some of the potential alternative
powerplants toward control technologies which could be more rapidly and
certainly implemented.
It now appears that the automotive emission regulatory situation has
stabilized somewhat. In August, 1977, the Congress passed the Clean Air
Amendments of 1977. The most important feature of the Amendments is a
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further postponement of the original "statutory 1975" standards for
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide (0.41/3.4 gm/mi HC/CO) from model year
1978 to model year 1980 for hydrocarbons and 1981 for carbon monoxide.
The original "statutory 1976" standard for oxides of nitrogen (0.4 gm/mi)
is dropped as a statutory vehicle requirement and changed to a "research
objective;" the new minimum requirement is set for 1981 (at 1.0 gm/mi).
The passage of these Amendments was accompanied by the usual
Congressional pronouncements that at last there was an emission standard
schedule that the automobile industry could live with and would.
This time, however, the claim seems considerably more plausible than
in the past. One indication is that the automobile industry has been
less vehement than before in its objections to the timing and level of
the new statutory 1981 requirements. This is due to two factors. First,
the alleviation of the ultimate oxides of nitrogen standard mitigates
what has always been the most contentious single regulation. Second, the
technological advances which have taken place over the past decade,
during which automotive emissions have been a major national issue, have
made it possible to produce cars which will meet the 1981 standards with
more reasonable cost, fuel economy, and quality losses than has ever been
the case in the past. Technologies very similar to those which will be
used are now being tested on some sales models, and it appears that these
techniques will be ready for fleetwide use in 1981. They are of course
incremental adaptions to the ICE, and the cost and fuel economy penalties
they involve are by no means negligible (see Sections 3.2 and 3.4 below),
but they are reasonably effective and reliable.
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There are two possibilities for renewed contention embedded within
the Clean Air Amendments of 1977. First, there is a mandatory studv to
be performed by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
of the costs and benefits associated with the formerly mandatory 0.4
gm/mi goal for oxides of nitrogen emissions. Recommendations are to be
submitted to the Congress with the report on the results of the study no
later than July 1, 1980. Second, there is provision for a waiver for up
to two years for the most stringent carbon monoxide standard. These
provisions, or other non-legislative possibilities for disruption of the
new schedule of standards, weigh against the view of increased stability.
However, it does seem that the inhibitory effect of the Clean Air Act
on advanced power system R&D has now been somewhat mitigated. A
reasonably stable set of standards seems in sight, so the future
competitive environment for an alternative is less uncertain. The cost
increase and fuel economy penalty associated with the 1981 controls will
probably be realized by ICE-powered vehicles and this will make
alternative systems appear more attractive (as shown in Section 3.4
below). A significant source of disparity between social and private
valuation of automotive power systems will in this case have been
eliminated.
Fuel Economy Regulation
On the other hand, a whole new regulatory regime has been added in
the automotive sector. This is the set of fleetwide fuel economy
standards imposed by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. The details
of the standards will not be described here. Thev consist of a gradually
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tightening schedule of minimum new car fleetwide average fuel economies
that must be met by each manufacturer. The incentives these standards
provide for the behavior of the automotive industry are extremely complex
and not well understood.1 Because the standards are imposed on the
fleetwide average rather than each vehicle, the manufacturers have
substantial flexibility in meeting the limit, especially as between
actions affecting various weight classes of vehicles offered.
As with the Clean Air Act, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act is
without question affecting short-run behavior in the intended direction.
That is, the manufacturers are pouring tremendous development resources
into modifying present vehicles to meet the tightening standards.
Off-the-shelf technology is being introduced now -- especially vehicle
redesign to reduce weight while maintaining volume and comfort
("downsizing"). Extensive planning is under way within the firms to
introduce known technology to make changes as needed to meet the
standards.
However, as has been the case with the Clean Air Act, efforts to
develop new technology are being focused on innovations which would be
available for introduction by the time they are needed, i.e., when
present technology will not suffice. Planning within the industry, and
analysis outside it, indicate that this "crunch" will occur approximately
in the early 1980s.l Therefore major engine development efforts are
1See Jacobs and Linden (2-2, Chapter 3) for a description and behavioral
analysis of the standards.
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under way, but they are aimed at modifications to, and closely related
replacements for, the ICE (especially the diesel and stratified charge
engines). As formerly under the Clean Air Act, advanced systems such as
the gas turbine and Stirling engines would not be available in time to
help the manufacturers avoid violations of the standards. This is true
independent of the fact that advanced systems might be more desirable
methods of improving fuel economy in the long run.
Thus the impact of the fuel economy standards on the incentives for
R&D on advanced power systems is mixed. It raises the value of vehicle
fuel economy, as a vehicle attribute, in the long run. But it
simultaneously forces the manufacturers to pour their engine development
resources into alternatives that would be available with less delay and
more certainty.
Sumary
In this chapter we set out to analyze the adequacy of the incentives
faced by the automotive manufacturers for R&D on advanced automotive
power systems. Two years ago, we reached the following conclusion:
In summary, it is very likely...that the automotive
industry will under-invest in alternative powerplant R&D,
relative to the level which would be socially desirable. This
provides a solid but very general justification for government
support of alternative powerplant R&D. (2-1, p. 68)
This situation now seems less clear. The incentives described above are
extremely complex and difficult to sort out. We now find it hard to
ISee H. Kahn (2-3) for a survey of submissions by the automobile
manufacturers to the Department of Transportation and the Congress
describing their strategies for meeting the standards through technical
changes and their indications that they do not believe these changes to
be adequate.
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argue that the net effect of all these considerations goes one way or the
other with respect to advanced systems. One area where there is an
important exception to this conclusion is the area of ceramic components,
which was mentioned above and will be analyzed at some length in the
following chapter.
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3. THE AUTOMOTIVE GAS TURBINE: THE FEDERAL ROLE
i i i i i i i -i
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we address government policy with respect to a single
automotive power system: the gas turbine. This system offers the
potential to provide automobiles with substantially higher fuel economy,
lower air pollutant emissions, and superior levels of noise, durability,
reliability, etc., than today's ICE-powered passenger cars. This
potential, however, remains only that: the high fuel economy levels have
not been demonstrated in any actual vehicle. The cost of the gas turbine
engine is even more uncertain than its potential. Furthermore, the fuel
economy of ICE-powered vehicles is improving rapidly, and the diesel and
stratified charge engines are also improving the available and
foreseeable passenger car technology. Thus while the benefits
potentially available from the gas turbine engine are large, they are
very uncertain.
The gas turbine is not a new technology. The major automotive
manufacturers, domestic and foreign, have supported gas turbine engine
development, and even vehicle demonstrations, intermittently over the
last two decades. A substantial part of this effort has been aimed at
the heavy duty application. Over the past five years a great deal of the
American gas turbine effort for passenger cars has been subsidized by the
federal government. At first the focus was reduced emissions; more
recently, it is improved fuel consumption.
The policy issue, now, is what, if any, continuing role for
government support of automotive gas turbine technology is reasonable.
At one extreme is no federal support whatsoever; funding could be
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terminated when the effort which has been the centerpiece of the federal
government's program for the past five years -- development and
demonstration by Chrysler of the latest system technology -- is completed
in mid-1978. Taxpayer dollars could be spent elsewhere or not
collected. Within the alternative of continuing support there are
choices of the technical focus of the development effort, the number of
firms to be supported, the choice of supporting whole new engine systems
or advanced individual components, and several others. Here we address
principally the question of whether there should be a continuing role,
and what its technical focus should be. In the course of the analysis we
raise a number of subordinate issues which the gas turbine system, and
thus any federal R&D program directed at it, may face.
We offer no original technical analysis. Our effort is centered on
the economic analysis of the technology and the resulting policy
implications. The technical data we use has been obtained from interviews
and the open literature, and tempered by our own judgment.
This chapter may be considered a companion piece to the three case
studies reported in Federal Support (3-1, Chaps. 5, 6 and 7). It follows
most closely the analysis of the Stirling engine reported there;
repetition of the analytical framework will be avoided where possible.
While much of the analysis is similar, it is extended in two directions.
First, a number of appealing simplifications in the economic analysis of
the Stirling are not available here, due to the greater disparity in
certain key attributes of the gas turbine from those of the ICE. Second,
we have been forced to be less reticent in projecting the properties of
advanced systems -- those involving ceramics -- than in the Stirling
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case, for here the choice of materials technology is a central policy
issue; the Stirling engine has not yet reached this stage.
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, in Section 3.2, the
technology and its key components and subsystems are discussed. The
institutional history is described and reviewed, and the nature and
content of the past gas turbine efforts of industry and government are
briefly described. The technology is then classified into distinct
levels and the potential attributes of the system at each level are
compared with those of the present ICE. A brief analysis of the
evolution of the ICE and related systems is undertaken to enable
comparisons of the gas turbine and the baseline of the future.
Next the analytical framework for our economic evaluation of the gas
turbine is motivated and described, in Section 3.3. The style of our
methodology is explained, in the context of our goals and compared with
the approaches taken by others. Our simple vehicle total operating cost
model is laid out.
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 then present economic calculations of the value
of the automotive gas turbine from three differing perspectives. In
Section 3.4 the perspective is the social one, that is, we calculate the
value of the system to society, at each of its levels of technical
advancement. The social calculations use social prices to value fuel and
capital. The sensitivity of these value calculations, to both engine
attributes and price levels, is explored. The framework is a static one,
in that it is assumed that the vehicle body and fuel logistics system
have been jointly optimized in a long-run equilibrium with the gas
turbine engine.
In Section 3.5 the value calculations are repeated from a private
perspective. First, the static calculations framework is repeated, only
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with private prices. Next, the transition process is analyzed, as the
valuation is made on the assumption that the vehicle body and fuel
logistics systems have not adjusted.
Finally, in Section 3.6, the results are summarized, and our
conclusions presented. Our focus is on the place of ceramics in gas
turbine technology and in the federal government's role in supporting R&D
in ceramic-based engines.
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3.2 Status of the Technology and Current R&D Programs
In this section we will first briefly describe the gas turbine
engine and the present status of its key components, and also touch upon
the important materials and manufacturing issues. We shall then
summarize quickly the history and present status of R&D programs on the
engine. We shall then discuss the probable attributes of the automotive
gas turbine engine at various levels of development relative to the
present internal combustion engine (ICE).
We subsequently consider in this section the movement of the
baseline ICE from the present through the mid-1980s time frame, which is
seen as the earliest plausible time frame for the introduction of a
gas-turbine-powered automobile.
3.2.1 Modern Automotive Gas Turbine Technologyl
The automotive gas turbine engine is a heat engine operating on the
open Brayton cycle. It is conceptually distinct from the ICE on three
major points. First, it operates on a different thermodynamic cycle; in
the Brayton cycle heat addition and rejection take place at constant
pressure whereas in the Otto cycle, used by the ICE, heat addition and
rejection take place at constant volume. Second, the gas turbine
utilizes steady flow processes of compression, heat addition, and
expansion, which permit better control and flexibility of operation.
Third, compression and expansion are effected by aerodynamic machinery in
contrast to the positive displacement action of the ICE.
1Fuller treatment of the contents of this section may be found in (3-2,
p. 5-2), (3-3), (3-4, pp. 1-162).
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The key components of the gas turbine engine are: the compressor,
which raises the pressure of the incoming air; the combustor, in which
fuel is introduced and burned with the compressed air; and the turbine,
which, powered by the hot expanding combustion products, delivers work.
Part of the work drives the compressor; the remainder is available as
motive power. The addition of a regenerator enables the transfer of heat
from the turbine exhaust to the compressed air prior to combustion,
serving to raise the efficiency of the engine.
The attractiveness of the gas turbine engine as an alternate
automotive powerplant is due chiefly to: simplicity - fewer moving parts
than the ICE; potential for higher specific power (maximum horsepower
available per pound of engine weight); smooth and vibrationless power
delivery - a consequence of rotary work processes in contrast to the
reciprocating action of the ICE; low emissions - due to the isolation of
the combustion process, permitting better control; easy cold starting;
potential for reduced maintenance requirements; improved life expectancy,
and potential for improved fuel economy. Weighing against these
advantages are its relatively exotic material and manufacturing
requirements -- which lead to a high initial cost; and the engine's
inherently constant speed characteristic which is inconsistent with the
highly variable load demand of an automobile.
More than one system configuration exists for the modern automotive
gas-turbine engine. Thermodynamically, the cycle may be "simple" or
"regenerated," as mentioned earlier. A further distinction can be made
based on the coupling between the engine and the drivetrain: the
single-shaft configuration employs a single expander turbine to drive
both compressor and drivetrain on a common "engine" shaft.
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Alternatively, a second, "power" turbine, mounted on a separate shaft,
can provide motive power to the wheels via the transmission. This is the
free- (or twin-) shaft configuration. The latter is at present the
better developed, by far, of the two.
Numerous automotive gas turbine prototypes have been built to date.
Hardware details are highly specific to each prototype. Some common
elements may, however, be identified. Here we will outline the status of
these major components and subassemblies.
A cutaway view of a representative (free-shaft) modern automotive
gas turbine engine is shown in Figure 3.1. We will subsequently discuss
the principal differences between the free-shaft and single-shaft
configurations. The principal structural member of the engine is the
main housing supporting the major subassemblies and providing connected
flow passages. The housing plays an important role in providing air flow
guidance and bearing bases for the shafts. It must have adequate
strength to contain the high-pressure gas flow without the distortion
that might lead to misalignment of the working components. The housing
may be a one-piece casting or may be a fabricated multiple-piece
structure. The former is preferable, since it can be more easily and
quickly mass-produced.
The major subassemblies are: the "gasifier" section (compressor,
"gasifier" turbine and gasifier shaft), the power turbine section
(including the nozzle assembly), combustor, regenerator, and reduction
gearing. Accessories may be driven either off the gasifier or the power
turbine shafts; the former arrangement adds to the inertia of the
gasifier section, affecting acceleration response, while the latter
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Figure 3.1
CUTAWAY VIEW OF CHRYSLER FOURTH GENERATION GAS TURBINE
MAIN COMPONENTS OF TIHE TWIN-REGENERATOR GAS TURBINE:
(A) accessory drive; (B) compressor; (C) right regenerator
(D) variable nozzle unit; (E) power turbine; (F) reduction
gear; (G) lcft regenerator; (H) compressor turbine;
(I) burner; (J) fuel nozzle; (K) igniter; (L) starter-
generator; (M) regenerator drive shaft; (N) ignition unit.
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necessitates the use of a clutch between power shaft and drivetrain to
keep the accessories running when the vehicle is stationary.
Modern automotive gas turbines use centrifugal (radial) compressors
exclusively, in preference to axial designs; ruggedness, compactness and
the ability to provide high pressure ratios in a single stage make radial
compressors the natural choice. Variable inlet guide vanes on the
compressor (not shown in the engine in Figure 3.1) help improve response
and part-load fuel economy at the cost of additional complexity.
Pressurized air from the compressor is routed through the rotary
regenerator(s),l where it picks up residual heat from the hot exhaust
gases of the power turbine. The regenerator consists of a rotating heat
transfer matrix shaped like a drum or disc, which is alternately exposed
to the hot and cold gas streams; the pressure differential between them
necessitates sealing to prevent leakage of the compressed air to the low
pressure side. Crucial problems, aside from sealing, are the durability
and reliability of the matrix under prolonged operation.
The compressed and preheated air from the regenerator is then ducted
to the combustor. Isolated combustion is the key to controlling
emissions from the gas turbine engine, since it permits control of the
combustion process independent of the power generation process. The
continuous nature of the combustion process also eliminates the noise
generated in the intermittent explosive combustion process of the ICE.
Combustor design is complicated by conflict between HC & CO emissions on
the one hand and NOx on the other. Further, higher temperatures,
necessary for higher efficiencies, aggravate NOx emissions. Careful
1The engine shown in Fig. 3.1 features twin regenerators. This is not
characteristic of present day design practice.
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compromise between these factors is necessary. Variable inlet geometry
offers one way of solving the problem but involves greater hardware
complexity and, consequently, increased cost.
The combustion products are ducted to the first-stage (gasifier)
turbine, which runs the compressor. The axial turbine has thus far
predominated in this application, but the radial turbine holds several
advantages over the former, especially in the single-shaft configuration,
and is a likely candidate for future designs.
Turbine inlet temperature is crucial in determining engine power
output and efficiency; it is desirable to maintain it as high as possible
under all operating conditions. Metallic turbine technology is close to
the limit of development - an upper limit of about 1900F is imposed by
uncooled superalloy turbine rotors. Turbine blade cooling as a means of
raising inlet temperature is not considered practical or cost-effective
for the relatively small-size turbines used in automotive practice,
although its use makes temperatures on the order of 22000F or higher
possible in aircraft turbines (3-5). The second approach is to find a
material (such as ceramics), having properties that will enable it to
withstand higher operating temperatures.
There is no mechanical connection between the first and second stage
(power) turbines -- coupling is aerodynamic, giving the engine its
flexibility. The axial design is preferred for the power turbine from
packaging considerations. Variable geometry inlet nozzles (see Figure
3.1) on the power turbine are an established feature of most modern
gas-turbine engines; they help improve part-load fuel economy and
response and provide engine-assisted braking for the vehicle.
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The technology associated with the aerodynamics of the rotary
components (compressor and turbine(s)) is close to the limit of its
development. While the overall cycle efficiency is sensitive to
improvements in aerodynamic component efficiencies (3-2, Figure 5-3, p.
5-35) only marginal improvements (of the order of a few percent) in the
efficiency of these components may be expected (3-6). Minimization of
the inertia of the rotating parts (of which the aerodynamic components
are the most important) is a necessary requirement for fast acceleration
response.
Finally, mention must be made of the control system. Control of the
gas turbine engine involves greater complexity than the ICE. It
represents one of the largest cost components of the engine. Essential
functions of the control system include limiting of turbine inlet
temperature, fuel metering and start-up sequence control from ignition to
idle. Control operation may be hydromechanical or electronic. The
latter offers increased versatility at greater cost.
The alternative to the free-shaft configuration is, as mentioned
earlier, the single-shaft version. By permitting the elimination of the
power turbine used in the free-shaft turbine, the single-shaft
configuration realizes several advantages: i) greater mechanical
simplicity; ii) less weight; iii) better efficiency; iv) lower cost.
However, the flexibility of operation offered by a separate power turbine
in the free-shaft version is lost. This makes the single-shaft turbine
incapable, as such, of meeting the highly variable operating conditions
1The engine shown in Figure 3.1 features twin regenerators. This is not
characteristic of present-day prototypes.
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characterizing passenger car utilization. This inherently constant speed
characteristic of the single-shaft turbine presents difficult
transmission problems in automotive applications. It is also important
to mention that the radial turbine is preferable for use on single-shaft
designs, principally because it can accommodate a higher pressure drop
per stage. At the cost of some increase in inertia, it gives higher
efficiencies over a wider operating range and is more rugged.
The single-shaft system cannot utilize conventional passenger car
transmissions; development of a suitable transmission is a necessity for
the single-shaft gas turbine to be a viable passenger car engine. While
a variety of candidate transmission designs exist or have been proposed,
we shall briefly discuss only those that have emerged from past studies
and development efforts (3-7 through 3-10) as being the most promising.
It is generally believed that a continuously variable transmission (CVT),
which permits a continuous variation in the ratio of vehicle speed to
engine speed, will be required. Two designs appear attractive: the
hydromechanical and the traction systems. In the former, the power is
split between a conventional mechanical gear train and a speed-changing
component consisting of a variable displacement pump and motor. Design
studies claim that this transmission has potential for good overall
efficiency in comparison to the conventional automatic, with no
significant weight or volume penalty (3-9, 10), but these are yet to be
realized in present prototypes for passenger car application. Further,
noise generation remains a crucial problem area.
Among the traction transmissions, the principal candidate is the
rolling element type, in which the radii of points of contact on power
rollers operating between toroidal output and input discs is varied to
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give a continuously variable speed ratio (3-9). The most critical
problem is one of durability, due to wear and fatigue at the highly
loaded contact points.
Final mention may be made of the variable-angle stator vane torque
converter (3-11) concept, which in combination with a conventional
automatic transmission, appears to be a potential transmission candidate
for the single-shaft engine.
It has been clear for some time that they key to achieving a
breakthrough in the status of the gas turbine relative to the ICE is to
employ ceramic materials which make higher turbine inlet temperatures (as
mentioned earlier), higher hot-flow-path-component service temperatures,
and more efficient heat exchangers possible, all of which contribute to
substantially improved engine efficiency. In addition, ceramic material
costs are lower (by about an order of magnitude) than the expensive
inputs to the superalloys used in state-of-the-art gas turbines. Thus
ceramics could substantially lower the cost of the gas turbine engine in
volume production. Finally, ceramics in addition to being only about 40%
(or less) as dense as ferrous metals (or superalloys) offer outstanding
resistance to corrosion, abrasion, and wear. Thus it is important to
consider the status and prognosis for ceramic materials development.
Ceramics materials for turbines fall into two classes: heat
exchanger ceramics, used in the regenerator, and structural ceramics for
the other hot flow path components, which are required to withstand high
mechanical stresses at high temperatures.
The principal requirements of heat exchanger ceramics (aside from
being able to operate at the highest possible temperature levels)are
durability under thermal cycling and resistance to chemical attack,
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rather than the ability to withstand heavy mechanical stresses. Ceramic
materials in the regenerator offer potential for lower cost, reduced
weight, and easier sealing (due to their low thermal expansion
characteristics). Within the past several years heat exchangers using
ceramics have been satisfactorily tested at suitable conditions and
lifetimes and they now seem a well-developed technology, on a par with
metallic components elsewhere in the engine.
The status of structural ceramics for the hot flow path components,
in comparison, is not as encouraging. Among these, the stationary
components that experience lower stresses but high temperatures are
relatively better developed. These include the turbine shroud rings and
nozzles, combustor lining and scroll, insulating liners on the inside
housing, and hot flow path ducting.
The ceramic turbine rotor, which could most dramatically affect the
status of the gas turbine by raising the allowable turbine inlet
temperature to 25000 F or more, is also the key development bottleneck:
this component has to effectively tolerate the highest stress at about
the highest temperatures in the engine. Consequently, a breakthrough in
ceramic rotor technology would almost certainly be accompanied, if not
preceded, by successful development of structural ceramics for the other
hot parts. Currently, the most viable concept is the duo-density rotor,
which utilizes a high-strength, hot-pressed silicon nitride hub,
diffusion bonded to a temperature-resistant, reaction-sintered silicon
nitride blade ring.
Mention must also be made, for completeness, of the hybrid rotor
concept which utilizes a superalloy hub forged around ceramic blade
roots. Apart from stress problems at the metallic-ceramic junctions,
this concept is still subject to the cost of the superalloy hub.
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A focus on ceramic components, however, must be tempered by an
awareness of the status of the basic understanding of ceramics as a
material.' The basic properties of ceramics are quite different from
those of metals, and they present relatively unique design problems.
These problems are most acute in the area of structural ceramics.
Although they possess high strength comparable to superalloys, they are
brittle and susceptible to the thermal shock imposed during engine
transients. This brittleness leads ceramics to crack or shatter at
points of contact or high stress, rather than yield and flow as do
ductile metals. These properties result in an extreme sensitivity of
ceramic component strength to the purity, fineness, and uniformity of
particle size in the powdered raw material and the number of pores in the
finished article. In the past few years, various types of silicon
nitrides and silicon carbides have been developed that seem to offer the
best combination of properties and potential for significant improvement.
Advances in structural ceramics technology need to be made in the
following three areas (3-13). First, suitable mass production techniques
must be develdoped, especialy for the turbine rotor. Sinterable silicon
nitride appears to have the best potential for volume production, and
development efforts are needed in this direction. Second, durability
testing is necessary to obtain presently scarce mechanical property data
to verify the long-term integrity of the hot-flow path compononents under
A detailed assessment by the Army Materials and Mechanics Research
Center may be found in (3-12) as cited by Katz, R.N., in "Ceramic Rotors
for Small Automotive Gas Turbine Engines," presented at ERDA Automotive
Power Systems, Contractors Coordination Meeting, Ann Arbor, Michigan, May
1975. Descriptions of key development tasks identified from this
assessment may be found in (3-13) and the current status of these
development efforts is reviewed in (3-14).
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thermal cycling at temperatures up tp 25000F, and the long-term effects
of environmental extremes. Third, there must be development of economic
proof testing methods to predict ceramic component life and reliability,
given the influence of impurities in the material, the considerable
variability exhibited in mechanical behavior, and the brittle fracture
characteristics, which combine to make a statistical approach mandatory
to account for these uncertainties. Finally, it must also be realized
that a ceramic gas turbine engine will call for an integrated design
effort and not just a simple subsitution of ceramic parts for metals
parts in view of their vastly different materials characteristics.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the unique set of
properties of ceramic materials extends their potential application to
areas far beyond just the gas turbine, or even heat egines in general.
First, structural ceramics have potential uses in the hot parts of the
ICE, and the diesel engine, including piston heads and rings, insulating
liners for the combustion chamber, etc. It has been proposed that
replacement of the water cooling system in the diesel engine by a
ceramic-based one could result in substantial improvements in fuel
economy and specific power (3-15). Ceramics also have potential
applications in bearings, sensors and control devices, exhaust ducting,
etc.
Going further afield, ceramics have potential to replace heat
exchanger tubing in chemical and metallurgical process industries, especially
where corrosion resistance is an important requirement, if the technology
for producing large flaw-free ceramic parts can be developed. Ceramics
also have potential application in large industrial gas turbines in the
same areas as in automotive size turbines: this could have significant
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impact on electric power utilities, if their high reliability standards
can be met. Further, with the incentives to convert to the more abrasive
and corrosive coal-derived fuels, the resistant properties of ceramics
make them look attractive.
The impact of ceramics could extend as far as magnetohydrodynamics,
fusion power, and fuel cell technologies in the long term.
The materials problem is closely coupled with the manufacturing
issues relating to the gas turbine engine. High-volume production of
automotive gas-turbine engines would require major new handling,
machinery, and transfer equipment. Further, superalloy components are
harder to machine than the lower-alloy-content ICE parts, but the fewer
number of parts in the turbine relative to the ICE should offset this to
some extent. It is also likely that the metallic gas turbine would
require an appreciable number of complex and expensive investment casting
processes, whereas the piston engine uses none. 1
Ceramic materials, as mentioned earlier, are far from the mass
production stage, having yet to demonstrate adequate properties on the
test bed. The feasibility and cost of mass-producing ceramic materials
are presently unknown. It is therefore not clear what fraction of the
raw material cost advantage associated with ceramics relative to
superalloys would be reflected in the final production versions of the
engines.
1For a detailed treatment of the mass-production potential of the
metallic turbine, see (3-16).
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3.2.2 Review of History and Present Status of R&D Programs on the
Automotive Gas Turbine Enginel
The history of R&D on automotive gas turbines is long and has
involved numerous participants. Beginning with the demonstration of the
first gas-turbine-powered car by the Rover Company of England in 1950
(3-17), various organizations both within and outside of the automotive
industry on both sides of the Atlantic have contributed to the
development of the gas turbine engine. The Big Three in particular have
had a long-standing, substantial and continuing involvement in gas
turbine research.
The pace of R&D on the gas turbine picked up considerably in the
U.S. through intensive federal support of such work in the wake of the
Clean Air Amendments of the 1970s, and, as a consequence, the major
advances in gas-turbine technology have since been made in this country.
During this period, various groups were involved with various aspects of
gas turbine development. The list includes (aside from the Big Three)
AiResearch Manufacturing Company of Arizona; Corning Glass Corporation;
General Electric Company; GTE Sylvania; Mechnical Technology Incorporated
of New York; Owens-Illinois, Pratt and Whitney Aircraft of Florida;
Sunstrand Aviation of Illinois; and Williams Research Corporation of
Michigan. We shall focus briefly on the involvement of the Big Three in
the following pages and then subsequently review quickly the history of
federally supported R&D on the gas turbine.
1See (3-4) for a detailed description of gas turbine development
programs through 1975.
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The first important advances in automotive gas-turbine development
in the U.S. were made by the Chrysler Corporation.1 Active research on
gas turbine powerplants for automobiles began at Chrysler in late 1947.
The first gas-turbine-powered passenger car in the U.S. was demonstrated
by Chrysler in 1954. Six "generations" of development followed in the
years 1954-1966. The Chrysler engine prototypes were all free-shaft
designs and were installed in conventional vehicle test beds, apparently
reflecting Chrysler's manifest aim to eventually mass-produce turbine
cars.
Chrysler's second-generation engine was operated in 1958; a
third-generation prototype followed in 1960. This period saw
considerable component development work, as well as materials research.
In addition to gains in component efficiency, a substantial amount of
data was gathered on regenerator design and consistent improvements were
made in reducing the acceleration lag of the vehicle. The
third-generation prototype also featured variable turbine nozzles, aimed
at improving fuel economy. Chrysler's fourth-generation engine holds an
important place in the history of gas-turbine development. Fifty such
engines were installed in two-door passenger vehicle chasses. From 1963
to 1965 these "turbine cars" were distributed to typical drivers across
the U.S. on a rotating basis. This program represents the only major
organized effort to date to generate consumer response to the gas turbine
passenger vehicle and to evaluate these cars under actual in-service
conditions. A total of more than a million vehicle miles was logged by
1
For a detailed description of Chrysler's early involvement with the gas
turbine, see (3-18, 19).
45
more than 200 users. User reaction typically was especially favorable on
the smooth and vibrationless operation of the engine and its reliable
starting ability. Some dissatisfaction with acceleration lag and fuel
economy was recorded. Chrysler's service operations apparently had to
face no major maintenance problems. Technically, this engine was
essentially similar to its predecessor, except that it had twin metal
regenerators instead of the single unit in the previous model. The
engine was rated at 130 b.h.p.
In 1966, however, the focus of research at Chrysler shifted towards
emissions control for the ICE. Despite this, the Chrysler gas turbine
was carried through two more generations of development through the early
1970s.
In 1972, in the wake of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,
gas-turbine research at Chrysler gained impetus under a contract with the
Advanced Automotive Power Systems Division of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. Three 1973 intermediate-size passenger vehicles were
fitted with the Chrysler sixth-generation engines forming a "baseline"
configuration, and component improvement programs were begun. The
baseline proved capable of meeting the original statutory 1975 emissions
standards (0.41/3.4 HC/CO gm/mi) but displayed poor fuel economy (8-9 mpg
over the urban Federal Driving Cycle). In the subsequent phase of the
program, the technological advances made under related contracts were
incorporated into the "upgraded" engine. The latter is roughly the best
available respresentative of the state-of-the-art gas-turbine
technology. The Chrysler gas turbine program is continuing under
government support and further details of this work are discussed below.
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Early gas turbine research at General Motors was done in the
Research Laboratories; later, with the shift towards commercial vehicle
applications, it was transferred to the Allison Division. Over the
period 1953 through 1958 GM built and demonstrated three
gas-turbine-powered cars, named respectively, Firebird I, II, and III.
In general, these prototypes reflect unconventional and complex design
approaches. The vehicles were overpowered; consequently their
performance was good but fuel economy was poor.
In 1958, the thrust of research shifted to military and,
subsequently, to heavy-duty commercial vehicle applications, under the
Allison Division. A major contribution to the technology -- the power
transfer system -- came about at this time. This is a coupling device
for the free-shaft gas turbine which improves part-load fuel economy and
provides engine-assisted braking, without variable turbine geometry.
Until 1970, Allison continued to design gas-turbine engines for
commercial vehicles on its own. Several vehicle installations were made
and road-tested.
Following the merger of Allison with the Detroit Diesel Division in
1970, GM announced its intention to produce turbine-powered, heavy-duty
vehicles on a pilot basis. However, even though a new prototype engine,
the "GT-404", was built expressly for the purpose, the program has not
yet materialized.
In 1971, under a new office called the Passenger Car Turbine
Development Group, at the GM Engineering Staff, and in close
collaboration with the Research Laboratories, some very intensive
combustion studies were initiated to evaluate the emissions potential of
the gas turbine. An experimental test-bed engine, the "GT-225," was
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built to evaluate these concepts (3-20). This engine, using complex
control concepts and variable geometry, was able to meet the original
statutory 1978 emissions standards (0.41/3.4/0.4 HC/CO/NOx gm/mi) in
dynamometer tests.
In the latest development, Detroit Diesel Allison has contracted,
starting in 1976, for an ERDA-funded program to improve the fuel economy
of GM's advanced industrial gas turbine, the "404/505," by 20% (3-21).
The program goal is targeted for 1981 using ceramic parts on a staged
basis. Further details of this work are discussed below.
The Ford Motor Company began active turbine development about the
same time as its Big Three competitors. The first Ford gas turbine
engine was built in 1955 following four years of intensive component
development. In 1957, following a full program reappraisal, the thrust
of research shifted to engines for commercial road vehicles.
Ford made an important step forward with the "707" prototype,
demonstrated in 1966, which featured twin glass-ceramic regenerators.
Following successful road tests, Ford began planning for full-scale
production of turbines in its Toledo, Ohio plant. A modified version of
their previous engine was developed and 36 such engines were placed in
trial service by 1972. However, they had to be recalled due to problems
involving corrosion and disintegration of the ceramic regenerator cores,
and the operation was terminated.
In mid-1971, Ford's ongoing work on ceramic components for turbines
was accelerated under a five-year contract with the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense, under the
supervision of the Army Materials and Mechanics Research Center. Further
details of government-supported work at Ford are discussed below.
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Several non-automotive organizations have also been involved in
automotive gas turbine system development. Foremost domestically among
these has been Williams Research Corporation, a manufacturer of small gas
turbines. Their most significant efforts to date have been the design,
construction, and vehicle installation of gas turbine engines for
Volkswagen and the City of New York under separate contracts.
The main thrusts of government involvement in automotive gas turbine
technology, beginning in the aftermath of the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, have been made through: 1) the "Baseline Gas Turbine Development
Program" with Chrysler as principal contractor; 2) the "Brittle Materials
Design Program" with Ford as prime contractor; and 3) the "Ford
Regenerator Design and Reliability Program," again with Ford as principal
contractor.1
The "Baseline Gas Turbine Development Program" actually consists of
two phases. In the first phase, originally under contract, starting
November 1972, from the Advanced Automotive Power Systems Division of the
Environmental Protection Agency (management was transferred to the Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA), Division of
Transportation Energy Conservation, upon formation of that agency in
January 1975), the "baseline engine" (namely, Chrysler's sixth-generation
engine as described earlier) was built, installed in intermediate size
vehicles, and tested. The results highlighted the need to improve NO
emissions and the fuel economy of the engine, and helped establish the
priorities to be addressed in the next "upgraded" phase. Various
improvement concepts generated from the preceding program were
1A detailed description of government-supported automotive gas turbine
R&D may be found in (3-22).
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incorporated in the "Upgraded Engine." The upgraded engine modifications
include a backward bladed impeller and variable inlet guide vanes for the
compressor, replacement of twin regenerators by a single ceramic one,
accessory drive from the power shaft instead of the gasifier shaft,
slightly higher turbine inlet temperature, etc. Initial running of the
upgraded engine took place on July 13, 1976; the engine was found to be
43% deficient in power (3-23). A corrective development effort was begun
to effect (principally) major aerodynamic redesign of the engine. This
effort has been extended through mid-1978 to attempt to eliminate the
current power shortfall of 25% (3-24). Further efforts are also needed
to meet the efficiency goals.
Concurrent with and backing up the baseline program, ERDA-funded &
NASA Lewis Research Center-monitored contracts were awarded to Corning
Glass Corporation and Owens-Illinois, among others, to develop and supply
ceramic regenerator core materials to Chrysler; the most significant
outcome of these programs was the identification of metal aluminum
silicates as promising candidate ceramic materials for regenerator
cores. The Baseline Program (i.e., the baseline and upgraded engine
phases together) has served most importantly to bring together and
establish the status of the metallic gas turbine as a complete system, at
close to the limit of its development. Major advances are now contingent
on the successful incorporation of ceramic materials for the hot parts.
The second principal focus of government involvement has been
through support of ceramic component research at Ford Motor Company,
through two major programs.
The "Brittle Materials Design Program" which has been supported in
part by ARPA since 1972, has served as the principal focus of ceramic
hot-parts development to date (3-25). A number of stationary,
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hot-flowpath components have succesfully completed the goal of a 200-hour
durability test at temperature levels of 25000F. The principal
conclusions to emerge were: 1) for combustors, reaction bonded silicon
carbide was adjudged a leading candidate material; 2) injection-molded,
reaction-sintered silicon nitride was identified as a promising candidate
material for nose cones; 3) stators were adjudged approximately in the
same stage of development as rotors; 4) silicon nitride rotor tip shrouds
survived more than 200 hours at 19300 F, remaining in excellent
condition; 5) the leading candidate for a ceramic turbine wheel emerged
as the duo-density rotor. This concept essentially involves diffusion
bonding a reaction-sintered silicon nitride blade ring to a hot-pressed
silicon nitride hub of higher density, hence higher strength, but less
temperature resistance.
Work on the Ford "duo-density" ceramic rotor concept is ongoing and
test runs at steady 2500F temperature levels for about 25 hours have
recently been made (3-26). When viewed against the perspective of the
order of a 3500-hour lifetime endurance requirement for automotive gas
turbines with the order of 20,000 startups and shutdowns, these advances
are seen to be quite modest. Further, there are other major unanswered
questions, in particular about the reliability of brittle-material
component designs, and the manufacturing feasibility and cost of ceramic
components. Plans are under way to continue this effort through FY 1978
under NASA, Lewis Research Center, supervision (3-27).
Since 1973, Ford had been working on new chemically resistant
ceramic materials to replace the lithium aluminum silicate materials then
prevalent (3-28). In 1974, EPA joined Ford in the "Ford Regenerator
Design and Reliability Program" and the program was transferred to ERDA
in 1975 and is now under the technical direction of, and partly supported
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by, NASA. The ceramic regenerator matrix suppliers participating in the
Ford program include Corning Glass, GTE Sylvania, and others.
Considerable and encouraging progress has been made: two new promising
materials, aluminum silicate and magnesium aluminum silicate, have been
identified; the former, especially, shows excellent durability
characteristics.
Present and planned support of gas turbine research by the
Department of Energy will continue under the technical supervision of
NASA, Lewis Research Center, in three principal directions: (i) "Improved
gas turbine" development to provide the industry with the option of
initiating production engineering development of improved gas turbine
systems by 1983. The improved turbine by definition, "incorporates
near-term technology and has at least a twenty percent gain in fuel
economy over a 1976 spark-ignition engine, and compares favorably with
respect to emission, driveability, reliability, and life-cycle cost to
various alternative engines." (ii) Definition of an "advanced gas
turbine" system by 1983, described as "one which incorporates significant
advances in technology, has a fifty to sixty percent gain in fuel economy
over a 1976 spark-ignition engine, and, like the improved engine,
compares favorably with respect to emissions, driveability, reliability,
and life-cycle costs to various alternative engines." (iii) To "develop
the technology required for advanced systems in a timely manner, so that
production of these systems is possible in the 1990s" (37-27).
Project organization and approach to attain these goals contain
several elements. First is the completion of the development of the
Chysler upgraded engine in 1978. Second, conceptual design studies for
improved passenger-car gas-turbine systems are planned with several
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contractors. These comprise GM (Detroit Diesel Allison Division in
combination with the Pontiac Division), Chrysler, Ford in collaboration
with AiResearch Company, and finally, Williams Research Corporation
teamed with American Motors Corporation; the results of the initial
design studies are expected in early summer of 1978, after which further
development work through 1983 is expected to continue (3-29). Third, the
work on ceramics at Ford will continue through FY 1978, as will the
program to incorporate ceramic components into the Detroit Diesel Allison
404 engine; the study program concerning potential improvements to the
engine is now complete (3-21).
In the advanced systems definition area, a variable geometry,
single-shaft engine prototype will be characterized, probably at GM
(3-29). Related in-house studies are also planned within NASA-Lewis.
In the supporting research and technology effort, most importantly,
development of a hydromechanical continuously variable transmission
(crucial to the success of the single-shaft turbine engine) is continuing
at Orshansky Transmission Corporation (3-30), aimed at better packaging
and noise and weight reductions. Also, Mechnical Technology Incorporated
is working in coordination with the current development effort at
Chrysler on the upgraded engine, to continue testing and to verify their
hydromechanical transmission concept (3-23). Development of the
hydromechanical transmission CVT has also been carried out by General
Electric (as described by Wright [3-8]) and by Sundstrand Corporation
(3-9), the latter for commercial heavy duty vehicles.
We will conclude this discussion with a brief review of the future
plans of the Big Three vis-a-vis gas turbine research. The main focus of
gas turbine research at GM is at the Detroit Diesel Allison Division, in
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the area of heavy-duty commercial vehicles, under joint government
support. While GM appears more optimistic (reflected in their level of
internal interest and funding for this effort) about the prospects of the
gas turbine in commercial applications, the emphasis on passenger-car
gas-turbine research is relatively low. They appear, however, to be
willing to enter into government-supported research in this area (see
above). The passenger-car turbine is seen as requiring major efforts in
all areas, especially cost, durability, and fuel economy (3-31).
At Ford, the major emphasis has been on ceramic component
development and will continue to be so under cost-sharing agreements with
the government. Total system development appears to have been relegated
to second place, behind the drive for improvements realizable from
ceramics. At Ford, the single-shaft engine is seen as the likely
advanced configuration (3-11).
The consensus at Chrysler that appears to have emerged from the
Baseline Engine Program to date is that the metallic engine is not a
viable alternative candidate to the ICE. A major step to advanced
turbine engines (i.e., with ceramic rotors) seems to be favored (3-32).
The Big Three in general, believe that the potential gains
achievable by the ICE and the other engines (such as the diesel) now in
the automotive market make the potential value of the gas turbine an open
question; however, they all seem to be in favor of entering into
cost-sharing programs with the government to investigate this potential
further.
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3.2.3 Attributes of Future Automotive Gas Turbine Engines
This section will focus on the attributes of the future automotive
gas turbine. While it is clear that the attributes of the vehicle as a
whole are of ultimate interest, the relationship between engine and
vehicle systems is complex and will be taken up in Section 3.3.
We delineate the technology according to degree of development as
follows: first, the state-of-the-art gas turbine -- defined as employing
metallic parts except for the ceramic regenerator; second, we define an
"intermediate" gas turbine technology, stipulated to employ ceramic
components for all or some of the stationary hot-section parts of the
engine -- i.e., excluding the turbine rotor(s); and finally, the advanced
engine -- defined as incorporating ceramics for all hot-section parts,
including the turbine rotor.
It is important that no temporal framework has been explicitly
associated with this delineation of the technology -- the focus is
exclusively on the technology itself. The state-of-the-art metallic
engine, perhaps, comes closest to such an association -- by definition,
it represents the best of the available technology, and the available
(metallic) technology is very close to its peak of development. The
intermediate and advanced technologies, on the other hand, are presently
so inchoate as to preclude a meaningful forecast of the timing of their
availability for an introduction decision.
In addition to the preceding classification based on the stage of
development, we also identify technological options within each class,
based on the choice of engine configuration -- single-shaft or free-shaft.
Ostensibly, this leaves us with six different engine types to
consider; however, the number may be reduced to four in view of the
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following considerations. First, no state-of-the-art metallic,
single-shaft automotive turbine prototypes are extant. Any single-shaft
prototypes that are built and developed to a level adequate for
introduction into the market will almost cerainly incorporate some
ceramic hot parts at least. This conclusion precludes us from
considering a metallic single-shaft configuration as we have defined it.
Second, we also neglect the advanced free-shaft technology, based on
consensus from industry (3-11 and 3-31, 32) and our own judgment; the
successful development of an advanced engine requires a major, risky, and
protracted effort to develop ceramic hot running parts, i.e. the turbine
rotor. The magnitude of this effort is probably much greater and less
certain than that needed to successfully develop the single-shaft turbine
configuration with a CVT. If and when an advanced single-shaft
configuration (with CVT) is developed it will certainly show advantages
over a comparable free-shaft engine on the important attributes as
indicated by Table 3.1. We therefore consider the single-shaft engine as
the only (or almost certainly so) viable advanced configuration.
Prior to consideration of the engine attributes, the technology
delineations made above will be described more precisely. We will limit
the description to the major components, those which it is felt largely
determine engine attributes. The metallic engine, as mentioned earlier,
is a free-shaft design; it incorporates: (1) all-metal technology,
except for the ceramic regenerator; (2) a radial compressor with variable
inlet guide vanes and backward-bladed impeller; (3) a fixed (possibly
variable) geometry combustor using premix/prevaporization combustion
techniques; (4) axial (possibly radial) flow superalloy turbine, and (5)
axial-flow superalloy power turbine with variable inlet nozzles. This
configuration corresponds roughly to the Chrysler upgraded engine.
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The intermediate gas turbine engine is defined as one that employs
ceramics for some or all hot-section stationary parts. Successful
stationary ceramic hot parts development is expected to precede ceramic
turbine rotor development to a degree sufficient to make this a distinct
technological configuration. Potential replacements of ceramics for
metal parts would include the turbine shroud rings, combustor lining and
scroll, gas generator turbine nozzle, variable power turbine nozzle
blades, and transition ducting (3-25). The switch to ceramic parts is,
however, likely to call for major design changes rather than just simple
replacement.
The advanced gas turbine engine is defined as employing ceramics for
all hot-section parts, including the turbine rotor. This will certainly
lead to major mechanical design changes and attribute differences.
Having characterized the technology in this fashion, we may proceed
to examine the attribute status of the various engine configurations. We
will begin with the attributes of the metallic turbine engine and then
proceed to examine the attributes of the others, focusing principally on
the potential of these engines to deal with the shortcomings of the
metallic engine. Table 3.1 summarizes the attribute status of the
various gas-turbine configurations with the present ICE as reference.
First, we consider the efficiency of the metallic engine. By
efficiency, we mean brake efficiency measured at the output of the
transmission. A single, unqualified, numerical value for this attribute
is of little validity. Brake efficiency is dependent on numerous
factors, namely: (i) turbine inlet temperature; (ii) component
efficiencies; (iii) engine operating point (or engine and transmission
operating characteristics) to name only a few. The estimates given in
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Table 3.1 may be taken as a crude bracketing of the efficiency of the
turbine relative to the present ICE. The deterioration of efficiency
with part-load is generally worse for the gas turbine than for the ICE
and this is, in fact, a major drawback of the turbine, leading to poor
fuel economy under the part-load conditions prevalent in normal driving
patterns. The efficiency of the metallic engine, roughly representative
of the (yet unattained) goals of the Chyrsler Upgraded Engine, is about
the same as the present ICE but could be slightly better or worse. It is
important to remember that we compare a laboratory turbine engine with a
production ICE. It is unclear how a production version of the turbine
would compare with the ICE.
Specific weight is a function of engine size or overall scale.
hence a single specific weight value cannot be truly representative of
the entire size range. The interpretation of numerical values given for
these attributes in Table 3.1 must be tempered accordingly. The specific
role of the efficiency and specific power attributes are brought out in
more detail in the discussion of the vehicle-engine interaction in the
next section. The specific weight of the metallic engine (based on the
Chrysler upgraded engine) is somewhat better than the present ICE.
However, it is possible that an actual production version could realize
some marginal improvements in specific weight.
Attributes such as driveability, noise, vibration, and safety,
compare satisfactorily with the ICE, if not actually better. The best
evidence for this stems perhaps from the consumer reactions to the
Chrysler and Ford pilot gas turbine vehicle introduction programs (see
Section 3.2.2): while some dissatisfaction with standing start response
was recorded, the low-noise and vibrationless characteristics of the
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turbine seemed especially to be appreciated. As for response, the
indications are that this has since improved substantially, in the
Chrysler Upgraded Engine.
One of the imporant factors favoring the gas turbine engine is its
excellent emissions characteristics. The legislated research goal 0.4
gm/mile NOx limit remains largely elusive. However it is not viewed as
being critical: first, because the problem appears to be solveable,
although perhaps at some penalty in cost and combustor complexity;
second, fuel economy improvements will help alleviate the problem since
emissions per mile vary inversely with fuel economy; and finally, the
legislated NOx standard can be expected to reflect the capabilities of
the ICE, for which the problem of NOx control is much more acute.
To sum up then, the status of the above attributesl appears
satisfactory; any deficiences that may exist are dwarfed by the high
initial cost. The actual cost of the metallic engine is very difficult
to estimate. There are numerous unavoidable sources of uncertainty --
the new and as yet unoptimized (for production) engine technology, poor
knowledge of mass-production methods, especially for gas turbine
superalloy components, disagreement as to the appropriate costing
methodology, etc. The initial cost data shown are compiled from
available studies both within and without the automotive industry and the
wide spread may be viewed as a consequence of the different ways in which
the various groups have coped with these uncertainties. Very roughly,
the cost of the metallic engine varies from 2 to 3 times the cost of an
ICE of comparable power. We do not deal here with the initial cost
1Not referring to efficiency and specific weight, discussed earlier.
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comparison for engines with comparable vehicle performance, but will
choose to address this in detail in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Note also that
these cost comparisons depend strongly on overall scale and assumed
production levels for the gas turbine.
We will now consider the key attributes (efficiency, specific
weight, initial cost) of the intermediate and advanced engines. Our
approach will be to examine how these advanced technologies are likely to
differ in these attributes from the metallic engine. Almost no estimates
of the efficiency and specific power of the intermediate engine can be
uncovered from the literature, and we have had to resort to engineering
judgments. The efficiency is most importantly affected by turbine inlet
temperature; since the latter is subject to the materials limit of the
metallic turbine rotor, which is common to both metallic and intermediate
configurations by definition, the efficiency is not likely to be much
better. Schultz (3-25) estimates on the order of ten percentage points
improvement in efficiency due to stationary ceramic hot parts. The
potential for weight reduction from the sustitution of ceramics for the
metallic hot-section parts is also unclear. There is some indication
that the scope for improvement is small (3-33). Specific weight is not
likely to improve substantially.
The attributes of the intermediate single-shaft engine are equally
uncertain, but we have made crude estimates based on comparisons between
metallic single-shaft and free-shaft configurations (3-2). Roughly,
improvements of the order of 10% over the intermediate free-shaft engine
in efficiency and specific weight are estimated.
The efficiency as well as the specific weight of the advanced engine
have the potential to be substanially better -- a consequence of the
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higher operating temperatures permitted by a ceramic rotor -- but this
potential is very uncertain. The scalability of the advanced engine,
especially in sizes below about 100 hp, is a major issue (3-34). The
decrease in size with higher operating temperatures could negate much of
the efficiency improvement arising fom such temperatures, principally
because of increased aerodynamic losses. On the other hand, efficiency
of the gas turbine is also dependent on the ambient temperature, which
affects the density of the intake air. Most available technology studies
assume ambient temperatures (about 75-1000 F) that are considerably
higher than the national average ambient temperature, around 56F.
Since the performance of the gas turbine improves with decreasing ambient
temperature, some credit must be attributed to the gas turbine on this
score. The improvement in efficiency has been estimated to be of the
order of 5% (3-21, p. 34). Although this estimate applies to heavy-duty
engines for commercial use, it is sufficient to convey the magnitude of
the improvement involved. The efficiency improvement of the advanced
turbine over the metallic turbine could be from roughly 30% to 60%. The
specific weight improvement is also uncertain, but could be around 30%
less than the metallic turbine.
Emissions control of the advanced engine will become more difficult
with the higher operating temperatures, which aggravate NO emissions.
On the other hand, combustor design may be expected to advance, hopefully
coping with this problem. The ceramic turbine rotors, lighter than their
superalloy counterparts, may be expected to contribute to improved
acceleration response.
The initial cost decrease realizable from ceramics (whether in the
context of the intermediate or advanced engines) is extremely uncertain
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at this stage. The already formidable task of initial cost estimation
for the metallic engine is compounded by the embryonic nature of ceramics
technology. So far, only the material cost of ceramics exists as conrete
data: ceramics are at least an order of magnitude cheaper than the
expensive superalloys they will replace; and what is more important, but
less clearly quantifiable in terms of benefits, available domestically in
abundance. However, the extent to which this cost reduction will be
reflected in the finished component in production stituations is unclear.
We will now quickly summarize the status of the gas turbine engine,
beginning with the metallic turbine. Apart from the key attributes of
initial cost and efficiency, the engine appears satisfactory, if not
better, on all other counts. The initial cost is considerably higher and
the engine efficiency is uncertain, but close to that of the present
ICE. The intermediate, free-shaft engine is likely to have values of all
attributes (except efficiency, which may be somewhat higher) about the
same as the metallic engine. The intermediate, single-shaft engine is
likely to have some improvement over the intermediate free-shaft in
specific weight and efficiency and also in initial cost, contingent on
the availability of a continuously variable transmission (CVT). The
advanced single-shaft engine has uncertain potential for substantial
improvement in the key attributes of initial cost, efficiency, and
specific power; it may have a problem with controlling NOx emissions to
the 0.4 gm/mi statutory "research goal;" but has satisfactory values of
other attributes.
3.2.4 The ICE Baseline
In the preceding sections we have explored at some length the status
of gas turbine technology at various levels of development. The
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attributes were assessed relative to the present, or contemporary ICE:
the status of the latter is well known and provides a sound basis for
comparison. In this subsection, we shall deal briefly with the character
and dynamics of the baseline. A more detailed but somewhat dated
treatment of this subject may be found in Federal Support (3-1, Chap. 4).
The ICE has been the globally dominant automotive powerplant since
the early 1900s, supported by a vast, well established and sophisticated
production, distribution, and service infrastructure. Further, the
industry has maintained an impressive and continuing record of
improvements in almost all aspects of the technology.
Two critical impediments now raise concern over the future of the
baseline technology: emissions standards and fuel economy goals.
Uncertainty regarding the future levels of these standards compounds the
situation. Since the alternative automotive powerplants are unlikely to
be in mass production before the mid-1980s, it is evident that a
realistic evaluation of the gas turbine must be based on the available
ICE in this future time frame. This forces us to consider the movement
of the baseline from the present through this future.
The tremendous development resources available for the ICE, coupled
with intensive ongoing efforts to adapt the ICE to the perceived needs of
the 1980s make substantial improvements in the conventional automobile
likely, with the main thrusts directed toward improving emissions and
fuel economy. Unfortunately for the ICE, these are conflicting goals. A
full discussion of the various technological devices and concepts under
development to improve emissions and fuel economy can be found in Federal
Support (3-1, Chap. 4) and'elsewhere. Our aim here will be to focus on
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areas of improvement in the engine alone that can lead to increased
engine efficiency and to roughly quantify the magnitude of this
improvement.
The need for isolating potential improvements in the engine alone is
clear: vehicle fuel economy gains are likely to be realized through
improvements, in the ICE design and also unrelated to the ICE. Unrelated
effects include changes in vehicle aerodynamic characteristics, weight,
tire design, etc. However, improvements in vehicle fuel economy due to
these effects would apply equally to a vehicle powered by a gas turbine
as to one powered by an ICE. It is principally improvements in vehicle
fuel economy due to changes in the ICE alone that will affect the
relative value of the engines.
A breakdown of the possible engine changes leading to improved fuel
economy without any emissions penalty is given in Federal Support (3-1,
Table 4.2). A similar, more recent cataloging of possible engine changes
leading to improved fuel economy by Withrow and Franceschina (3-35)
includes combustion chamber development providing for more efficient
combustion, more compression-induced turbulence, variable valve timing,
intake manifold improvements, use of electronically controlled fuel
injection systems, optimizing of engine controls such as air-fuel ratio,
EGR, and spark timing under all operating conditions, etc.
As mentioned earlier, improvements in fuel economy realizable from
engine modifications have to be traded off against losses due to tighter
emissions standards. Any estimates of fuel economy gains carry implicit
assumptions about emissions levels. The emissions levels that will
obtain in the mid-1980s time frame are not known with certainty. We will
assume that the legislated 1981 standards (0.41/3.4/1 HC/CO/NO gm/mi)
x m/i
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will carry over into this period. The actual emissions levels will
probably be at least as tight as these, so that the fuel economy gains
for the ICE predicated on these standards might be somewhat on the
optimistic side. A crude estimate of the potential fuel economy changes
due to engine improvements by 1985 at the assumed emissions levels can be
obtained from Federal Support (3-1, Fig. 4.1., p. 111). The 1981
emissions levels are not represented, but relative to the 1977 ICE, a
fuel economy penalty ranging from 5% to 15% can be interpolated. We now
believe this to have been overly pessimistic by approximately 10%, so
that the 1985 ICE may be from 5% inferior to 5% superior to the 1977 ICE,
in efficiency, at 1981 and 1977 emission standards, respectively. This
is roughly consistent with the predictions of Withrow and Franceschina
(3-35), and others.
We have made the point in Section 3.2.3 that the continuously
variable transmission (CVT) is required for the single-shaft engine. It
is also important to recognize that this could result in major
improvements in the efficiency of the ICE powerplant (3-30) and
consequently, fuel economy. The impact of the CVT on the other
attributes of the baseline engine is uncertain, but the indications are
that there will be no significant increase in weight compared to the
conventional automotive transmission and the cost increment, although
uncertain, is probably not considerable. Our focus on CVTs will be
confined mainly to the realization that advantages of the development of
a CVT for a single-shaft turbine will also apply to the ICE.
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3.3 Analytical Framework for Economic Analysis of the Gas Turbine Engine
3.3.1 Conceptual Background
In Section 3.3.2 following we develop a simple, quantitative model
for comparing automotive powerplants. In later sections (3.4 and 3.5) we
apply it to a comparison of the gas turbine and the ICE under various
circumstances. Our goal here is to develop a framework which is as
simple as possible, which captures the important effects of the
differences in attributes between the gas turbine and the ICE, and yet
which is no more detailed than is justified by the uncertainties in the
available input data -- especially the forecasts of the attributes of the
two systems and the other key exogenous parameters (in particular, fuel
prices). The purpose of the framework is not a conclusive comparison of
the two systems -- for as we shall see, this is impossible -- but rather
it is for analyzing the reasonable extent and direction of the
government's role in supporting R&D in this area.
The basic methodological issues in comparing automotive powerplants
are discussed adequately in Federal Support (3-1, Sects. 3.3, 3.5 and
5.3) and will not be reviewed in detail here. The work by MIT (3-1), JPL
(3-2), and Rand (3-36) remain the important contributions in this area;
little of methodological interest has been published since these three
works were published one and one-half to two and one-half years ago. In
the present effort we continue the basic approach previously used in
those three efforts. This may be summarized as a comparison of
life-cycle costs of vehicles using different engines, where the following
key vehicle parameters are held constant at exogenously specified
levels: internal compartment volume, acceleration, and emissions.
Vehicle structure (i.e., weight), engine design power, and fuel type are
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allowed to vary across engines. Cost minimization is especially
appropriate for the present study as it constitutes a reasonable
normative goal for government-supported R&D programs (3-1, Sect. 3.5).
As discussed in Federal Support (3-1, Sect. 5.3.1), vehicle acceleration
and emissions should properly be calculated endogenously, as they in fact
result from something approaching optimizing behavior and their marginal
costs are quite different between engines; however, lack of data on the
demand (marginal value) side makes this impossible at present.
The model used here is an extension in substance and style of that
used in the previous MIT effort on the Stirling engine. That powerplant
could reasonably be assumed to have approximately the same specific
weight (engine weight per unit of power) as the ICE and a similar
power-speed characteristic; thus equal vehicle performance implied equal
engine power, so that vehicle cost difference equalled engine cost
difference, and the ratio of vehicle fuel economies was the ratio of
engine efficiencies. An extremely simple vehicle cost model was
therefore acceptable.
Here we extend that basic model, but in the simplest possible
manner, to account for the gas turbine's advantage in specific weight and
in power-speed characteristic relative to the ICE as they affect the
engine/vehicle system configuration. The economic value of the
gas-turbine, relative to the ICE, is calculated for an individual
vehicle. It is a function principally of the extensive properties of the
fixed "baseline" vehicle (weight and fuel consumption), the intensive
attributes of the ICE and the gas-turbine engines (efficiency,
power-specific weight, power-specific initial cost, and a parameter
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characterizing the power-speed characteristic), and fuel prices (gasoline
price, social premium on fuel, price difference between baseline and
gas-turbine fuels).
As will be apparent, our model makes drastic simplifications for the
preservation of computational simplicity and analytical clarity.
However, it will be seen that, for the purpose at hand, the model
exploits the data available to us to the maximum extent justifiable. The
results establish the rough range of the possible benefits of the
availability of the gas turbine engine, and the factors upon which those
benefits are dependent. Where detailed guidance for project management
is the goal, then original and detailed technical analysis is
appropriate; our goals are quite different.
A major continuing difficulty in this (and other) powerplant
analyses is the choice of a "baseline," or the system against which all
new engines must compete, at least analytically. With the recent
introduction of the diesel into the passenger car marketplace by General
Motors, and the serious consideration of a similar move with the open
chamber stratified charge system by Ford, it is no longer adequate to
just attempt to forecast the future attributes of the ICE. Further, we
will be examining the potential role of gas turbine engines using
ceramics for hot parts, and thus our time horizon extends beyond the
mid-1980s. Nevertheless we will compare future gas turbines with our
estimate of the mid-1980s ICE. We do this because it is not clear
whether beyond that time there is much to be gained by the ICE or similar
systems (the diesel or stratified charge). In this sense we use the same
1985 baseline to refer more generally to the ICE or similar systems at
even more distant dates. To the extent that this is incorrect, we
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have erred in favor of the gas turbine. Thus, accompanying the following
calculations there is an implicit case where the "baseline" system makes
much greater improvements than we admit in our presented results, and
which thereby makes the gas turbine valueless under all circumstances.
We consider this an unlikely occurrence.
Difficulties in dealing with emissions as an engine attribute are
essentially related to the baseline. It remains the case that the
"original 1976" statutory emissions goals (.41/3.4/.4 HC/CO/NOx gm/mi),
are the most stringent in sight, that the gas turbine can meet them
fairly readily, and the ICE can meet them only with sacrifices in cost
and efficiency. At the present time the most stringent legislated goals
are .41/3.4/1.0 for model year 1981 and thereafter, and indications are
that these standards will be attained by ICE-powered vehicles (see
Chapter 2 above). Thus there will likely be little difference in
emissions between future powerplants. We have incorporated the
efficiency loss and initial cost increase due to these standards in our
ICE baseline projections. The lower NOx emissions of the gas turbine
have no measurable health impact (3-37, p. 16), so no credit will be
given for this in the social economic calculations to follow.
Continuous combustion systems have the desirable property of being
able to burn almost any liquid or gaseous fuel (and possibly even
pulverized coal). This seems a desirable attribute in light of the
foreseeable evolution of the energy system, as conventional petroleum
becomes depleted and synthetics take its place in uses where liquids are
especially highly valued, as in transportation. However, whatever the
ultimate source of the liquid fuels used by transport systems, it is
unlikely to be the case that any given vehicle will operate during its
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lifetime on more than one type of fuel (or, at worst, a gas turbine or
other flexible system would be modified once during its lifetime to
accommodate a change in fuels). The highly refined gasoline required by
the ICE can be produced from almost any of the potential synthetic crude
oils. Thus the value of fuel flexibility is nothing more, or less, than
the value of the ability to burn a fuel which is less expensive than
gasoline. This is accounted for in the simple model below.
In consonance with the basic style of our analysis, we will perform
our economic calculations for a single vehicle size only. We have chosen
a compact class vehicle representative of those likely to dominate the
American automotive fleet of the future. Consideration of the diverse
range of vehicle classes, or of the diversity of driving patterns, would
add little substance to our results.
3.3.2 A Simple Vehicle Total Operating Model
A simple calculation procedure (model) is developed here for
comparing the "total lifetime operating cost" (defined here to include
initial outlay minus scrap recovery and direct operating costs) of a
vehicle equipped with an alternative power plant to one having a
conventional ("baseline") Internal Combustion Engine (ICE). Although the
model developed here is similar in basic approach to the one developed in
Federal Support (3-1, Section 5.3.1.2) it is more general, being
applicable to any powerplant given quantitative values of the relevant
engine attributes (to be identified below). The model is somewhat more
versatile, bringing out more clearly the role of these key attributes in
determining total operating costs, and allows us to investigate
trade-offs other than just those between initial powerplant cost and
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efficiency attributes as in the original study. First, the physical
configurations of the alternative powerplant and ICE vehicle systems are
established with the ICE-powered vehicle, and with what are considered to
be appropriate consumer acceptance criteria as a starting point. Second,
an equation for determining the total lifetime operating cost associated
with these configurations is formulated.
As discussed above, the style of our analysis will be one of drastic
simplification. The purpose of this model is to crudely estimate in
economic terms the benefits available from an alternative powerplant, and
the key dependencies and uncertainties of those benefits. Detail is
retained in the model only as necessary to adequately meet this purpose.
System Configuration
First, we will establish a consistent basis for comparison of engine
technologies by defining "powerplants" to include the engine and all
auxiliaries such as fans, radiator, generator, battery, cooling systems,
emission controls (if any) and transmission. Thus all elements of the
automobile exogenous to the powerplant are common to all technologies.1
Before attempting to estimate the total operating costs and benefits
associated with alternative powerplants, it is necessary to establish the
total powerplant-vehicle system configuration; we limit our description
of system configuration to the principal extensive powerplant attributes
-- power and weight, and the major vehicle attribute -- weight. The
Note that we may subsequently sometimes loosely use the term "engine"
(as we have done previously in Section 3.2.3) but in the same sense as
the powerplant defined above.
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comparison between the ICE and alternative powerplant cannot be made
arbitrarily; configurational differences will be determined on vehicles
with comparable acceleration performance.
The first two of the inputs to the analysis will be the following
intensive powerplant attributes: (i) power-speed characteristic and (ii)
specific weight (powerplant weight per design horsepower). From these
two attributes, powerplant configuration will first be established. The
vehicle configuration will then follow by the weight-propagation effect.
There is more than one way to characterize vehicle performance, and
none does so completely. Quantitatively, the performance is variously
described in terms of distance covered from standing start in a given
time, time taken to attain a specified velocity from standing start, or
time (distance) to go from a highway cruising speed to passing speed. We
shall opt here (although it is not entirely clear that this is the best
option) to use the most common measure of performance, namely 0 - 60 mph
acceleration time. The performance criterion can then be specified
abstractly in terms of the parameter pair -- (Vo, to) -- where Vo
is the final velocity at the end of the acceleration mode and to is the
time duration of this mode.
We now attempt to determine roughly the relation between engine
power and vehicle weight. The major components of the load on the engine
are inertia load, rolling friction, and aerodynamic drag. Aerodynamic
drag power is a cubic function of vehicle velocity and thus is most
significant at higher speeds. We choose to neglect it during the 0 - 60
mph acceleration mode to preserve analytical simplicity. A simple
correction for this nontrivial, but not crucial, effect will be
introduced below.
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The power required during the acceleration mode is
Pi = (WV/g) (dV/dt) + i WV (1)
where
Pi = total instantaneous power demand (hp)
W = inertial vehicle weight (lb)
V = instantaneous vehicle velocity (mph)
t = time from standing start (s)
0( = tire coefficient (hp/lb-mph)
g = acceleration due to gravity (ft/s 2)
The above differential equation sums up the inertial and rolling
friction power requirements in the acceleration mode. In order to con-
fine ourselves to a closed form solution, we replace dV/dt by the time--
averaged acceleration Vo/to, which is expected to be most closely
representative of the instantaneous acceleration at the midpoint of the
acceleration period; we further assume the velocity to be about its ave-
rage value (Vo/2) at this time so that an "average" power, Pa can be
estimated as
PPa = (W/2) (V2/gt +V o )a
or
Pa/W = Ka (2)
where
Ka = (Vo/2) ( Vo/gto +o() (2a)
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The quantity'Ka can be regarded as an "acceleration parameter," crudely
summarizing the dynamics of the acceleration mode.
The discussion so far has been concerned strictly with the power
required by the vehicle. We now turn to the power available from the
engine and its relationship to vehicle kinematics. This relationship
plays a significant role in determining the design horsepower of the
engine, as JPL (3-2, p. 10-4) has demonstrated.
The power that the enginel can deliver at a certain vehicle road
speed is determined by two factors: (i) the power that the engine can
deliver at a certain engine rpm, and (ii) the manner in wich the
transmission and drivetrain system relates engine rpm to vehicle road
speed. The first of these factors depends on engine design and is also
specific to engine type. The second factor is a characteristic of the
transmission and drivetrain system, and insofar as all engines are
constrained to have the same transmission, is independent of engine type
(the single-shaft gas turbine, which requires a continuously variable
transmission is an important exception and we shall deal explicitly with
it in Section 3.4). For the purpose of establishing powerplant and
vehicle configuration from acceleration performance criteria, we deal
with the maximum power that the engine can deliver at any given
engine-rpm.
A complete representation of the two distinct (i.e., (i) engine and
(ii) transmission and drivetrain) characteristics would take the form of
1Strictly speaking, and confined only to this discussion of the
power-speed characteristics, we refer to "engine" excluding the
transmission, and to engine rpm before the transmission, while we refer
to the powerplant as defined earlier, that is, including the transmission.
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functional relationships. However, consistent with the very limited
level of detail we wish to retain in this analysis we will make a gross
simplification which will, however, capture in a rough sense, the
importance of these characteristics.
First, recall that in equation (2) we estimated an "average" power
during the acceleration mode at an average velocity (for our
assumed 0-60 mph acceleration mode, this average value is 30 mph). For a
conventional 3-speed automatic transmission, the engine rpm is about 65%
of the rpm corresponding to peak or design horsepower, Rand (3-36, p.
12). We can also estimate, from available curves of normalizedl engine
horsepower versus normalized engine rpm, a value for the ratio of the
design horsepower to that at 65% of design speed. A "power-speed"
parameter 0 is defined accordingly, as given below:
= 1/P* (3)
where P* is the normalized horsepower at a normalized engine rpm value
of 0.65. The parameter a is the first intensive engine attribute input
to our model, and since its definition is consistent with the conditions
underlying our earlier estimate of an "average" power from equation (2),
we may combine equations (2) and (3) as follows
Pa/P C P*
"'Normalized" implies that the relevant quantity (such as horsepower, or
rpm) is expressed relative to its design value.
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where P is the design horsepower. Then,
P/W = K (4)
Thus, the acceleration parameter K and the power-speed
parameter, , combine to determine the design power-to-weight ratio.
This equation in its present form is inadequate, even given the
assumptions and simplifications that led up to it. It diverges from
reality in several respects. Not only is the actual relationship a more
complicated one, but each key simplification tends to result in an
underestimate of design horsepower. To attempt to characterize these
effects rigorously would vastly increase the complexity of the analysis;
our approach, therefore will be to estimate the import of these factors,
listed below. These estimates will be used to roughly correct the value
of P from equation (4) and are roughly consistent with similar estimates
given by Hurter ((3-38, p. 5); also refer to (3-39 through 3-44)).
First, inefficiencies in the transmission and drivetrain will reduce
power availability -- a loss of 10% to 15% of design power is typical;
second, auxiliary and accessory power requirements -- a 10% to 15% margin
is estimated on this account; third, and finally, aerodynamic drag and
grade effects are assigned a 10% to 15% margin. The above effects add up
to roughly 40% of the design power. An overall factor, $ = 0.6 is used
to upgrade our estimate of design power from (L). g mav be recognized
It is also recognized that should vary with engine type, but
probably not significantly, so that we elect to use the same value for
all engines.
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as the fraction of design power reaching the wheels. Then, from
equation (4):
P/W = (1/) Ka (5)
It may be mentioned that the calculations of powerplant
configuration that follow in Section 3.4 roughly validate this
formulation by giving us power-to-weight ratios for the ICE that agree
with those for current ICE automobiles (3-45, p. 7).
Equation (5) is the first of our equations for establishing the
(extensive) engine-vehicle configuration. We now turn to the role of
another engine attribute, specific weight, in determining this
configuration. We seek to relate powerplant weight to engine design
horsepower. Available studies do this in various ways; both linear as
well as nonlinear relationships have been used. For our purposes, a
simple proportionality constant is judged adequate:
W = wP (6)
where
W = powerplant weight (lb)
w = specific weight (lb/hp).
It is recognized that changes in powerplant weight due to any reason
whatsoever (from modifications within engine type to entire replacement
with a different engine type) should be reflected in the weight of the
nonpropulsive (i.e., excluding the powerplant) vehicle, which is
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consistent with the fact that the vehicle provides structural support for
the powerplant. The weight propagation factor quantifies the change in
the total vehicle weight resulting from a unit change in powerplant
weight. JPL (3-2, p. 10-3) has accounted for the effect of differing
engine specific weights (across engine types) on the weight propagation
factor. However, a preliminary analysis indicates that this effect is
well within the error limits of our analysis. We therefore adopt a
weight propagation factor that is independent of engine type, defined as:
dW/dWp k
or
W = kWp + KW (7)
where k is the weight propagation factor.1 The constant KW is
independent of engine type, has the dimension of weight, and may be
determined from relatively well-established baseline data.2 ,3
1See Wright (3-46, p. 858) for a similar treatment of, and JPL (3-2, p.
10-3) for a more detailed approach to, weight propagation.
2This actually assumes that the baseline ICE is optimal in the sense
that there is no needless weight or power. It is seen as a fairly
reasonable assumption, in view of the long evolutionary development of
the baseline.
3In Section 3.5.2, we shall also adapt the model to conditions where no
weight propagation might result.
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Equations (5), (6), and (7) form the basis for the determination of
powerplant configuration; from these it is possible to obtain very easily
the following equations expressing system configuration in terms of
intensive engine attributes:
W = /( - k Ka w/) (8)
P = KWI( Ka/)/(1 - k Ka w/ ) (9)
Wp = KW(0Ka w/f)/(l - kRa w/) (10)
It may be noted that the quantity ( Ka w/ ) represents the ratio of
powerplant to vehicle weight.
Initial Cost
The initial cost comparison between the alternative powerplant and
the ICE must necessarily be made on a vehicle basis. On the other hand,
our ultimate objective is to focus on powerplant attributes -- which, in
this case, means the initial cost of the powerplant alone. To start
with, the total vehicle initial cost is expressed as follows:
v + Ip (11)
where
I = initial cost of the powerplant,
v = initial cost associated with the rest of the vehicle
(nonpropulsive vehicle), and
I = initial cost of the entire vehicle.
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It is possible to crudely estimate Iv as being proportional to the
weight of the nonpropulsive portion of the vehicle. This allows us to
focus conveniently on the initial cost of the powerplant itself. Thus:
Iv = Cv(W' - Wp) (12)
where cv is the cost per pound of nonpropulsive vehicle. W' is the
curb weight, taken to be inertial weight W, less 300 lbs.
At this stage we introduce the intensive engine attribute, "i," the
power-specific initial cost of the power plant. Thus,
i = I/p (13)
Equations (12) and (13) allow us to express the total initial cost of the
entire vehicle entirely in terms of intensive engine attributes.
At this stage, however, we shall not introduce all the intensive
attributes, but express the initial cost in a simpler form, using the
extensive attributes W, P, and Wp (recalling that these are expressible
explicitly in terms of the intensive attributes according to equations
(8) through (10)). Combining (11), (12), and (13),
I = iP + c (W - Wp) (14)
v p
Further, the initial cost difference between the alternative powerplant
and the baseline ICE may be expressed as
I = A(iP) + cv A(W - Wp) (15)
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where x = x - x, where x stands for alternative powerplant attribute
and the zero subscript indicates the corresponding baseline attribute,
here, and in all subsequent discussions.
Using equation (7)
AI = A(iP) + (1 - 1/k)cV W (16)
Finally, we also define a comparative measure of specific initial
cost relative to the baseline:
r i = i/i o (17)
Wechoose to deal with specific initial cost, since it allows us to ignore
scale effects for not too large variations in scale.
Fuel Economy
Fuel economy (or its reciprocal, fuel consumption) is an attribute
of the engine-vehicle system. Engine attributes, system configuration,
vehicle dynamics (dependent on driving cycle), and controlled design
parameters (air fuel ratio or compression ratio, for instance), even
ambient conditions, all affect fuel economy. The interrelationships
between these factors are very complex. There is, however, no doubt that
the single intensive engine characteristic that most directly determines
fuel economy is the engine brake specific fuel consumption (BSFC)
characteristic, which expresses the fuel consumption rate per unit power
output at any point in the operating range of the engine. The BSFC is a
direct measure of engine brake efficiency, according to a reciprocal
relationship.
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Apart from this engine attribute, a second crucial factor affecting
fuel economy is the extensive system configuration, most conveniently
expressed as vehicle weight (3-47). The fuel economy appears to vary
more or less proportionately with vehicle weight, other factors remaining
unaltered (3-45, 47) -- a conclusion supported analytically.
We will consider these two factors within the simple framework of
our approach. We are specifically interested in the effect of engine
efficiency and in the effect of weight changes (due to the differing
specific weight and power-speed characteristic of the alternative
powerplants) on fuel economy. We thus construct the following simple
relation
F KF (WI ) (18)
where
F = fuel consumption (gallons per mile)
E = a crude average efficiency estimate over the Federal
Composite Driving Cycle
KF = a (dimensional) constant that includes the effect of those
factors other than total vehicle weight and efficiency,
such as the particular driving cycle, aerodynamic drag,
tire friction, etc. which affect fuel economy.
The factors embodied in KF may be assumed largely independent of
powerplant type. Consequent on this assumption, it is expedient to
factor out the constant KF and deal only with fuel-economy ratios as
represented below.
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= Fo/F = r (Wo/W)I 0 C w0 w (19)
where
= ratio of fuel economy of alternative-powerplant-powered vehicle
to that of the ICE vehicle of comparable performance, and
= ratio of the average efficiency of the alternative powerplant
to that of the ICE.
It must be realized that this treatment is a very crude
simplification. The effect of the numerous engine-vehicle design
variables that affect engine efficiency are not considered -- but it is
nonetheless consistent with our initial assumption that we consider only
optimally designed engines; here, we may interpret this to mean that
these design parameters are controlled to provide the best possible
engine BSFC characteristic and consequently, optimum efficiency.
Vehicle Total Operating Costs
We choose a representative vehicle class and compute the total
operating costs for this class. An equation for the average total cost
per mile was developed in Federal Support (3-1, pp. 154-155). We will
present the equation below with this brief note. The total cost is
averaged through the vehicle's life using a single average vehicle
lifetime and an average annual vehicle mileage assumed invariant over
time (for comparisons in the future). Thus
C = T/M = (A/M)I + pF + V (20)
where
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T = total annual average vehicle operating cost (¢)
I = initial vehicle purchase price ()
A = annualized fraction of capital cost
V = vehicle total operating cost other than fuel and capital
costs, i.e., maintenance, insurance, oil, etc., all
calculated on a per-mile basis (¢/mi).
p = price of fuel (/gal)
F = vehicle fuel consumption (gal/mile)
M = average annual vehicle miles traveled
C = total operating cost (¢/mi).
The annualized fraction of capital cost, A, is defined below.
A = r(( + r)L -)/((1 + r)L - 1) (21)
where
r = relevant interest rate; and
= fraction of initial value received for salvage at the end
of the vehicle life.
Equation (20) is applicable to any automobile in general,
independent of powerplant type. We now introduce powerplant-vehicle
system characteristics, using equations (14) and (18).
C = (A/M)(iP) + (A/M)c(W' - W) + P(KF W/) + V (22)
where, once again, it may be recalled that the extensive system
attributes W, P, and Wp are expressible in terms of the intensive
powerplant attributes according to equations (8) through (10).
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The first term in the above equation constitutes the amortized
fraction of powerplant cost; the second, the amortized fraction of
nonpropulsive vehicle costs; the third, fuel costs; and finally, the
other operating costs per mile. This last is a very uncertain quantity
for the alternative powerplants; service experience with them is
virtually nonexistent. The indications are, however, that the
maintenance requirements will, at worst, be the same as those for the ICE.
It is evident that the status of the alternative powerplants is
meaningful only in comparison to that of the ICE. This highlights the
importance of the economic benefit associated with the alternative
powerplant over the ICE, if any. A positive benefit may be said to
accrue when the total operating cost for the alternative powerplant is
less than that for the baseline. The total operating benefit, "B," may
be defined on this basis:
B = C - C = - AC (23)
This benefit may also be expressed as follows (via equation (20))
B = -(A/M)AI - (pF) - AV (24)
Thus it is composed of an initial cost difference, a fuel-consumption
benefit, and a maintenance benefit. In accordance with our earlier
discussion with respect to "V," the associated benefit is
(conservatively) set to zero. Thus
B = -(A/M) I - (pF) (25)
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Before proceeding further, we shall quickly summarize the factors
that determine the benefits. These benefits are a function of (i) the
intensive technical engine attributes (of both the alternative powerplant
and baseline ICE) namely, the power-speed characteristic, specific
weight, efficiency, and specific initial cost; (ii) the extensive
baseline system configuration chosen as a reference, represented by the
vehicle inertial weight and fuel economy (note: the comparable
alternative system configurations are incrementally derived from the
baseline reference, using the intensive attributes listed in (i)); (ii)
economic inputs, namely fuel prices, interest rate on initial cost, and
cost per pound of nonpropulsive vehicle, and finally, (iv) exogenous
factors such as annual average vehicle miles traveled and vehicle
lifetime.
The total operating benefits may this be expressed by the following
equation, using equations (16), (17), and (19) in (25)
B - (AIM)ioPo( - ri(P/po))
+ (A/M)Cv(1 - l/k)Wo(1 - W/Wo)
+ PoFo(1 - (1/r. )(W/Wo))
0+Fop(l/r )(W/W0 ) (26)
where, from equation (8),
W/W = (1 - kKa owo/~ )/(1 - kKa w/ ) (27)
and, from equation (9)
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P 1-()( kKa8O w/ (28)
P0 0a C 1
The first term in the the benefits equation is the difference in
amortized powerplant costs. The second is the amortized cost difference
associated with differences in nonpropulsive vehicle weight. The last
two terms constitute the fuel economy benefit. The expression of the
possible alternative powerplant fuel price advantage as a difference in
fuel price ( p)l rather than as a fractional value of the gasoline
price (po x fraction) is because the difference would be attributable
to refining cost differences, while movements in the price of both
gasoline and the fuel used by the alternative powerplant would be
expected to occur principally due to changes in the cost of crude oil.
Thus the two factors are clearly distinguished by this form of expression
of the fuel price advantage.
Because the initial cost of the gas turbine engine remains the
single most uncertain engine attribute, in the following economic
analysis we will treat it as the "residual" attribute. The net benefits
(equation 26) are linear in relative specific initial cost, ri. We
will focus our discussion on the two intercepts of the line obtained when
B is plotted against ri. The vertical intercept (B @ ri = 1) is a
rough indication of the maximum obtainable benefits from a gas turbine
1The fuel difference A P, is defined as (p - p) so that a positive
value would mean positive benefits associated with the alternative
powerplant.
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system defined by all the attributes other than initial cost; we have
taken it to occur where the specific initial cost of gas turbine is equal
to that of the ICE. The horizontal intercept (rBE) indicates the
maximum socially acceptable initial specific cost, relative to the ICE,
of a given configuration; that is, it is the relative specific initial
cost at which the gas turbine "breaks even."
Finally, it is necessary to include the effect of the different
energy densities of gasoline (or whatever fuel is used by the ICE) and
the fuel used by the alternative powerplant. We shall do this by
adjusting the price "p" of the alternative fuel to gasoline-equivalent
gallons (in terms of equal energy content) as follows:
p (in cents per gasoline-equivalent gallons) = p (in cents per
gallon of alternative fuel) x (energy content per gallon of
gasoline/energy content per gallon of alternative fuel).
In calculating the total benefits, we shall use the price of the fuel
used by the alternative powerplant in cents per gasoline-equivalent
gallon. We shall also use (roughly) constant 1977 dollars and real
interest rates.
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3.4 The Social Value of the Gas Turbine Engine
The total operating cost model developed in the previous section
will now be used to investigate the potential operating benefits
associated with a gas-turbine-powered automobile, relative to the
ICE-powered vehicle of comparable performance. We consider four
different classes of gas turbine powerplants, as defined in Section 3.2,
-- (i) the mature metallic free-shaft turbine (MMFST), (ii) the
intermediate free-shaft turbine (INFST), (iii) the intermediate
single-shaft turbine (INSST), and (iv) the advanced single-shaft turbine
(ADSST). The baseline is held fixed at the mid-1980s level, as
previously discussed. We also include at this point the ICE baseline
equipped with a continuously variable trasmission (ICE-CVT) for reasons
explained below. For the purpose of examining the gross desirability of
the gas turbine engine, calculations across the range of vehicle sizes
are not necessary. Extrapolating data on average inertia weight class
for automobile sales by GM (3-48, p. 12a) in model years 1974 through
1977, the average automobile inertia weight in 1985 is close to 3,500 lbs
which corresponds to a "compact" class vehicle; we shall use this inertia
weight for our baseline ICE-powered automobile of 1985.
In this subsection we estimate the potential social benefits of the
gas turbine engine, on an individual vehicle basis. That is, we estimate
the economic benefits using social prices for fuel and for capital.
Furthermore, the calculations are made for an optimal vehicle-engine-fuel
configuration, i.e., the superior specific weight and power-speed
characteristic of the gas turbine engine are given full credit in the
vehicle design, and the use of a distillate fuel is assumed for the gas
turbine vehicle.
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At the outset a "base case" is defined for each class of gas turbine
technology. This base case represents the conservative end of the
available spectrum of technology projections. Table 3.2 summarizes the
range of available estimates for the gas turbine attributes. The values
in the table are adapted from the available data (displayed in Table 3.9
in Appendix A) consistent with the attribute definitions in our model
(see Section 3.3). In addition to the base case, we will also compute
the benefits for a number of other cases, some examining the impact of
uncertainties in a single, key parameter or attribute, and some
reflecting combinations of these. The magnitude of the variations
roughly reflects the spread of available projections for that parameter,
where applicable. The benefits will be calculated, in every case, as a
function of the relative initial specific cost of the gas turbine, which
remains the most uncertain key engine attribute.
The parameter and attribute values used in the base case are listed
in Table 3.3. For the most part, little explanation is required beyond
that presented in the table. The discount rate and the fuel prices
explicitly reflect the considerations involved in computing the social
benefits. The baseline fuel price is fixed at the 1977 (retail) market
level, but a social premium is added. The social premium, however, is
assumed not to affect the fuel price differential between gasoline and
the distillate fuel used by the gas turbine' (calculated from first
quarter 1977 gasoline and diesel fuel prices), following our earlier
argument that the changes in baseline fuel price are lilcely to he
distinct from changes in the fuel price differential. The tax on fuel is
included as part of the fuel price, since the tax revenues for the most
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Table 3.2
RANGE OF TECHNICAL ATTRIBUTE VALUES DERIVED FROM LITERATURE (1)
POWER-
PLANT ATTRIBUTES
Power-Speed
Parameter
1.22-1.32
Specific
Weight
(lb/hp)
4.6-6
Average Efficiency
(Ratio relative to
to 1985 ICE) (3)
1
Specific
Initial
Cost ($/hp)
11-13
Roughly same
as baseline
ICE
4.0-4.5
About 20% im-
provement over
baseline ICE
About 10%
higher
than
baseline
ICE
1.0
Same as MMFST Same as MMFST
1.00 (2)
1.00 (2)
Roughly 10%
improved over
INFST
2.2-3.2
Roughly 10%-15%
improved over
INFST
1.3-1.6
(1) Where available data (see Table 3.0) are not directly applicable,
the attribute values were estimated according to the definitions in
Section 3.3.2.
(2) Dependent on assumption of a continuously variable transmission.
(3) Our economic model explicitly requires only relative values of
efficiency. The baseline efficiency is implicit in the baseline fuel
economy given in Table 3.3. Note that for the single-shaft engines, in
actually calculating the benefits as shown in Tables 3.5 through 3.8,
relative efficiencies with respect to the ICE-CVT are used (see text).
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ICE
ICE-CVT 1.0 (2)
MMFST 1.08-1.14
INFST
INSST
1.05-1.15
ADSST
I ____ _
Table 3.3
PARAMETER AND ATTRIBUTE VALUES USED IN GAS TURBINE BENEFITS ANALYSIS
I Parameter Values Used in All Cases (1)
PARAMETER
M
L
'1
cv
VO to
VALUE
10,000
10 years
0.07
1.15 $/lb
60 mph, 13.5 sec
.018 hp/lb-mph
COMMENT
(3-49, p. 44)
(3-50, p. 3-11)
(3-36, p. 17)
Retail cost of
nonpropulsive vehicle from JPL
(3-2, p. 20-5) adjusted roughly
to 1977 dollars
Prevailing performance level
for compact class vehicle
Estimated from (3-36, p. 13)
3500 lbs
0.043 gal/mi
(23 mi7gal)
12 $/hp
Compact class baseline vehicle
material weight (1!
Estimate of 1985 baseline
vehicle fuel economy (see
text) (1)
Estimate from Table 3.2 (1)
II Parameter Values Used in Social Base Case (SBC)
65.7 /gal Calculated using national
average (regular gasoline,
full and self-service, over
first quarter, 1977) retail gas-
oline price of 59.3¢/gal (3-51)
plus social premium calculated
using average (over first
quarter 1977) imported crude
oil price of 14.4 /bbl and a
composite average domestic crude
oil price of 14.4 S/bbl with 4%
social real interest rate for
one vear (See text for dis-
cussion of methodology; figures
taken from (3-51.))
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Table 3.3 (continued)
PARAMETER VALUE
8.7 c/gal
4% annualr
k 1.22
III Powerplant Attribute Values Used ir
Assuming gas turbine operates on
diesel fuel. Fuel price differ-
ential based on retail diesel
fuel price of 55.8 /gal
averaged over first quarter
1977 (3-51) and adjusted to
gasoline-equivalent gallons,
using 116,800 Btu/ gal for
gasoline, and 127,600 Btu/gal
for diesel fuel (3-52)
Social real discount rate (range
3-5%)
Taken from JPL (3-2, p. 104)
i Social Base Case (SBC)
POWERPLANT ATTRIBUTE
ICE
ICE-CVT
MMFST
INFST
INSST
ADSST
w (lb/hp)
i ($/hp)
w
i
w
re
w
re
w
w
VALUE
1.25
5.0
12
1.0
5.0
1.2
13
1.14
4.5
0.95
1.14
4.5
1.05
1.0
4.0
1.15
1.0
3.2
1.3
COMMENT
Likely values for 1985 ICE
based on data in Table 3.2
Likely values for 1985 ICE
equipped with a CVT
from data in Table 3.2.
Conservative figures from
the ranges given in
Table 3.2
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
As above
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Table 3.3 (continued)
IV Parameter and Attribute
PARAMETER
OR ATTRIBUTE
DIFFERING
FROM SBC
SMla
Values Used in MMFST Cases
VALUE
rE 1.05
COMMENT
Stricter NO standard or
optimistic gas turbine
efficiency
w (lb/hp) 4.0
1.08
all of above
Po (/gal) 99.7
all of above
V Parameter
Optimistic specific weight
Optimistic power-speed
characteristic
Optimistic technology case
Doubling of imported crude
oil price. Approximate
long run cost of synthetic
crude oil
Most favorable reasonable case
and Attribute Values Used in ADSST Cases
PARAMETER OR VALUE
ATTRIBUTE
DIFFERING
FROM SBC
r
w (lb/hp)
1.5
2.2
both of above
COMMENT
Optimistic efficiency
Optimistic specific weight
Optimistic technology
Po (/gal) 99.7
all of above
Doubling of imported crude
oil price. Approximate
long run cost of synthetic
crude oil
Most favorable reasonable case
(1) The values of W Fo, and i shown above were not used in
computing the benefits associates with the single-shaft turbines; the
ICE-CVT was used as the "basleine" for these engines and the values of
W and F used are those corresponding to the ICE-CVT in Table 3.4;
tRe value of i for the ICE-CVT is shown above in Section III of this
table. 
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SMlb
SMlc
SMld
SM2
SM3
CASE
SAla
SAlb
SAlc
SA2
SA3
_____ ·_ · ___._ _ __ _ _ _I __ _ _ _ ___ _ _ __ _ _ _ _
--
---
CASE
part go to road maintenance and construction and represent, as such, a
real part of the social cost of automobile operation. We have taken the
present differential between the prices of gasoline and diesel fuel to be
indicative of the future differential between gasoline and a distillate
fuel of some sort which would require less refining than gasoline and he
suitable for the gas turbine. Inasmuch as we have not attempted to
distinguish between the differing tax rates between gasoline and diesel
fuel, the fuel price differential does not reflect the difference in
taxes. However, the error involved is small, since the difference
between average tax rates (1976), state plus federal, for motor gasoline
and diesel fuel (3-53) is of the order of a tenth of a cent per gallon
compared to the total fuel price differential on the order of ten cents.
It is important to note that the adjustment of the retail price of diesel
fuel to gasoline equivalent (in terms of energy content) gallons accounts
for as much as 60% of the price differential.
The social premium on automotive fuel is a matter worth some
discussion. We have used the following extremely simple approach. The
value of crude oil in the United States is set by its marginal cost,
which is the price of imported crude oil plus a national security premium
to account for the national security costs associated with importing
crude oil from insecure foreign sources. Thus the social value of
gasoline is taken to be the retail price, plus the difference between the
average domestic and the imported costs of crude oil,l plus the
national security premium.
1We ignore the fact that one gallon of crude oil is not converted to
fully one gallon of refined products.
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A simple measure for the national security premium is the cost of
the crude oil stockpile necessary to mitigate or deter an embargo, thus
voiding any possibility of international blackmail. If the cost of a
stockpile is principally the cost of holding the crude oil, and if the
stockpile is sized to supply the nation with N years of imported oil,
then the national security premium is simply the cost of storing each
imported barrel for N years. In terms of a fractional increase in
the value of the imported crude, it is N times the relevant interest rate.
The difficulty of predicting the fuel economy of the 1985 baseline
ICE is compounded by the minimum fuel economy standards through 1985 and
by the effect of changing emissions standards. We have assumed earlier,
in Section 3.2.4, that the mandated 1981 emissions standards
(0.41/3.4/1.0 HC/CO/NO gm/mi) will carry over through 1985. At these
standards we have estimated, based on the JPL (3-2, p. 3-17) estimate for
their "mature Otto engine" and from estimates by GM (3-48, p. 17c) that
the fuel economy of the compact baseline ICE will be roughly 23 mpg.
For computing the benefits associated with the single-shaft engines
(both intermediate and advanced) on a technologically consistent basis,
the ICE-CVT was used as the baseline. The incorporation of a CVT in the
ICE brings about fuel economy improvements as well as powerplant size and
vehicle weight reductions (see Table 3.4). The extensive system
configuration shown in Table 3.4 is used as a baseline against which the
benefits for the single-shaft turbines are evaluated.
The gas turbine attribute values used in the social base case are
reasonably conservative projections for the respective technology
classes, as comparison between Tables 3.2 and 3.3 will indicate. The two
sets of sensitivity calculations then address more optimistic technology
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Table 3.4
BASE CASE SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS
POWERPLANT
ICE
ICE-CVT
MMFST
INFST
INSST
ADSST
DESIGN
POWER
(hp)
128
97
111
111
93
90
POWERPLANT
WEIGHT (1)
(lb)
640
480
500
500
370
290
VEHICLE
INERTIA
WEIGHT(1)
(lb)
3500
3310
3330
3330
3170
3070
FUEL ECONOMY
(mpg) (2)
23.0
29.2
23.0
25.4
29.2
34.1
(1) Rounded to nearest 10 pounds.
(2) Gallons are energy-content equivalent to gasoline.
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projections, as well as the impact of a doubling of the cost of crude
oil, for both the metallic and advanced systems. The impact of
optimistic values of each relevant attribute is tested separately, an
overall technologically optimistic case is presented, and a combined
favorable technological and economic case. The doubled cost may be taken
to represent a rough upper limit on crude oil prices for the next several
decades, because it is roughly the cost at which a synthetic crude oil.
can be obtained from coal or oil shale.
Table 3.4 shows the standardized (with respect to acceleration
performance) base case configurations which result. These results are
preliminary to calculating the total operating benefits. t may be noted
that the intermediate and mature metallic free-shaft configurations are
alike. This results from our model in that the efficiency does not
affect system design; for engines satisfying the same acceleration
criterion, the power-speed characteristic and specific weight together
determine the vehicle configuration. The intermediate single-shaft
turbine and the metallic turbine, when compared with the corresponding
compact class JPL configurations (3-2, p. 10-5) are calculated to have
around 10 to 25% larger design horsepower. Within the limitations of our
analysis, these results reflect the somewhat more conservative nature of
our base-case assumptions for the gas turbine.
The results in Table 3.4 also show the dramatic impact of the
availability of a CVT for use with the conventional ICE. This will have
significant implications for the economic value of the single-shaft
systems, which require its availability.
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Table 3.5 summarizes the results of the social benefits
calculations. The social base case benefits across technologies are
illustrated in Figure 3.2 while the variants from the base case are
illustrated (only for the metallic free-shaft case) in Figure 3.3. We
shall focus our discussion on the two intercepts of the lines shown in
Figures 3.2 and 3.3.
The results show that the "maximum" benefits for the metallic
turbine range from 0.66 to 1.31 /mile. The spread due to uncertainty in
attributes and prices is therefore about 100% of the base case benefit.
However, it must also be recognized that these benefits are a somewhat
arbitrarily defined maximum -- it is defined to occur at equal powerplant
specific initial cost. Given the manufacturing problems associated with
the gas turbine, as discussed in Section 3.2 above, this is a reasonable
upper expectation.
The breakdown of the maximum benefits for the metallic turbine in
Table 3.6 indicates that they result almost entirely from the ability to
burn a less expensive fuel and from the smaller engine allowed by the
superior power-speed characteristic. The savings in non-engine nitial
cost is small; the benefit due to reduced fuel consumption is zero.
Reasonable variations in each important non-cost attribute
(efficiency, power-speed parameter, and specific weight) have significant
effects on the potential benefits of the metallic turbine engine, at any
initial cost. Fuel price has no impact because, as seen in Table 3.4,
the fuel economy of the metallic gas turbine is the same as that of the
baseline (the effect of the improved specific weight and power-speed
curve is eactly cancelled out by the lower efficiency). Further, it is
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tTable 3.5
SUMMARY OF GAS TURBINE TOTAL SOCIAL OPERATING BENEFIT CALCULATIONS
I. Social Base Case (SBC)
POWERPLANT
MMFST
INFST
(ICE-CVT)
INSST
ADSST
RELATIVE BREAK-EVEN
INITIAL COST (rBE)
1.42
1.57
(2.02)
1.27
1.54
SPECIFIC MAXIMUM SOCIAL BENEFIT
(¢/mi) (B @ ri= 1)
0.66
0.89
(1.39)
0.39
0.75
II. MMFST Sensitivity Cases
PARAMETER OR ATTRIBUTE
AS CHANGED FROM BASE
CASE
r_ = 1.05
RELATIVE BREAK-
EVEN SPECIFIC
COST (rBE)
1.57
MAXIMUM SOCIAL
BENEFIT (/mi)
(B @ r = 1)
0.89
w = 4.0 lb/hp
c = 1.08
all of the above
Po = 99.7 c/gal
all of the above
III. ADSST Sensitivity Cases
PARAMETER OR ATTRIBUTE
AS CHANGED FROM BASE
CASE
r = 1.6
w = 2.2 lb/hp
both of above
Po = 99.7 c/gal
all of the above
RELATIVE BREAK-
EVEN SPECIFIC
COST (rBE)
1.76
1.67
1.89
1.66
2.18
MAXIMUM SOCIAL
BENEFIT (C/mi)
(B @ r = 1)
1].05
0.89
1.19
0.91
1.58
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CASE
SMla
SMlb
SMlc
SMld
SM2
SM3
1.51
1.54
1.79
1.42
1.92
0.77
0.79
1.13
0.66
1.31
CASE
SAla
SAlb
SAlc
SA2
SA3
I l
1.0 1.5 2.0
RATIO OF GAS TURBINE POWERPLANT
SPECIFIC COST TO THAT OF ICE
Figure 3.2
SOCIAL BASE CASE BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH VARIOUS
CLASSES OF GAS TURBINES AS A FUNCTION OF GAS
TURBINE POWERPLANT SPECIFIC INITIAL COST RELATIVE
TO BASELINE ICE (FOR THE SINGLE-SHAFT TURBINES,
RELATIVE TO THE ICE-CVT).
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Figure 3.3
SOCIAL BENEFITS OF THE MATURE METALLIC GAS TURBINE
FOR VARIATIONS IN PARAMETERS AND ATTRIBUTES AS A
FUNCTION OF GAS TURBINE POWERPLANT SPECIFIC INITIAL
COST RELATIVE TO BASELINE ICE.
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Table 3.6
BREAKDOWN OF MAXIMUM BENEFITS FOR AUTOMOTIVE GAS TURBINE
COMPONENT (1,2)
Engine Total Initial Cost
Difference
Non-Engine Total Initial Cost
Difference
Fuel Economy Improvement
Fuel Price Advantage
BENEFIT (C/mi) (3)
MMFST
0.24
0.04
0.00
0.38
Total 0.66
ADSST
0.11
0.06
0.32
0.26
0.75
(1) The components in order are the terms in equation (26).
(2) Base case values of all parameters are used, with r. = 1.
1
(3) Rounded to two decimal places.
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also evident that these (admittedly uncertain) benefits cannot be
realized at all unless the specific initial cost of the metallic turbine
powerplant is brought down to within 40% to 90% above that of the ICE of
equal horsepower.
It is necessary therefore to compare these breakeven costs (crude as
they are) with available estimates (even though evaluated on somewhat
differing bases) of the relative specific cost of the turbine
powerplant. A recent Volkswagen study (3-54) estimates the relative
production cost of engines of the same horsepower (bracketing engines of
100 to 150 hp). As indicated in Table 3.9, their estimate is for a
specific initial cost of 2 to 2.6 that of the ICE. This clearly is not
likely to result in a socially beneficial engine. The JPL (3-2, p.
11-12) estimates, on the other hand, put the specific initial cost of the
"mature" metallic turbine powerplant at about 50% more than that of the
ICE. While this appears to make the turbine look barely attractive,
judging by our breakeven criteria, there is considerable doubt (3-55) as
to whether these projections are realizable. The set of available
estimates is, however, meager.
Included for comparison in Table 3.5 are the calculated value
indicators for the ICE-CVT. At any given relative specific initial cost
it is clearly more valuable than either of the free-shaft configurations
using conventional transmissions. That is, the relative break-even cost
and its maximum benefits are higher. Further, its cost is better known
than those of the gas turbines; at the value r = 1.1 which we have
assumed the ICE-CVT gives benefits relative to the ICE of 1.3 c/mi. Of
course the CVT would benefit the free-shaft gas turbines as well as the
ICE. Therefore the relatively higher economic valuie of the ICE-CVT as
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compared to the free-shaft turbines does not imply that it should be
developed in place of them. The high value of the CVT does, however,
have important implications for the value of the single-shaft systems
relative to the free-shaft systems, as our analysis implicitly assumes
the CVT in the single-shaft calculations but not in those for the
free-shaft.
At the other technological extreme, the advanced single-shaft
turbine might offer benefits ranging from 0.8 to 1.6c/mile at specific
initial costs equal to the ICE-CVT. Breakeven specific cost ranges from
about 50% to 120% above that of the ICE-CVT. The social base case values
of the advanced single-shaft turbine relative to the ICE-CVT are seen to
be less than those of the intermediate free-shaft turbine relative to the
baseline ICE. Thus, inasmuch as the single-shaft engines require the
existence of a CVT, which can also be applied with great benefit to the
ICE, their own incremental value is reduced. Nevertheless, their value
beyond the ICE-CVT is still potentially large.
The specific initial cost of the advanced single-shaft powerplant
has been estimated by Volkswagen (3-54) at 40% to 100% above that of the
baseline ICE. The margin relative to rBE in this case is sufficient to
realize possible benefits for the advanced single-shaft turbine relative
to the 1985 ICE. However, the degree of uncertainty associated with
advanced technology predictions is of course much higher than those for
the metallic systems. As discussed in Section 3.2, it is well known that
the materials costs of ceramics are low, far lower than those of
superalloys, however the primitive state of the process technology leaves
only the vaguest knowledge of the costs of processing this material into
engine components.
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Our level of analysis does not allow any significant discrimination
of the intermediate gas turbine as against the metallic or advanced; the
benefits are in fact at intermediate levels (given either that the CVT
exists or it does not), and there are few data on potential costs.
Another important conclusion from Table 3.5 is that the effects of
uncertainty in prediction of gas turbine technology status are much
greater than the effect of the uncertainty in the fuel prices. This
further compounds estimation of the social value of the gas turbine. We
can only conclude that the order of uncertainty in enefits matches the
order of the likely benefits. These arguments hold equallv well for the
advanced technologies.
Finally, it is worth considering the possibility that ceramics
technology might develop more rapidly than anticipated, or that CVT
technology might develop more slowly, so that an advanced gas turbine
engine was possible but no CVT had been developed. In this case an
advanced free-shaft engine would be an extremely desirable system, giving
benefits on the order of .5¢/mi more than the intermediate free shaft, at
any given initial cost.
In summary, then, this simple economic analysis reveals the
following. First, only a technologically optimistic estimation of the
performance and cost attributes of the metallic gas turbine lead to the
belief that social benefits of much more than a tenth of a cent per mile
or so are available. Second, while the attributes of the advanced gas
turbine are even less well known, it appears that benefits on the order
of a cent per mile are possible. Third, both of these extremely crude
estimations are subject to great uncertainty. Even given a value of
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specific initial cost, the most uncertain of the attributes, variations
of the performance attributes or of fuel price significantly affect
social value calculations.
How important are social benefits of .1 to 1¢/mile? One perspective
on the benefits might be gained by considering them in relation to the
total baseline operating cost. Corresponding to a value of about
15c/mile for the latter, the maximum benefits range from 5% to 10% of the
total baseline operating cost, for the metallic free shaft, as well as
for the advanced single shaft. For specific costs greater than those of
the ICE, the fractional cost reduction is of course much lower. However,
as discussed in Federal Support (3-1), the discounted present value of
the aggregate benefits resulting from single-vehicle benefits of the
order of several tenths of a cent per mile, for reasonable values of
vehicle miles traveled, conversion engine dates, etc. are easily $1
billion and more. Thus the amount of dollars our nation should be
willing to pay for the existence of a socially beneficial gas turbine
engine is very large.
109
3.5 The Private Value of the Gas Turbine Engine
A socially valuable gas turbine engine is not necessarily viewed as
an economically attractive technology by the individual consumer.
Because the consumer, together with the management of the automotive
manufacturers, make the individual technology choices in our economic
system, it is necessary to examine the economic value of the gas turbine
in private terms as well as social terms. The simple economic model
developed in Section 3.3 can also be applied to determine the potential
total operating benefits associated with the gas turbine from a private
standpoint. It is necessary, of course, to first identify the sources of
disparity between the social and private cases.
The first and most obvious effect is the removal of the social
premium on the fuel price, to reflect the actual market (retail) price
seen by the vehicle owner. This does not, however, affect the price
differential between the baseline and the gas turbine fuels.
The second difference might arise due to the privately perceived
discount rate applied to the initial cost, which is expected to be higher
than the social discount rate (see Federal Support (3-1, Sect. 5.4) for a
detailed discussion). To investigate the effect of such a possibility,
we have used a private real annual discount rate of 15% as compared with
the 4% used in the social base case. Unfortunately there is little in
the way of empirical support for any particular choice of private
discount. Our choice of 15% would represent substantial
"short-sightedness" on the part of automobile buyers, i.e. a very
uneconomic weighting of first cost relative to operating cost.
The private benefit calculations examine the effect of each of these
sources of disparity separately and in combination. The effect on the
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maximum benefits and on the breakeven specific cost ratio across
technologies is shown in Table 3.7. (Note that all other parameters are
held constant at the levels in social base case.) The private benefits
are also shown (only for the mature metallic free-shaft turbine) in
Figure 3.4. The effect of using private prices, for the metallic
free-shaft turbine, is to reduce the maximum admissible specific initial
cost premium from about 40% above to about 30% above that of the ICE.
The effect is more pronounced for the more advanced technologies. In
both cases the principal effect is due to the high private discount rate
we have posited, rather than our estimated social premium on fuel.
However, it seems clear that the gas turbine, an option which trades
capital for fuel, suffers when the value of fuel relative to capital is
higher for the nation as a whole than for individuals. An engine which
is socially valuable may not be privately valuable.
The analysis so far has focused on the evaluation of the gas turbine
engine given that it exists and that the vehicle body and fuel production
logistics network have been adjusted to minimize the overall system
cost. If the engine were in fact put into production and attained
widespread use, the system would no doubt adjust. Initially, however,
the newly introduced gas turbine would face an environment optimized for
an automotive vehicle fleet using entirely ICEs, except for a few
diesels. The gas turbine must be attractive during this phase as well as
in the long run if it is to ultimately succeed.
A full discussion of the problems specific to the introduction
process (i.e., the transition to an alternative powerplant) may be found
in Federal Support (3-1, Sect. 5.4). We will only briefly summarize them
here, and then proceed to examine the private desirability associated
with the gas turbine in the transition.
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Table 3.7
SUMMARY OF GAS TURBINE TOTAL PRIVATE OPERATING BENEFITS
PARAMETER CHANGE
FROM SBC
I MMFST Cases
RELATIVE BREAK- MAXIMUM PRIVATE
EVEN SPECIFIC
INITIAL 'COST
( rBE)
BENEFIT (¢/mi)
(B @ ri =1)
MMFST SBC
r = 15%
Po = 59.3 /gal
both of the above
II ADSST Cases
ADSST SBC
r = 15%
Po = 59.3 ¢/gal
both of the above
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CASE
PM1
PM2
1.42
PM3
1.32
1.42
1.32
PAl
0.66
0.84
0.66
0.84
0.75
0.86
0.71PA2
1.54
PA3
1.37
1.51
1.36 0.82
1.0
-
. 0.5
Z 
E-4 .
0.0
CASE REPRESENTATION
SBC
PM3
TM3
(See Tables 3.7 and 3.8
X for Case Designations)
\\
v 
1.0 1.5 2.0
RATIO OF GAS TURBINE POWERPLANT
SPECIFIC COST TO THAT OF ICE
Figure 3.4
PRIVATE AND TRANSITION BENEFITS FOR THE MATURE
METALLIC GAS TURBINE AS A FUNCTION OF GAS
TURBINE POWERPLANT SPECIFIC INITIAL COST RELATIVE
TO BASELINE ICE.
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The introduction of a powerplant into the marketplace is the focal
point of the long technology development and production process]: it
determines the long-term commercial success of the alternative
powerplant. Underlying the introduction decision is a massive commitment
on the part of the industry and very high levels of risk and dollar
exposure. Historically, the decision criterion used by the industrv for
making technological changes has generally been that an innovation at
least match every relevant attribute (except cost) of the system it
replaced. Cost increases would be tolerated only if commensurate net
gains were clearly realizable in other attributes. The crucial
determinant of a positive introduction decision will be an initial cost
that consumers find attractive; the introduction decision will follow
only after the economics of manufacture and operation of the gas turbine
have been clearly quantified.
The status of the nonpecuniary attributes of the gas turbine (in its
various technological stages) was dealt with in detail in Section 3.2.3.
To summarize, the gas turbine appears to be as good as or better
(especially with respect to noise and vibration) than the ICE in these
attributes. As for the readily quantifiable attributes, initial cost and
fuel economy are the key unknowns. In addition, there is uncertainty as
to the maintenance requirements and durability of the gas turbine. The
former is a problem not so much because of any intrinsic feature of the
technology (the gas turbine is far less complex than the ICE) but because
these services may not be available to the consumer, especially in the
transition.
See Chapter 2 of Federal Support (3-1) for a detailed description and
analysis of the process of technology development and production in the
automotive industry, as it would apply to an alternative powerplant and
with examples of other innovations from the past.
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The crucial feature of an alternative powerplant introduction,
namely that it would take place in an environment dominated by the ICE,
has important implications for the potential value of the gas turbine in
the transition. We will focus on two readily quantifiable effects and
examine their impacts on the total operating benefits associated with the
alternative powerplant.
First, the gas turbine may be forced to operate on gasoline in the
transition because of: (i) the lack of an adequate infrastructure to
supply the gas turbine with alternative fuels; (ii) the absence of any
incentive in the short term for those components of the infrastructure
not in the control of the manufacturer, namely the petroleum refining and
distribution industry, to provide a supply of the alternative fuel.
Presumably then, the fuel price advantage attributable to a fuel less
highly refined than gasoline may not be realized.
Second, one important consequence of the manufacturer's attempt to
minimize the fixed cost of the innovation is that the gas turbine would
likely be offered in a vehicle body designed for the ICE -- in other
words, the gas turbine would be designed for the highest possible degree
of integrability. This behavioral postulate has been substantiated most
recently by the approach adopted by GM's Oldsmobile Division in
introducing diesel-powered automobiles -- essentially retaining the
original V-8 ICE powerplant layout to allow integration into vehicles
designed for the latter (3-56).1 For an alternative powerplant like
the gas turbine,
See also Federal Support (3-1. Chap. 2) for other examples.
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which has a higher power density (i.e., a lower specific weight) than the
ICE, this would lead to suboptimal vehicle configurations: by not
utilizing the savings in vehicle weight that can result from the weight
propagation effect, the gas turbine would be installed in a heavier
vehicle than necessary. In our simple model we can quantify this effect
by setting the weight propagation factor (k) to unity, which fixes the
nonpropulsive weight of the automobile.
Table 3.8 lists the potential private total operating benefits in
the transition for the metallic and advanced systems. The "base case"
here is the private static case (PM3 and PA3 of Table 3.7); the effects
of zero fuel price differential and null weight propagation have been
examined separately and in combination. The metallic case (TM3) is also
shown in Figure 3.4. The effects are relatively dramatic -- the maximum
benefits are decreased by about one half, and so, roughly, is the
allowable specific cost premium over the ICE. The characteristics of the
transition process thus have important effects on the value of thp gas
turbine.
Thus, if our behavioral postulates are correct, the gas turbine
vehicle looks much less attractive during the transition process than
later when vehicle design and the fuel system have adjusted. In our
simple model, a metallic gas turbine engine with a specific initial cost
between 13% and 32% higher than that of the ICE would be privately
attractive in the long run, but not during the transition unless a
See Federal Support (3-1, Chap. 2) for other examples.
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Table 3.8
GAS TURBINE BENEFITS DURING TRANSITION
PARAMETER CHANGE RELATIVE BREAK-EVEN
SPECIFIC INITIAL
COST (rBE)
MAXIMUM PRIVATE
BENEFIT (¢/mi)
(B @ r i I)
I MMFST Cases
MMFST PM3
k = l
Ap = 
both of above
II ADSST Cases
ADSST PA3
k 1
Ap= 0
both of above
CASE
TM1
1.32
TM2
TM3
1.27
1.18
1.13
0.84
0.72
0.46
0.34
TA1
1.36
TA2
1.28
TA3
1.25
1.17
0.82
0.67
0.57
0.41
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made and a low-cost but compatible fuel is widely available. Thus it
might not make it through the industry innovation process. Further, as
previously discussed, engines with specific initial costs up to 42%
higher than the ICE are, in our simple calculations, socially valuable.
Thus, between private undervaluation of vehicle attributes and behavioral
problems of technological change, there is a substantial range of initial
cost wherein a socially valuable gas turbine might never make it to the
vehicle showroom.
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3.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have examined the gas turbine engine as a
potential alterantive to the ICE for the passegner car powerplant of the
future. Our principal goal has been to shed some light on the issues
facing federal policy-makers in this area. Should the federal government
be supporting R&D efforts on this technology? If so, what should be the
general thrust of those efforts? These are the apparently modest
questions we have attempted to address.
The automotive gas turbine, as a system, is not a new or exotic
technology. Since the successful development of the aircraft jet engine
during World War II the basic concepts have been well known. After the
war virtually all major automotive manufacturers, domestic and foreign,
recognized the potential for the system in ground transport and conducted
development efforts. In the mid-1960s the Chrysler Corporation made
probably the most dramatic demonstration of a passenger car innovation
since most of the major features of the modern passenger car were fixed
in the early 1920s, when they built and distributed fifty gas
turbine-powered automobiles to carefully selected individuals for three
months each over a total period of twenty-eight months. However, while
most consumers were generally satisfied, the fuel economy, acceleration
lag, and several other features of the engine were not considered
satisfactory. Chrysler did not proceed with mass production of the
engine. While tightening emission standards were cited as a principal
cause for this decision, it seems clear that Chrysler was, more
importantly, not able to produce the engine at a cost which would make it
an attractive option to consumers. With the inferior attributes
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demonstrated, that cost would likely have had to be less than the
comparable ICE.
Now, over a decade later, Chrysler is testing in vehicles an engine
which has gone through three development generations since those consumer
tests. Much of the intervening work has been substantially supported
with government development funds. The new "upgraded" system roughly
matches the contemporary ICE in fuel economy, and in the other important
consumer attributes, and surpasses it in emissions reduction. But again
its production costs are too high to make it attractive to consumers.
The present engine could probably be put into production in five to eight
years; during that period technology changes in the production ICE would
allow it to roughly hold its own on efficiency while it met tightened
emission standards. Thus, while advances have been made, they have not
been sufficient to make the available gas turbine engine technology
competitive with the contemporaneous ICE. The experience at Ford,
General Motors, and a number of other automotive and heavy duty prime
mover manufacturers around the world has been similar to Chrysler's.
Our analysis of the benefits to be gained from gas turbine
technology provides some quantitative support to this view of the present
status of gas turbine technology. While the superior specific weight and
power-speed characteristics of the presently available system mean that
buyers would be willing to pay somewhat more for the system than for the
competition, and that the "maximum" benefits which could be attained are
substantial, only the most optimistic cost estimates bring the system
within the economic range. Substantial uncertainty surrounds these
calculations, as demonstrated in our analysis, but the qualitative
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conclusion seems sound. Further, it is true whether one makes the
calculation from the point of view of society as a whole or from that of
a private individual.
The economic properties of the gas turbine vehicle have been limited
by the available materials technology. The efficiency and power output
of a heat engine depend strongly on the maximum temperatures of the
thermodynamic cycle. In a gas turbine those peak temperatures are
experienced by components which must simultaneously resist substantial
stresses. Superalloys -- special steels -- must be utilized to attain
the cycle temperatures necessary for attaining the efficiency and weight
characteristics of the gas turbine which now make it competitive in value
with the ICE. At the same time, these superalloys are the key elements
of the high cost of the system which make it, overall, economically
unattractive. Expensive materials and processing techniques are required
by superalloys.
There now exists the potential for a discrete change in materials
technology. Ceramic materials have the potential to tolerate higher
temperatures, under load, than superalloys. Dramatic efficiency and
weight improvements in the gas turbine engine would thus be possible.
Our economic calculations indicate that a gas turbine engine making heavy
use of ceramics in its hot parts could be a very valuable engine. That
is, it would be worth a substantial cost premium over the ICE.
The extent of this extra value is highly uncertain. It depends on
the extent to which ceramic components can be manufactured in quantity to
meet the different demands of the various parts of the engine. Even for
a given degree of ceramics utilization, the attributes of the engine are
highly uncertain. Optimized engines making exensive use of ceramics are
differently configured from present gas turbines, therefore calculations
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at the potentially improved cycle parameters do not have the experience
behind them that those for metallic technology do. Furthermore,
processing technologies may be very important in determining the design
of ceramic components, and therefore efficiency and power decreases may
have to be accepted relative to what could be attained if the geometries
producible with superalloys could be maintained. There are numerous
other nontechnical sources of uncertainty in the value of ceramic gas
turbie engines; the future price of fuel is probably the most
significant. Our calculations leave little doubt, however, that the
availability of ceramic components for the automotive gas turbine engine
would be worth a substantial sum of money.
However, the cost of gas turbine engines produced with ceramic
materials is even more uncertain than the value of the metallic system.
The basic materials costs of ceramics may be extremely low -- sand and
air may be the principal inputs. However, conventional rules-of-thumb
relating product costs to materials costs are not likely to be relevant.
There is virtually no experience in processing ceramic materials in such
a manner as to mass produce engine components of consistently acceptable
quality. Furthermore, as a brittle material, ceramics are generally less
forgiving than metallics. Flaws tend to propagate rather than dissipate,
so consistency in processing is of critical importance. Thus presently
unknown, but possibly very expensive, processing techniques may be
required. This is true especially for the turbine rotor required for
advanced systems.
But technical uncertainty, be it in product or process technology,
is subject to resolution -- through research and development. The
potentially very large, but simultaneously very uncertain, benefits
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available from a ceramic-based automotive gas turbine engine make it an
excellent candidate for a major R&D effort. The level of detail in our
analysis does not permit us to define clearly the specific engine
components which should be the subject of the program. Within the
technology classifications used in this report, it is not clear whether
such an effort should be focused on the intermediate or the advanced
engine. But the focus on a ceramic-based engine, to the relative neglect
of further work on the metallic engine, is the key.
This conclusion is robust with respect to the existence, or lack
thereof, of a continuously variable transmission. The development of
such a CVT results in a major improvement of the baseline system. The
CVT is necessary for single-shaft gas turbine systems, but also a useful
supplement to free-shaft systems. Without a concurrent CVT program,
whether funded publicly, privately, or shared, a gas turbine program must
focus on the free-shaft system. But in either case a ceramic-based gas
turbine system is very valuable.
A somewhat secondary consideraton is the relative focus on new
engine systems, as compared to a focus on specific components using
ceramic materials and the basic ceramic-processing technology. Our
analysis sheds some light on this issue. The answer depends on whether
the system in its interrelationships would be sufficiently different to
be worth the complications of the simultaneous design of new ceramic
components for it. As discussed above, however, the value of the
ceramic-based turbine depends on system attributes, and this value is the
standard against which costs must be compared. Thus, while there is
little doubt that a ceramics R&D program must focus on process
technology, an accompanying engine definition program appears a necessity
as well.
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But this leaves unaddressed the question of who, in our system of
economic organization, can be expected to pay for this R&D. The high
value of the potential benefits does not alone justify the expenditure of
taxpayer revenues, since the essential arguments should hold well with
corporate boardrooms as well. Put succinctly, a ceramic-based gas
turbine engine would be a highly profitable product. If there is no
disagreement between government and industry concerning the distribution
of the technological outcomes of the research, and the prices with which
those attributes will be valued, then the case for government subsidies
must rest on the ability of the corporate interests involved to capture
the potential benefits. These general arguments are presented in Chapter
2 of this report. There we concluded that, in the general case of
alternative automotive powerplants, the argument for government support
is certainly not one which is convincing in its strength or its general
applicability, but that the analysis does provide some clues as to the
circumstances where industry support is likely to be inadequate.
The major automotive manufacturers claim that their ceramic gas
turbine development programs will progress without government assistance,
but that the rate of progress would be greatly accelerated if
supplemental government support were available. As discussed in the
following chapter, such statements are not verifiable after the fact.
The question, then, is whether such assertions are plausible given what
we know about the economics of the gas turbine engine. The key
considerations are discussed as they apply to alternative automotive
powerplants generally in Chapter 2 of this report, and they will not be
reviewed here. However, here we will examine briefly how these
considerations relate to the case of automotive gas turbine engines.
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In the case of the metallic engine, it is extremely difficult to
find compelling reasons for government support; it is difficult even as
of five years ago when the present government program was initiated. The
long history of automotive industry efforts and their resulting
expertise, and the long-standing incentives and actual development
efforts for heavy duty competitors for the diesel, all point to the
conclusion that most worthwhile R&D projects were most likely being
privately funded.
The case of ceramic-based engines seems different. Two
considerations seem to dominate. First, the development of ceramic
materials for use in heat engines would be a major technological advance
which would affect many areas beyond the passenger car fleet, or even the
transport sector. The heat engine is society's principal means for
converting fossil fuels into useful work. The availability of low
cost, high performance, ceramics would have important benefits for most
forms of transporation, for electric power generation, etc. Further
influence would be felt in metallurgical and chemical process industries
where loads must be borne at high temperature.
Second, as analyzed in the body of the report and discussed above,
the state of ceramics processing technology is relatively primitive, and
the technology is a particularly challenging one. Therefore high risk
projects extending over ong periods will be necessary to make any new
techniques commercially available. A ceramic-based gas turbine engine
program may properly be put into the category of research or initial
development, rather than final development. This again implies that the
nature of the results will not be readily predicted, and uses for them
which are not now foreseen will probably arise.
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Thus we find the traditional economic argument for the support of
the development of advanced technology a most compelling one in this
case. It is difficult for any single private entity to be at all certain
of capturing more than a small fraction of the benefits which could
result from a ceramic gas turbine R&D program. The principal benefits
might not even occur in the automotive sector. This argument leads one
to consider a ceramics technology program which is not so focused on
automotive technology as that discussed here. However, it also leads us
to view the industry proposals for cost-shared ceramic gas turbine
programs as reasonably equitable, in the sense that both the corporate
shareholders and public taxpayers would be risking money on reasonable
gambles for their own ultimate benefit.
It is very important that such efforts be cost-shared with one or
more automobile manufacturers. Their money must be committed as a signal
that their management believes in the future commercial viability of the
engine. Further, it is these firms which have the expertise, and the
incentive, to make the system ultimately marketable. It is also
important that companies with greater experience than the automotive
industry in dealing with ceramic materials be made an integral part of
the program. Present DOE plans seem roughly consistent with these
guidelines.
Finally, our analysis indicates that the ultimate success of a gas
turbine development program will depend on the process by which the
engine is integrated into a system optimized for ICE-powered vehicles.
The gas turbine can generate more power per unit weight than the ICE, and
can burn a less-refined fuel. A substantial part of the economic
attractiveness of the system is lost if a new vehicle body is not
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designed for the engine, or if a distillate fuel is not widely
available. The automotive industry, in combination with the petroleum
industry, has generally moved very gradually into engine innovations, and
such will likely continue to be the case. R&D programs are weak tools
for dealing with such difficulties. However, the development and
introduction of a ceramic-based gas turbine engine is sufficiently
distant in time that such transitional difficulties need not be a
significant concern at the present time.
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APPENDIX
Powerplant Attribute Values from the Literature
Table 3.9 lists values available in the literature of powerplant
attributes needed as inputs to the total operating cost model developed
in Section 3.3.2. The values shown in Table 3.9 are, in the majority of
cases, not directly reported as such in the literature. Where necessary,
therefore, these values were estimated according to the powerplant
attribute definitions made in Section 3.3.2.
The power-speed parameter was estimated from normalized engine-power
versus engine-rpm characteristics, or from tabular data (as in the case
of Rand (3-36)).
Specific weight of the respective powerplants was estimated, where
necessary, by adding the estimated weights of transmission and any
emissions control equipment applicable, to the weight of the basic engine.
The efficiency estimates are especially crude, since it is difficult
to obtain an average brake efficiency over a specific driving cycle in
the open literature. However, our total operating cost model only
requires estimates of the relative efficiency of the alternative
powerplant with respect to the ICE. In our model, fuel economy is
directly proportional to efficiency and inversely proportional to vehicle
inertia weight. Therefore, where necessary, we have estimated relative
efficiencies from relative fuel economy values given in the literature by
adjusting for inertia weights; the implicit assumption is that the other
factors contributing to fuel economy, embodied in the constant KF (see
Section 3.3.2), are the same across powerplants. Note that relative
efficiencies are given with respect to the present ICE baseline as
reference. Recall that in Section 3.2.4 we estaimted that the
improvement in baseline efficiency through 1985 may range from -5% to
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+ 5%. This has been taken into account in choosing the relative
efficiency values used in the total operating cost calculations made in
Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
Data on powerplant specific costs are relatively scarce and very
uncertain. Costing methodologies used differ from one source to another
and there is a wide spread, therefore, in the estimates. Where
necessary, the estimated costs of transmission and any emission control
equipment applicable are added to basic engine costs. All absolute costs
given are in 1977 dollars.
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Table 3.9
POWERPLANT ATTRIBUTE VALUES DERIVED FROM LITERATURE
I. Powerplant Speed Parameter
POWERPLANT
1) JPL (3-2, p. 10-25,
Figure 10-1)
2) Rand (3-36, p. 88)
1) JPL (3-2, p. 10-25,
Figure 10-1)
2) Chrysler (3-57)
3) Amann (3-58)
4) Williams Research
Corporation (3-59)
1.22
1.32
For "mature"
engine
For roughly
contemporary
engines
Equipped with CVT
For a "mature"
metallic FSGT
Sixth generation
Chrysler turbine
For a "typical"
free-shaft engine
For the "WR-26"
engine
1.0
1.11
1.14
1.14
1.08
No difference from
MMFST foreseen
CVT requirement
CVT requirement
II. Specific Weight (lb/hp)
1) JPL, ATSP (3-60) 5.0 to 5.4 For an "advanced"
ICE powerplant
in compact size
range
5.5 to 5.8
2) JPL (3-2, p. 5-41,
Figure 5-12)
5.6 to 6
For an "updated
baseline" ICE
powerplant
For a "mature"
ICE powerplant
3) Rand (3-36, p. 88) 4.6 to 5.5 Contemporary
powerplants
(transmission and
emission systems
weight included)
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SOURCE VALUE(S)
ICE
ICE-CVT
COMMENT
MMFST
INFST
INSST
ADSST
1.0
1.0
ICE
I I IIiii l
Table 3.9 (continued)
POWERPLANT ATTRIBUTE VALUES DERIVED FROM LITERATURE
II. Specific Weight (lb/hp) (continued)
POWERPLANT
1) Sunstrand Aviation
(3-9, p. 3)
2) Mechanical Tech-
nology Incorporated
(3-10, p. 34)
1) Chrysler (3-61)
No signifi-
cant dif-
ference
from ICE
No signifi-
cant dif-
ference
from ICE
4.3 to 4.5
Estimated for ICE
with hydromechan-
ical transmission
Estimated for ICE
with hydromechan-
ical transmission
Estimated by in-
cluding trans-
mission weight
based on Rand
(3-36)
2) JPL (3-2, p. 5-41,
Figure 5-12)
4 to 4.3
No signifi-
cant dif-
ference
from MMFST
About 10%
better than
INFST
Corresponds to
roughly compact
class powerplant
Potential for
weight reduction
due to replace-
ment with ceramic
stationary hot-
parts uncertain,
but likely not
significant.
Assumption of no
advantage over
MMFST conserva-
tive
Once again, uncer-
tain, but based
on trend of
specific power
values for single
shaft powerplants
relative to free-
shaft powerplants
from JPL (3-2),
we have conserva-
tively assumed a
10% improvement
over MMFST
ICE-CVT
SOURCE VALUE(S) COMMENT
MMFST
INFST
INSST
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Table 3.9 (continued)
POWERPLANT ATTRIBUTE VALUES DERIVED FROM LITERATURE
II. Specific Weight (lb/hp) (continued)
POWERPLANT
1) Mclean (3-6)
2) JPL (3-2, p. 5-41,
Figure 5-12)
2.2
3.1
Crudely estimated
by scaling pro-
jections for
engine weight
per unit air mass
flow with mate-
rial density and
a characteristic
size. Estimated
(from Rand
(3-36)) weight of
transmission in-
cluded. Refers
to nominally 100
hp powerplant
Applies to a
powerplant of
about 150 hp
III. Efficiency
Present ICE base-
line used as
reference
1) Orshansky Trans-
mission Corpora-
tion (3-30)
1) Chrysler Upgraded
Engine (3-35)
2) JPL (3-2, p. 3-17
and p. 5-26)
20% improve-
ment over
ICE
About the
same as or
marginally
better than
present ICE
About the
same as
JPL's
"mature"
ICE
Improvement due to
replacement of
conventional
automatic trans-
mission by CVT in
test vehicle
Represents (yet
unachieved)
program goal
Derived from fuel
economy figures
for compact class
vehicles of
equivalent per-
formance by cor-
recting for dif-
fering inertia
weights
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ADSST
SOURCE VALUE (S) COMMENT
ICE
ICE-CVT
MMFST
Table 3.9 (continued)
POWERPLANT ATTRIBUTE VALUES DERIVED FROM LITERATURE
III. Efficiency (continued)
POWERPLANT
MMFST (cont.) 3) Volkswagen (3-54) Around 10%
better than
present ICE
Derived from
fuel economy
figures, for
roughly compact
class vehicles
1) Schultz (3-25) Roughly 10%
improvement
over metal-
lic turbine
Rough estimate of
improvement due
to ceramic
stationary hot
parts
1) JPL (3-2, p. 5-6) The single-shaft
turbine has an
efficiency roughly
10% higher than a
comparable free-
shaft, i.e., both
metallic configura-
tions
1) NASA, Lewis
Research Center
(3-52)
2) Mclean (3-6)
3) Detroit Diesel
Allison (3-21)
4) JPL (3-2, p. 3-17,
and p. 5-25)
From 10% to
40% better
than ICE-
CVT, about
30% to 60%
better than
ICE
About 25%
improvement
over ICE
About 20% to
30% improve-
ment over
metallic
turbine
engine
About 50%
improved
over JPL's
"mature"
ICE
Range due to
possible vari-
ations in de-
sign, for a
turbine
operating at
2500F
turbine inlet
temperature
For a turbine
inlet tempera-
ture of 2500OF
Applies to engines
for commercial
vehicles
Estimated as in
the case of MMFST
(see above)
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SOURCE VALUE(S) COMMENT
INFST
INSST
ADSST
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v
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Table 3.9 (continued)
POWERPLANT ATTRIBUTE VALUES DERIVED FROM LITERATURE
IV. Powerplant Specific Initial Cost ($S/design hp)
1) JPL (3-2, Chap. 11)
2) Rand (3-36, p. 34
and p. 88)
1) Volkswagen (3-54)
11-13
8.5-9.5
About 10%
higher than
than for
ICE
2-2.6 times
initial cost
of ICE of
same horse-
power
"Selling price"
estimate for
mature power-
plants of roughly
compact size, ad-
justed for infla-
tion to 1977 dol-
lars
Based on a
"sticker price"
of $1.13/lb of
engine, in 1973
dollars, adjusted
for inflation and
bracketing en-
gines of from 100
to 150 hp; trans-
mission and emis-
sion control
equipment costs
at $1.99/hp are
added after ad-
justment for in-
flation to 1977
dollars
Rough estimate
based on
cost of hydro-
mechanical trans-
mission that is
about 30% higher
than standard
automatic (3-9,
10)
Refers to "pro-
duction cost" of
engines of 100 to
150 hp
2) JPL (3-2, p. 11-12) 16-19.4 "Selling price"
estimate for a
powerplant of 107
hp equivalent in
performance to a
150 hp ICE
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ICE
ICE-CVT
MMFST
Table 3.9 (continued)
POWERPLANT ATTRIBUTE VALUES DERIVED FROM LITERATURE
IV. Powerplant Specific Initial Cost ($/design hp) (continued)
INFST
INSST
ADSST 1) Volkswagen (3-54) 1.4 to 2 Bracket
times
initial
cost of ICE
of same
horsepower
s "pro-
duction cost"
of engine of
50 to 100 hp
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4. FEDERAL RESEARCH STRATEGY
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we turn our attention to the strategic choices faced
by a federal R&D agency supporting technology development and production
(TD&P) of advanced automobile engines. We include in our category of
"advanced" engines the gas turbine and Stirling engines, which are not
expected to see commercial application prior to the late 1980s.1 We
exclude nearer-term alternatives such as the diesel and stratified charge
engines which are now available or could be in the early 1980s. The
discussion of the advanced engine programs will concentrate on the last
three stages of the TD&P process -- initial development, final
development, and introduction. We will pay particular attention to
strategic and competitive relations among the key participants. Needless
to say, all of the advanced engine programs entail significant technical
and economic risks about which there is great uncertainty and some
disagreement.
The set of choices to be made by the federal agency in this area may
be crudely decomposed into a three-level hierarchy. At the highest level
is the question of whether the federal government should be supporting
work in this area at all. The middle level is the set of what we term
"strategic" choices which determine the general framework and structure
of the program. The lowest level is the myriad of details which must be
decided for each research project.
1Note that the term "advanced" here is used to refer to any of the
technology levels (metallic, intermediate, and "advanced") discussed for
the gas turbine in the previous chapter and for the Stirling in (4-1).
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In this chapter the prior decision that there will be an active
federally supported advanced automotive powerplant R&D program is taken
as a given. The analysis presented in Chapter 2 above indicates
substantial ambiguity as to whether this should be the case.
Nevertheless, such a program now seems to have a reasonably secure place
within the larger program of energy R,D&D.
The key policy issues now hinge on the specific features of the
program, and these are what we address here. The most important part of
the effort will be to define just what the key choices are. The level of
analysis engaged in here proves unable to provide many convincing
normative distinctions. The relative desirability of the potential
advanced powerplants is not addressed here. There is a wide consensus in
the technical community that the gas turbine and Stirling engines
represent the power systems with the best potential for displacing the
internal combustion engine and the closely related variants (the diesel
and stratified charge systems). Electric and hybrid systems are dealt
with in a separate government program, and are not considered here. Nor
is the Rankine cycle engine, the other potential advanced heat engine
which might compete with the gas turbine or Stirling for a place in the
government program; it is not considered technical or economically
competitive.
Thus only the choices concerning the gas turbine and Stirling
systems against a broadly defined baseline are considered. Further, for
purposes of our analysis, we will assume them to have equally favorable
technological and economic prospects. The economic analyses reported in
Chapter 3 of this report and Chapter 5 of Federal Support (4-1) indicate
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highly uncertain but potentially large benefits from either, and do not
allow any detectable distinction. The key difference of relevance here
is the number of firms which are involved with each.
The core of the analysis is the relationship between the powerplant
R&D programs of the firms of the automotive industry and the support for
such programs by the federal government. The analysis must, on one hand,
respect previous patterns of behavior in the U.S. automobile industry
and, on the other hand, acknowledge the novelty (and uncertainty
associated with that novelty) of developing and producing an advanced
engine, especially with government support.
One of the historical patterns which we will assume for the future
is that there will be no significant production of advanced automotive
powerplants in the United States except by the three firms which have
produced all but a tiny fraction of those engines for the past
half-century. These are, of course, the automotive "Big Three" --
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. Thus only the Big Three firms and
the federal R&D agency (which is the U.S. Department of Energy) are
considered. Clearly, other firms may be party to certain advanced engine
development programs, although typically in subcontractor roles. Nor is
the additional complication created by several federal R&D agencies
hiring firms to do development work considered here, especially DOE's use
of NASA as an intermediary in contracting for research.
The analysis follows in four sections. In Section 2 we define the
goals we assume for the federal R&D agency and the Big Three. Next, the
process of Technology Development and Production (TD&P) in the automotive
industry is reviewed, with a focus on the pattern of technology change
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4.2 Goal Definition for the Federal R&D Agency and the Automotive
Manufacturers
Before appropriate government strategies to support industry TD&P
can be discussed, the goals of the government and important actors in the
U.S. automobile industry must be reviewed. A convenient distinction is
made between conceptual goals, which determine general strategic
principles, and concrete goals, which determine real activities.
For the R&D agency, the conceptual goal stated earlier (4-1, p. 89)
need only be repeated:
to reduce (for automotive transportation) life-cycle costs with
inputs valued in social terms (for social analysis) or in market
prices (for private market analysis), while meeting legislativelv
established environmental standards.
After the passage of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), fleet
average fuel economy standards must also be added to the constraints.
However, since the EPCA standards apply to the new car sales fleet
average, their incorporation into the analysis of individual vehicles is
complex and uncertain, as seen in Chapters 2 and 3 above. Allowing for
the qualifications expressed in Chapters 2 and 3, it remains reasonable
to suppose that the federal government will value decreases in fuel
consumption and in emissions more highly than the public or the Big Three.
The agency's concrete goal can be divided into three parts. First,
it wants to encourage more technological options for advanced engine
designs which have equivalent or improved fuel economy and emissions in
comparison to the ICE. Second, it wants to encourage successful
commercial adoption of advanced engines which have attractive social
attributes in the U.S. automobile market. Third, it wants to accomplish
these in a way which is most effective per dollar expended bv itself. In
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particular, it would like to avoid merely substituting its own dollars
for expenditures which would have been made by the firm in any case.
Indeed, it would like to stimulate increases in private expenditures with
its own. Obviously, success in meeting this goal cannot be measured
easily, due to ambiguity of firms' intentions as affected by government
expenditures.
The Big Three automobile firms -- General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler
-- complete the set of important actors. They alone among domestic
manufacturers can be expected to place significant numbers of cars on the
road possessing advanced engines. Their conceptual goal is to maximize
the market value of the firm. They achieve this through making
investments which maximize the value discounted to the present of
expected future cash flows. Of course, we are concerned here only with
the firms' activities within the automobile industry, not elsewhere.
We will omit direct discussion, here and later, of a large number of
"dependent" firms within the U.S. automobile industry: parts suppliers,
tooling manufacturers, and research firms. We also will not discuss,
except in the context of specific engines, American Motors and foreign
automobile manufacturers, who hold relatively small shares of the U.S.
market. To a simple approximation, the major decisions affecting the
powerplants of the U.S. automobile fleet over the next decade can he
assumed to be determined by the Big Three firms and the federal R&D
agency.
The Big Three firms' goals involve two parts defined along a
continuum; the parts differ only in a qualitative way and do not
necessarily require different activities. First, the firm wants to
develop an advanced engine, which it hopes to successfully introduce and
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establish in at least a niche within the market. Second, the firm wants
to maintain the capability to imitate quickly in production an advanced
engine introduced by a competitor.
In the first part of its goal, the Big Three firm attempts to
maximize its market value directly through introduction of its own new
engine. In the second part, the firm tries to minimize its losses from
an unfavorable competitive situation. It is, in fact, insuring itself
against the downside risk of another firm achieving the "successful"
engine.
There are a number of areas where one might anticipate discrepancies
between the goals of the Big Three and those of the R&D agency. First,
as discussed above, there may continue to be differences between the
agency's measures of social costs and benefits and the Big Three's market
prices.
Second, presumably the federal R&D agency is indifferent to the
source of the development of the "successful" advanced engine, while each
Big Three firm strongly prefers to develop it "in-house," i.e., it wishes
to avoid having it developed by one of its competitors. There exist
significant potential losses for firms which do not lead in technological
innovation. The government favors all increases in relevant
technological options and introductions of advanced engines into the
market (although it may be concerned about the transfer across firms of
the technology). Yet individual firms favor only increases of options
the benefits of which they can appropriate, and they are clearly
threatened by engines introduced by competitors.
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Third, there may be some potential for conflicting goals related to
differences in importance placed on industry stability during periods of
transition in the automobile fleet from the baseline engine to an
advanced engine. Again we presume that the federal R&D agency is
generally indifferent to changes in market shares caused by the
introduction of an advanced engine. However, it would certainly strive
to avoid the bankruptcy of one of the Big Three, so as to preserve at
least the level of competition which is present now. Presumably it would
also wish to avoid major disruptions of production, or significant
increases in foreign market share. While it is very unlikely that there
would be a new domestic entrant into the American market,l it is not
implausible that one of the firms (especially Chrysler) might go bankrupt
during a major transition period.
Certainly there appears to be no satisfactory reason for the R&D
agency to possess a hidden agenda of changing the structure of the U.S.
automobile industry through its support of R&D. The government --
through antitrust actions -- has far more direct means of affecting the
industry structure.
However, individual firms are definitely concerned about any changes
in their market shares. Unless either the total or the domestic
producers' share of the U.S. automobile market expands, increased sales
1According to White (4-2) it appears very unlikely that a new firm
can enter the U.S. automobile industry. Even with the possession of a
dramatically improved engine and car design, a new entrant would require
a minimum production capacity of 800,000 cars per year and a
billion-dollar expenditure.
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of cars with one type of engine take away from sales of cars with other
engines. An advanced engine must substitute in use for the baseline
engine, shifting sales between firms and divisions of firms.
The problem of stable transitions during substitution of engines
becomes exacerbated when one takes into account the numerous government
interventions into automobile market (such as emissions and fuel economy
standards, and fuel and vehicle taxes), and the uncertainty about future
interventions. As discussed in Chapter 2 above, the staged introduction
of emissions and fleet fuel economy standards generally encourages
incremental rather than radical changes in individual cars and their
engines, and in the composition of the new car fleet as a whole.
Changing the car's technology, especially through advanced engine design,
is only one of the tools available to the Big Three firms to meet the
standards. They may also decrease the size and weight of the vehicles,
and (to meet the fleet average fuel economy standards) increase the
relative prices of large, fuel-consuming cars. R&D programs on advanced
eninges offer a very attractive but uncertain route to meeting these
standards. Yet, in selecting their programs, the Big Three firms may be
juggling more operational goals -- particularly in meeting changes in
annual standards -- than is the federal R&D agency.
As a minor point, the agency is primarily concerned with outcomes in
the U.S. while the Big Three are concerned with their worldwide profits.
However, since a large percentage of the Big Three's sales occurs in the
U.S., this difference may not be operative.
Finally, there is at least some concern that the government spread
its R&D funds equitably among the Big Three firms. Some argue that only
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the relative merits of a firm's bid on a given contract should he
considered, while others argue for consideration of the total research
shares to each firm. If R&D funding is considered a simple subsidy, then
equity among shareholders of the firms might be a plausible concern. It
is more likely the case, however, that it is a possible competitive edge
achieved with government-supported technology that is of concern, and
thus equity is not really an issue but rather the agency's impact on
market structure.
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4.3 Review of the Process of Technology Development and Production
in the Automotive Industry
Issues of government research strategy necessarily depend very
heavily on the decision process in the automotive industry. Therefore it
is worthwhile to review the conceptual model developed previously (in
Chapter 2 of Federal Support) of that process. While the presentation
here necessarily overlaps the previous one, the emphasis here is somewhat
different. First, a clear distinction between technical and economic
considerations is maintained. Second, the present emphasis is on the
perspective of individual firms. Third, certain areas where trade-offs
appear to be available are made more specific. The focus here is on
the three central stages of the process of "Technologyv Development and
Production" (TD&P) -- Initial Development, Final Development, and
Introduction, and the decisions to invest in them.
4.3.1 Technical Learning in TD&P
In order to simplify a necessarily complex analysis, it seems
worthwhile to separate technical learning and decisions based primarily
on technical information from economic interpretation of technical
information and decisions based primarily on financial considerations.
For a private firm maximizing its market value, in general financial
considerations will dominate purely technical criteria in TD&P
decisions. Here, however, the perspective is that of a research director
at one of the Big Three firms who is responsible for the development of
technological capability for an engine but not for its application in the
business.
There are four important types of technical questions relevant to
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the later stages of advanced engine development. First, at what time
will the engine be ready to move on to the next stage, and, most
importantly, to be introduced? Second, what will be the technical
performance of the product at the current stage and later? Third, what
will be the cost of the development program and of the engine in actual
production? Fourth, what will be the usefulness, in a technological
sense, of the development program and the product's attributes?
Learning in the TD&P process is fundamentally achieved through
"doing" (4-3, pp. 156-157). Typically, conceptual problems become more
clearly defined by attempts to arrive at solutions to very concrete
engineering problems. Within a firm, the engineering staff becomes
familiar with an engine's particular attributes and develops greater ease
in handling problems. One can argue strongly for "economies of
experience" derived from past investments in manpower and machinery for a
particular engine.1 Obviously in the case of the ICE, all Big Three
firms are extremely familiar with the engine's most subtle properties.
Yet, even in the case of the gas turbine, there is a long history of
involvement by the engineering staffs of the Big Three firms.
Clearly, complicated dynamics of competing firms' plans and
executions of development programs cannot be captured through the
artifical designation of individual firm activities into sequential
stages at once and for all decisions about whether or not to proceed.
ISee (4-4) for an empirical exploration of economies of experience
for a very different industry.
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Firms always have the option to delay or accelerate decisions, to place a
project on a different schedule, and particularly to rethink decisions
after examining the outcomes of their own and others' projects. Despite
differences in the ability to resolve technical auestions at different
stages, firms will make go/no o decisions depending on the development
program's likelihood of meeting its targets and the probability of other
programs meeting their targets. Certainly there is room for disagreement
among participants over appropriate targets for different engine
programs. However, we are willing to assume -- given the availability of
public reports and frequent conferences -- that the Big Three firms are
quite well informed about each other's programs despite differences of
opinion concerning the future potential of different engines.
During the central three stages of TD&P, there are five important
engine attributes about which uncertainty may focus. First, there is the
power output of the engine per unit of fixed input (e.g., horsepower per
pound of metal). Obviously an engine's principal duty is to move the
car; it should do so with the smallest possible engine.
Second, efficiency of the advanced engine is a critical factor.
Again the size of the vehicle and the timing of the introduction of the
mandatory fleet average fuel economy standards (from EP(A) determine the
relevant requirements for engine efficiency.
Third, emissions standards must be met by the vehicles powered by
the advanced engines. Currently, the staged introduction of emissions
standards is designed to accommodate modest annual changes in the
baseline ICE. Any implicit trade-offs between different types of
emissions are arranged for the ICE (potentially with some
modifications). Certain advanced engines, although much superior to the
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ICE in some types of emissions, may face costly penalties in meeting
other constraints, such as particulate emissions.
Fourth, the bulk, weight, and packaging of the engine must be
considered for fitting the engine into the rest of the car. Weight is of
course particularly important because of its impact on fuel economy.
Fifth, the cost of manufacturing the engine becomes critically
important prior to a decision to begin production. Costs will depend on
a large number of factors, but particularly on the product's design,
materials requirements, and tooling needs. The cost of manufacture can
be expected to decline significantly with the development of the engine
design and experience in producing engines.
During the Initial Development Stage of the TD&P process for an
advanced engine, performance is typically not measured with the engine in
the vehicle. Ranges but not exact measures for efficiency (and thus
vehicle fuel economy) and emissions are obtained. Generally, important
information is generated about the final necessary size of the engine,
but little about its cost of manufacture. Certainly most of the
technical information concerns the potential performance of an engine in
production. Specific targets for the engine's final capabilities cannot
easily be formulated.
During the Final Development Stage, several generations of prototype
engines are tested on dynamometers and in actual cars. Much greater
emphasis is placed on realizing the engine's potential performance,
maximizing fuel economy, and satisfying emissions standards. Targets for
these attributes can be defined quite well, and the engine's potential,
with the best possible design, can be determined. Placing engines in
vehicles creates a direct source of information on the engine's "fit" to
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the car. Finally, engineering design work provides much more accurate
estimates of manufacturing costs. In fact, the cost of producing the
engine at introduction, and in more mature production, may become the
critical factor in comparison to the baseline engine.
During the Introduction Stage for an engine, learning on all
remaining areas of technical uncertainty takes place -- at a rapid pace
and potentially at a very high cost (should the engine fail). In
particular, the firm receives far more extensive feedback about the
engine's performance on the road and in actual consumer use. Also the
firm should learn very quickly about techniques for manufacturing the
engine.
The timing of introduction of an advanced engine depends primarily
on market as opposed to technical factors. However, in delaying or
advancing introduction the Big Three firms face a trade-off between
learning in preproduction engineering and learning in production.
Despite their large accumulation of experience in manufacturing ICEs, the
Big Three firms would still face considerable difficulty in forecasting
actual costs of producing new engines at different points in time. We
assume that the Big Three use sophisticated techniques in planning and
executing production. However, the simple tool of a learning curve can
approximate the typical experience of a firm in reducing manufacturing
costs. For a doubling of cumulative output, average cumulative costs per
unit tend to decline by a fixed percentage.
This tool allows one to estimate crudely the costs of producing
engines as the firm progresses from a production prototype engine to the
first and subsequent production runs. The expected decline in cost
arises from changes in product design, production flow, materials and
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supplies, tooling and equipment scheduling.
The firm may face another important trade-off in balancing product
design improvements against the costs of production changes. In
determining its strategy at introduction, the firm may attempt either to
maximize the engine's performance or to minimize its cost of production.
4.3.2 Economic Expenditures and Returns in TD&P
In this section the economic, or financial, interpretation of the
value of technical learning during the TD&P process for advanced engines
is examined. Generally one can view an investment in TD&P as similar to
any investment: expenditures are made now for returns expected later.
The payoffs of TD&P to the Big Three firm correspond to the goals
outlined in Section 4.2 above. The primary payoff corresponds to the
goal of developing the "successful" engine. This event occurs when the
firm introduces an advanced engine which replaces the baseline engine in
part of the U.S. market. From the perspective of the late 1980s, one
will be able to identify one engine (or perhaps two, or none) actually
introduced from among several of the current candidates. However, one
uses too narrow a definition of the economic value of activities in TD&P
if one only places a positive value after the fact on actions leading in
a linear sequence to a "successful" engine.
The secondary payoff to investments in TD&P corresponds to the goal
of quick imitation of a competitor's engine. This rises from insurance,
provided by development work, against the loss of competitive position in
IThis is demonstrated in the discussion by Abernathy and Wayne
(4-5) of the experience of Henry Ford.
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the event that a competitor introduces an advanced engine. Clearly there
can be no value in projects which never produce a commercial engine.
However, these projects, like all development projects, may have once had
valuable content in the form of a special sort of asset. This asset is
the option to proceed to the next stage of development of an engine, and
maintains a positive value until there no longer exists a potential for
commercial introduction of the engine (4-6, p. 46). Thus certain
projects can provide temporary hedges for a firm against certain
outcomes, even if they do not eventually lead to a successful engine.
There are other features of the economic aspects of the TD&P process
which make investments in it somewhat unusual. First, an advanced engine
has a direct payoff only if its attributes dominate those of the baseline
engine in at least part of the U.S. automobile market and if the engine
is introduced into that part of the market. We need to look again at the
technical attributes of the engines to measure their economic value in
market prices. The comparison is between engine and the baseline of the
late 1980s (most likely the ICE, diesel, or stratified charge engine) on
the technical attributes discussed above. Clearly, if the advanced
engine is superior in all attributes to the baseline engine, one can
state unambiguously that the former dominates the latter. However, it
appears unlikely that an advanced engine would prove superior in all
attributes.
Second, the price of the advanced engine (which must be compared to
its cost of production) must be derived from the market value of the
combined attributes of the engine within the total car. Initially, the
advanced engine may substitute for the baseline in only certain
automobile sizes or certain models. Again there is great difficulty in
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determining market prices on regulated emissions. Perhaps even more
ambiguous is the price of fuel economy given the fleet average fuel
economy standards, in this case, as discussed in Chapter 2, the value of
fuel economy to the consumer; presumably the latter is based only on the
discounted flow of expenditures on fuel. Through raising the initial
price of cars, the firm may be able to shift some of the burden of this
"implicit tax" on fuel consumption to purchasers of cars with high fuel
consumption. However, in the absence of government taxes and subsidies
the firm may have to subsidize internally the production of certain
engines, or car sizes, to achieve its desired mix of car sales and to
meet the fleet fuel economy standards (4-7, Chapter 3).
Third, investments in TD&P, like other investments in R&D, but
unlike typical corporate investments, frequently require for their
justification the expectation of short-term monopoly profits in
exploiting the competitive advantage of a technical innovation. It is a
common view that firms need the reward of abnormally high profits as a
motivation for risky investments in R&D. Yet one of the Big Three firms
in the automobile industry may not be able to appropriate all the
benefits of its innovation -- due either to certain benefits accruing to
purchasers as "consumer surplus" or to implicit constraints on the firm
preventing it from capturing its full advantage. The firm leading with a
prominent fuel-saving innovation might not be able to withhold the
licensing of rights or to raise the price of its engines.
Fourth, an increase in the number of advanced engine programs can be
expected to increase the likelihood of the introduction of a "successful"
advanced engine and provide insurance against several program failures.
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Yet the economic benefits of advanced engine programs depend inversely on
progress made in the baseline engine. As a secondary effect, an increase
in the number of advanced engine programs decreases the likelihood that
any one particular engine will achieve technical attributes dramatically
superior to those of the next best. Further, the expected economic
benefit of a particular engine program may be reduced slightly by the
addition of other promising candidates in the field.
Fifth, TD&P programs have an unusual pattern of expenditures,
different from many other investments. To a rough approximation,
expenditures increase by an order of magnitude in proceeding from one
stage to the next. Initial Development may cost $10 million, Final
Development $100 million, and Introduction, $1 billion. Not even a Big
Three firm can make decisions to expend such large sums of money casually.
The assumption here is that there exists greater uncertainty for a
Big Three firm in interpreting the economic value of its in-house and
competitors' programs than in estimating their technical status. Clearly
the costs of developing and producing advanced engines and the market
prices of engine attributes may fluctuate significantly during the next
decade. Yet if the firm is lucky it can estimate the expected values of
different advanced engines along the key attributes and eliminate
investments in certain engines. Still, there are caveats one must
recognize in ranking engines along expected economic returns from a
direct sequence of stages from Initial Development to Introduction.
First, the rankings are usually ambiguous now and are likely to change in
the future. Second, the development of several engines, perhaps through
Initial and Final Development, may be necessary for development of a more
advanced engine. Third, there mav be a value to particular firms in
certain engine programs as hedges against competitors' developments.
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We have presented the technical and economic aspects of the TD&P
process from the perspective of a Big Three firm, able independently to
implement the total process. The maintained assumption is that the firm
has the resources to do what it wants on its own without government
financing. However, in the next section the respective roles of the Big
Three firms and the federal R&D agency in combined R&D ventures are
examined more directly.
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4.4 General Analysis of Strategic Choices to Be Made in Advanced
Power System R&D Programs
Decisions for all parties in the area depend on evaluations of
industrial projects as investments and then arrangements for financing.
The firms and the agency first select among engine projects based upon
their expected return adjusted for risk. Then the firms and agency make
final decisions on programs based on their willingness to finance the
programs, either independently or jointly. In other words, one can
initially examine advanced engines solely as investments. However, one
must consider secondarily the effects of financial contracts between
parties, especially between large private firms and the government.
Therefore in this section we take the following approach. First we
define and discuss the parameters which describe individual engine R&D
projects, as investments. Next we describe the properties of R&D
strategies, or combinations of projects, as they are available to each
firm, and to the agency, and review generally the circumstances which
would affect the reltive desirability of the strategies. The section
closes with a review of the areas where difficulties associated with
negotiations between the agency and the firms make strategic choices
difficult.
4.4.1 Considerations in Project Selection
In this subsection the key considerations in project selection will
be laid out. The first four are parameters which differentiate advanced
engine projects. It would be desirable to construct the parameters so
that they are as distinct and independent of each other as possible.
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However, certain of the parameters frequently must be coupled to one
another in actual applications. The parameters defined here are intended
to be relevant to both the private parties and the R&D agency in setting
their respective strategies.
We define the first parameter, like several others, roughly along a
continuum -- based on the stage in the TD&P process and level of
technical difficulty (and riskiness, therefore) of the advanced engine
project. Presumably, at the time of consideration, the most advanced
engine designs will only be ready for Initial Development. Less advanced
engines will be ready for Final Development, while certain engines could
be nearly prepared for Introduction (perhaps prematurely for advanced
engines prior to the late 1980s). The stage of development of different
engine programs carries importance for the Big Three firms in planning
for baseline engines in the fleets in future years. This stage of
development has importance for the R&D agency because of the government's
traditional role (outside of industries involving direct government
procurement) of supporting earlier rather than later stages of
development . The R&D agency has a more difficult case to make in
supporting a firm introducing an advanced engine if it does not intend to
grant substantial long-term support.
The second parameter is the financial riskiness of the engine
project. The two types of risk -- technological and economic -- are, as
discussed above, somewhat independent. The former is included here in
the first parameter and the latter in the second. For example, one
engine may require very little technical advance but may carry high
economic risks due to uncertainties in the market values of its
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attributes. Another engine might require a very risky technological
breakthrough. Assuming success in that breakthrough though, the engine
might be introduced with little economic risk.
A third parameter is the degree to which an engine promises advances
in either marketable attributes or in "social" attributes not fully
valued in market prices. The Big Three firms are very unlikely to
develop an engine with socially valued attributes that are not coupled to
attributes valued with suitable market prices. Generally the R&D agency
is most concerned with supporting engines with socially valued
attributes, particularly low emissions and fuel consumption. However,
major problems could occur if the agency zealously supports an engine
which could never achieve market acceptance, even if it were socially
valuable, unless the agency intends to subsidize the engine in the long
term (after its introduction), or expects federal policy to legally
change the value of the social attributes.
The fourth parameter, again defined along a continuum, focuses on
whether to develop a whole engine system or to concentrate on certain kev
components. A "components" strategy seems attractive if the success of
one or more engine systems is contingent on the successful resolution of
the manufacture of a certain component. Sometimes the expense of
developing prototype engines can be delayed until a breakthrough in a
particular component (such as a ceramic turbine wheel) creates immediate
possibilities for several engine types. On the other hand, a "systems"
strategy might be advocated if it were possible to learn more quickly
about different engine configurations. Certain components once believed
to be critical for success might lose their importance with a
modification to the overall system.
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Beyond the four project parameters, there are three other key
considerations involving the firm's or agency's choice of projects in
fashioning a satisfactory strategy. The fifth consideration is the
number of different engines in the strategy. This requires the most
complicated analysis, as a variety of factors encourages behavior in
conflicting directions by the Big Three firms and the federal R&D
agency. Here as in all R&D cases the investor is faced with a problem of
forecasting technolgical outcomes, given different allocations of
resources and different paths to the solutions. Further, after a "bet"
has been made on a technical outcome, the investor must then bet on the
economic benefits associated with the outcome.
The same arguments can be made for a diversification of engine
programs that are made for parallel.R&D strategies. The pursuit of
several engine programs represents a decision to delay selection from
among engine candidates until more information is available. The value
of this type of action derives from an improved choice of the best
approach, and a better hedge against failure of all approaches. (Also,
to be discussed below, there is enhanced competition among teams.)
The strategy is justified under several conditions. There must be a
reasonably well-defined task target attribute, in the case of advanced
engines. There should also be a high priority in achieving these
attributes. Further, several approaches must be available to fulfill the
task. Finally, the preferred approach cannot be currently identified
(4-8).
The number of engines supported in a strategy depends positively on
the differences in the approaches and the differences in the estimates of
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the engine attributes from the various approaches, and depends negatively
on the costs of the approaches. Again, the costs of engine development
increase tremendously in the later stages of TD&P. Therefore,
diversification across engines is far more likely to be reasonable if the
time at which a selection can be made occurs early in the process rather
than late. It would probably be unwise for a firm to conduct several
engine projects through the Introduction Stage if the firm could have
curtailed the inferior program earlier (4-, p. 82).
Competitive factors also affect the choice between types of
projects. Therefore a sixth consideration, which is relevant primarily
to the federal R&D agency and less important to the Big Three firms, must
be introduced. This is the decision to support diversified or duplicate
efforts at different firms. It depends almost entirely on the agency's
assumptions about the nature of competition in R&D among the Big Three
firms. Specifically, the issue is whether the most competition arises
from several teams working on the same advanced engine or from several
teams working on different engines.
The first type of competition might be called "technical." A firm,
and specifically its technical staff, may respond most directly to
competition for the completion of a task when another team is assigned to
the same task. If this type of competition is judged important, it would
certainly encourage government support of duplicate efforts on the same
engine at different firms.
The second type of competition might be called "business"
competition. A firm, and particularly its general management, might
respond most to the total R&D strategies of the other firms. It would
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not necessarily feel obligated to match on a one-to-one basis the
projects of its competitors. It might be assumed that the second type of
competition, because of its generality, would, if operative, dominate
technical competition. In this case, the R&D agency need not be
concerned to find multiple teams for each engine.
Finally a seventh consideration is necessary. It is a matter of
choice by the Big Three, but a key factor to be considered by the R&D
agency. The strategies for all parties will depend on both the economic
potential of the engine programs and their sources of financing. In
particular, different strategies should emerge based on company responses
in the TD&P process to the potential availability of government support.
There appear to be two important aspects, again different but not
entirely independent, involved in potential Big Three responses. First,
a firm may be to various degrees willing to pursue work it does not
consider privately profitable to its central business of building cars.
A firm obviously rejects many engine programs with large amounts of risk
and inadequate expected returns. Yet a subset of the programs may have
adequate social returns so as to be worth undertaking. The question,
then, is the degree to which a given firm will apply its resources, even
if subsidized by government funds, to projects it would not consider
profitable when evaluated without consideration of the subsidy.
Second, a Big Three firm may impute some penalty on development work
financed by government funds. That is, a dollar received from the
government might be valued at well less than one dollar. Presumably the
size of the penalty would depend on the company's ability to appropriate
the benefits of the work (whether it had given up plans, patent or
licensing rights) and on the difficulties in contracting with the outside
party.
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We might define four types of responses of the firm which combine
the two aspects of the seventh parameter. First, the firm could decline
to work on any advanced engine program which it did not consider
privately profitable. Further, it could consider the penalty for
receiving one dollar of government funding to be at least the dollar
itself. In this response, the company selects only the projects that it
cares to finance internally, and does not accept federal subsidies even
for these. (This response appears to summarize the position until
recently of General Motors.)
In the second response, the firm could be willing to perform certain
projects which it did not deem privately profitable. Further, it could
consider the penalty for receiving one dollar of government funding to be
significantly less than the dollar itself. However, the firm would
choose to conduct, under its own financing, all projects considered
privately profitable. Presumably certain "high risk" projects would
be acceptable for government funding and company operation. (This
response appears to represent that of the Detroit Diesel Allison Division
of GM and the stated positions of Ford and Chrysler.)
In the third response, the firm might be willing to perform with
government funding certain projects not privately profitable and certain
projects which it does consider profitable. In other words, the firm
could subtitute government funds for its own funds in both profitable and
unprofitable ventures. The penalty on receiving a government dollar for
any engine project in this case is valued at less than one dollar.
Fourth, a firm may be willing to conduct any research suggested by
government without concern for its content. In the other three responses
we have assumed that the firms would refuse any project with no positive
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potential benefits for developing advanced automobile engines. However,
it is possible that a firm could sell the services of its research
laboratories in a manner similar to an R&D firm performing contract
research on a "cost-plus" basis. None of the Big Three firms states a
willingness to perform this type of function. Assuming their obvious
commitment to the automobile business and a limited capacity in the short
run to expand their research staffs and facilities, only a single
situation in which one of the Big Three firms would show this response
can be imagined. In this case, the firm would perform development work
on a high-visibility project in order to demonstrate government-industry
cooperation and improve its public image.
If a firm has a "Type One" response, there can be no contract
between the government and that firm.
In a practical sense, there is substantial difficulty in separating
company responses two and three. If the government negotiates
successfully a contract with one of the firms, it does not necessarily
know whether it is in fact financing a profitable or unprofitable
venture. If the firm is truly showing a Type Two response, the
government's dollars do not substitute for research dollars which the
firm would otherwise spend itself. In fact, the addition of the engine
project may make other projects more attractive. As in priming a pump,
government dollars might induce increased expenditures by the firm.
However, if the firm truly is showing a Type Three response, government
dollars may merely be substituting for company dollars. As stated
previously, this is inconsistent with the previously hypothesized goals
of the federal R&D agency.
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Since no firm can be expected to state explicitly that it would
conduct its development program in exactly the same manner and over the
same time horizon independently of the source of funding, the R&D agency
must use careful judgment in estimating the differential impact of its
investment on the firm's actions. In fact, the government should be
careful in negotiating, particularly with Ford and Chrysler, that these
firms are not really showing response Type Three, instead of Two, and
substituting government dollars for their own without changing their
planned engine programs. Clearly the best protection for the government
derives from tough bargaining in arriving at contracts.
4.4.2 Strategies for the Big Three and the Federal R&D Agency
in Supporting Automotive R&D
In this section several model strategies for the Big Three firms,
and several for the federal R&D agency, are presented. They combine the
project parameters previously discussed into distinct "packages."
Clearly there exists a very large number of possible strategies combining
the parameters into all sorts of configurations. Furthermore, the
strategies of each party must depend greatly on those of the others.
In the first company strategy, the firm becomes a "specialist." It
concentrates all of its own resources (allocated to advanced engines) in
what it considers the most likely candidate for commercial introduction.
The firm selects its "best" candidate -- the one with minimum business
risk -- after the Initial Development Stage, and goes with it at full speed
through the Final Development and Introduction Stages, assuming con-
tinuing success. The engine is likely to be in the less technically
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advanced category of advanced engines corresponding, for example, to the
metallic gas turbine engine discussed in Chapter 3 above. In this case,
the firm is developing an entire engine system and will itself perform or
hire out all essential activities. Assuming that the company has a Type
Two response to government funding, it funds this high priority project
by itself. That is, it views the project as privately profitable and,
given its aversity to government funding, supports it internally.
Assuming a Type Three response, the firm obtains, if possible, some funds
from the R&D agency. That is, if it is not averse to accepting
government funding, it seeks to substitute those funds for its own,
without changing its R&D project. Clearly the specialist strategy does
not offer the company strong protection against the successful
development of other engines by its competitors.
In the second strategy, the Big Three firm maintains a defensive
posture, attempting to maximize its "protection" against other firms'
competitive advantages from engine programs. The firm spreads its
development efforts over several engine types in different stages of
TD&P. The firm invests in several engine types to hedge against
developments made by competing firms. This strategy depends on the
partial duplication of the efforts of other firms and offers significant
possibilities for commercial introduction by other companies. Generally
the projects duplicated will tend to involve whole engine systems (so
that the firm is prepared for a rapid Final Development Stage). with
limited technical risk but significant financial risk (if pursued
aggressively by the leading firm). Pursuing this strategy, the firm
expects to maintain some in-house familiarity with any engine
successfully developed by a competitor. Again depending on whether the
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firm has a Type Two or Type Three response to government funds, it will
finance its projects internally or will seek government support.
In the third strategy the Big Three firm places its bet only on very
"advanced technology." In this case, the firm must implicitly expect
significant positive shifts in the baseline engine. Further, it must be
well aware of the very high cost of the Final Development and
Introduction Stages for any advanced engine. Therefore, the firm
concentrates on Initial Development of technically sophisticated engine
components, hoping for a breakthrough that will facilitate development of
a much improved engine system. This strategy requires the smallest
direct expenditure, at least in the near term, and produces a small
probability of a very large economic return in the distant future.
By not investing resources in less advanced solutions, the firm
clearly hopes that it can imitate easily or purchase from its competitors
the manufacturing technology necessary to match a competitor's less
technically advanced engine in the market . It would seem reasonable to
expect that this type of strategy would be financed largely by the
federal R&D agency, as it entails risky technology with a distant
economic return.
The two remaining possible strategies for a Big Three firm require
little description. In the fourth strategy, the firm goes all out in
supporting a wide variety of advanced engine programs. The firm invests
large sums of its dollars (and those of the government, if available) in
the hope of selecting as soon as possible the trulyv "best" engine. In
the fifth strategy, the firm does little development work on advanced
engines. This strategy requires either a pessimistic forecast of other
competitors' efforts or belief in the firm's own ability to imitate
quickly a new engine even without an ongoing effort of its own.
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In setting its strategy the federal R&D agency must be particuarly
responsive to the Big Three strategies, which are not usually explicitly
stated or necessarily consistent over time. In its first strategy, the
R&D agency acts as a "specialist," like a firm, allocating its total
support to the engine most likely to achieve commercial introduction.
The government can pick from among all of the engine types and, unlike
the Big Three firms, from among each of the automobile manufacturers'
projects. Again, with the current high level of uncertainty about the
potentials of different engine types, the R&D agency may find itself in
agreement or disagreement with the Big Three firms. If the agency
chooses to encourage development of an engine type in which one firm is
currently "specializing," there may be no use for additional government
expenditure to accelerate the program. If the agency picks an engine
that no firm is actively developing, it should first reexamine the
reasons for its disagreement with the Big Three. Then the agency should
determine whether one of the firms has the capability and commitment to
perform the development with government funding. In the most likely
case, the agency will provide supplemental support to an engine already
in development by at least one of the firms. Hopefully it will actually
accelerate the company's research, and not merely substitute government
for company dollars.
This strategy does not expand the "protection," for the industry and
the nation as a whole, of assuring at least one "successful" advanced
engine in the marketplace in the late 1980s. It also could create
certain problems of equity in supporting exclusively one firm's efforts.
Some special provisions might have to be made to aid in the transfer of
technical knowledge and manufacturing experience to other firms in the
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event of a successful introduction. This strategy does, however, promote
the development of the strongest commercial option, and encourages the
accelerated introduction of an advanced engine into the market.
In the second strategy the federal R&D agency concentrates its
investments in an advanced engine with significant "social attributes."
The R&D agency selects an engine which has received relatively little
private development attention but has very positive social attributes
coupled with at least a few favorable market attributes -- excepting,
perhaps, initial cost. In this case, the R&D agency would probably have
to grant large subsidies to the firm to develop the engine and would hope
for some breakthrough in cost. This strategy depends critically on the
later incorporation of the social attributes into market prices, perhaps
through changes in the emissions and fuel economy standards or
implementation of taxes and subsidies.
In the third strategy, the federal R&D agency supports several
advanced engine programs to maximize its "protection" against the
possibility of no advanced engine appearing on the U.S. market during the
1980s. In no sense does this strategy offer the government and
automobile industry additional insurance against the failure of the
advanced engine programs. This insurance is provided by the continued
improvement of the baseline engine -- currently the ICE and in the near
future possibly either the diesel or stratified charge engine. Actually only
the electric vehicle programs offer significant additional insurance against
the lack of availability or the gross unattractiveness of fossil fuel to
power automobiles.
To pursue this strategy of limited protection, the R&D agency might
assume that the Big Three firms respond primarily to "technical"
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competition. One might reasonably expect both that a "successful" engine
would be introduced faster and that other firms would quickly imitate the
leading firm's production. The R&D agency would have to exercise
judgment in offering to the Big Three the minimum support necessary to
encourage duplicate efforts. In particular, duplicate efforts could
arise if the government funds only one or no teams at all.
In a fourth strategy, closely related to the third, the federal R&D
agency again seeks protection against the development of no new advanced
engine. In this case, the R&D agency might assume that firms respond
mainly to "business" competition. The government would then support
programs on diverse engine designs, betting on the pressure of
competitors' total R&D programs to induce increased company
expenditures. As always, the R&D agency risks substituting its funds for
company funds and spreading too thinly its limited resources. The
advantages of this strategy lie in the increased encouragement for firms
to insure themselves against competitors' innovations and in decreased
ability of one firm to appropriate monopoly profits from its innovation.
In the fifth model the R&D agency supports exclusively development
of more "advanced technology" applicable to several advanced engines.
Here the government bets against fairly heavy odds on a very large but
delayed economic payout. It can fund a variety of research institutions,
including Big Three research laboratories, R&D firms, tooling and
component suppliers, and nonprofit organizations, to develop new
applications of materials and manufacturing technology. Clearly this
strategy offers the government the widest range of possible
participants. Yet there may be significant problems in directing the
research efforts toward a consistent goal and in transferring technical
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knowledge to the Big Three firms, which are finally the onlv parties
capable of performing TD&P on an advanced engine toward implementation.
Again, there are two final strategies for the federal R&D agency --
to fund everything, or to fund nothing. Both of these alternatives
obviously appear to be very unlikely choices. The former requires a
large and indiscriminate role for the government; the latter ignores the
apparently strong political arguments for government action.
4.4.3 Key Areas of Ambiguity in Choosing a Federal Strategy
The ambiguity related to advanced engine R&D arises from two main
sources: lack of full information about current (and, obviously, future)
projects, and disagreement among parties about available information.
First, at this point in time, there is a high degree of uncertainty
about the potential of the competing engine designs that might be
introduced successfully in the late 1980s. The analysis in Chapter 3 of
this report and Chapter 5 of Federal Support (4-1) documents this in some
detail. With such a long time horizon, disagreements within firms and
across firms about the best course of action seem very legitimate. The
R&D agency should recognize these disagreements and weight the firms'
opinions according to their allocation of inhouse funds to different
projects. Clearly firms give strong signals in their budgets about their
estimates of the potential likelihood of an engine introduction. The
agency could disagree reasonably with some or all of the firms on certain
technical and economic judgments. However, the agency should check
before funding a privately "underfunded" project to see whether it truly
has positive "social" potential and is not an unattractive project from
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the perspective of all parties. In particular, the federal R&D agenc
should respect the manufacturing and marketing expertise of the Big Three
firms, which should certainly exceed that of the government.
Second, there are persistent problems associated with contracts
between parties. As stated previously in the discussion of company
responses to government funding, one can never determine exactly the
differences between company plans with and without government funding.
Currently, government support to advanced engine R&D still represents
a small fraction of the total Big Three allocation to technology
development. However, with the availability of long-term government
support, the burden of financing research could shift, at least in part,
from the Big Three to the public.
There are also difficulties associated with the limited number of
potential parties with which the- R&D agency can contract. Frequently the
government will be constrained to accept bids from as few as three
contractors (or not even all of the Big Three). For development of
engine systems components and more basic research, the government may
face more candidates. Presumably the Big Three are capable of hiring
subcontractors so as to complete their tasks more efficiently. With some
negative political side effects the R&D agency could hire foreign
automobile manufacturers; however, this would probably create more
trouble in monitoring contracts. Foreign firms also have fewer resources
and less concern for the peculiar problems of doing business in the
American automobile market.
In all contracts between parties, one can potentially confront a
"moral hazard" (4-10, pp. 313-319). In examining outcomes after the
fact, one cannot always separate chance occurrence from events created by
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a party's specific decision. In the general case of advanced automobile
engine development, no particular problems should arise since the firm
and the R&D agency both presumably desire a favorable outcome for the
program. However, if a firm carries out parallel development programs,
one supported by its own funds and the other supported by the government
(requiring some limitations on the firm's patent and licensing rights),
success may "automatically" shift only to the company-sponsored work.
Third, the lack of precedent for government support to the TD&P
process in the automobile industry creates several potential hazards. In
particular, considerations often reputed to be politically important
cannot be met clearly by any one the R&D agency's strategies. There are
no promises of early commercial payoffs for an advanced engine. Certain
engines, such as the metal gas turbine and Ford's Stirling engines, could
be demonstrated soon in actual vehicles. Yet neither engine is even
nearly ready for commercial introduction. These engines are "research
tools," not "commercial" engines. The expected high rate of failure of
the advanced engine programs also seems unpalatable for the public. With
extensive additional expenditures, the government can force programs to
achieve technical success. However, it cannot force commercial
acceptance for a risky, new consumer product. Finally, there exists
considerable political disagreement concerning the appropriateness of any
government interventions in the later stages of product development. In
particular, different parties place more or less emphasis on fairness in
the allocation of government support and on the smoothness of the
automobile industry's transition to a major new engine.
Fourth, inherent in the concept of any "strategy" is a coherent plan
that designates actions contingent on a variety of potential outcomes. A
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true strategy requires consistency in goals and methods for meeting those
goals. It also requires flexibility in modifying actions in response to
new information and circumstances. Thus, the federal R&D agency must
strike a balance between consistency and flexibility in maintaining a
strategy over time. Certainly, without a stable strategy the R&D agency
merely introduces into the business environment of the U.S. automobile
industry one more source of government-induced uncertainty.
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4.5 Strategic Choices Available to the Federal R&D Agency
We now begin a three-part exercise to apply the above-developed
analysis to the government's decisions now at hand. As always, the test
of any analytic framework is whether it provides increased understanding
of the available alternatives and indicates likely consequences of
actions. In the first two parts here we will discuss the options
available to the federal R&D agency to support TD&P on the gas turbine
and Stirling engines. Again, we have confined the choice of options to
versions of these two engines, omitting nearer term solutions such as the
diesel and stratified charge engines and more distant future solutions
such as the electric vehicle.
In the third part, we present a brief description of apparent Big
Three strategies, before proposing alternative strategies or "packages"
of actions, for the federal R&D agency. At this point we primarily are
interested in actual contracts between the government and Big Three
firms. However, we will not pursue specific aspects of the contract
process, but will suggest programs with which the government might wish
to become involved.
We might provide a quick review of the concrete goals for the
government and Big Three before introducing the options through which
they might implement their respective strategies. The federal R&D agency
wants to increase the available technical options (with reduced emissions
and fuel consumption), to avoid substitution of government dollars for
private dollars, and to focus its expenditures on advanced engines with
large potential payoffs in commercial introduction. A Big Three firm
wants to develop an engine through the stage of successful introduction
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into the U.S. automobile market and to protect its competitive position
in the event of competitor introduction of an engine. Also, the critical
engine attributes include performance, fuel economy, emissions, size and
cost of manufacture.
Options for R&D on the Gas Turbine Engine
For several reasons the gas turbine engine provides an interesting
case for government support. First, all of the Big Three firms have long
histories of involvement with the engine type in passenger car and other
applications. Second, all three firms currently show strong interest in
the engine. Third, there are a number of different versions of the
engine, varying in their requirements for technical innovation and in
their potential for successful commercial introduction. As in the
general case, significant uncertainty and disagreement surround each of
the options, and all parties do not favor the same options. Fourth,
critical engine attributes for the gas turbine are emissions (long-term
standards can probably be met), fuel economy (which depends on the
version of the engine), and manufacturing cost (which for near-term
versions greatly greatly exceeds that of the baseline ICE).
We will introduce the alternative programs available for the gas
turbine, distinguishable by the parameters outlines in Section 4.4. The
first version consists of an all metal turbine engine -- currently being
developed by Chrysler and the Engineering Staff of General Motors. A
major problem for project selection begins here. There are two potential
configurations for the gas turbine: the single shaft (simpler but
requiring a continuously variable transmission (CVT)) and a free-shaft
version not requiring the CVT. There is definite disagreement over the
better option for an engine receiving commercial introduction. GM has
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been working on the double-shaft engine at its Engineering Staff and on a
single-shaft engine at Detroit Diesel Allison Division. Officers at
Chrysler and Ford have stated that they favor the single-shaft
configuration for introduction. The metallic free-shaft gas turbine is
currently in final development and is a candidate for perhaps premature
introduction. As discussed in the previous chapter, the limited
technical riskiness of this engine seems to be matched by its limited
promise for commercial success.
The second version is the "intermediate" gas turbine engine.
Vehicles using this version of the engine show gains in fuel economy of
10% to 25% over the 1977 baseline ICE, through the use of ceramics in the
hot flow path -- except in the turbine rotor, the most important
component. Again, the choice of a single- or double-shaft configuration
for the engine system has not been resolved. From discussions with
industry officials, there appears to be a general consensus at Chrysler
and Ford, of skepticism concerning the success of commercializing an
"intermediate" engine with only this range of improvement in fuel economy
over today's vehicles. In fact, both GM and Ford are currently
forecasting 20% improvement in the fuel economy of the baseline engine by
the early 1980s using the nearer term diesel and stratified charge
engines. Thus, to predict the successful commercialization of the
"intermediate" gas turbine, one requires an optimistic forecast about the
fuel economy (and manufacturing cost) of the "intermediate" gas turbine
and a pessimistic forecast about the fuel economy of the baseline engine
in the 1980s. This engine is currently ready for final development, with
all Big Three potentially interested in programs of government support.
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The third option involves the development of an "advanced" gas
turbine engine. This engine has ceramic components in all hot flow
parts, including the turbine. These parts allow increased operating
temperatures and offer up to 50% improved fuel economy over the 1977
ICE-powered vehicles and significant improvement over the baseline
engines projected for the 1980s. This engine is currently ready for the
Initial Development Stage. It would involve more a "components" than a
"systems" program, as defined above. There is the greatest technical
uncertainty associated with this program, but also the greatest potential
for applications of the new technology to other advanced engines
(particularly the Stirling), given a breakthrough. If the materials and
manufacturing problems are resolved to satisfaction, then the advanced
gas turbine can be introduced with a larger expected economic payoff.
Currently Ford has a substantial ceramic component program with some
government support. Chrysler has a small program -- involving certain
suppliers -- which is funded internally. General Motors has no active
program in this critical area.
We will delay discussion of possible courses of action for the
federal R&D agency in supporting gas turbine programs until after we have
introduced the Stirling options.
Options for the R&D on the Stirling Engine
In this second of three parts we will introduce the options available
for development programs on the Stirling engine. In some ways the
Stirling engine provides a less interesting case than the gas turbine.
The federal R&D agency has far fewer options, since Ford, a relative
newcomer to the Stirling, is the only Big Three firm currently interested
in directly participating in a program. General Motors dropped completely
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its Stirling engine program in 1970; Chrysler has never had such a
program. Ford has coordinated its efforts with Philips, now the most
experienced developer of this engine, and United Stirling, a highly
regarded new participant. The technical and programmatic history and the
key factors affecting the economic value of the Stirling engine are laid
out in Federal Support (4-1, Chap. 5).
There are several complications bearing on the Stirling case that are
not relevant to the gas turbine. First, the federal R&D agency cannot
necessarily contract directly with Ford for the sale of patent and
licensing rights. Many of these belong to Philips.
Second, Ford does not necessarily possess all the experience and
expertise currently available on the Stirling. However, because it
coordinates its efforts with Philips and United Stirling, the government
does not appear to have a likely separate candidate with which to
contract. There has been some discussion of forming a new team of United
Stirling and U.S. engine manufacturers. Given the pooled technology
available to Ford and the apparent lack,of interest at Chrysler and GM,
there seems to be no obvious vehicle for duplication of the Stirling
efforts by several teams or diversification of efforts on several phases
of engine development.
Third, the R&D agency faces all of the typical problems involved in
contracting with a single party. There are no other parties to force
competitive bids for a fair contract. In particular, Ford does not
necessarily have to show its full hand in negotiating. A cost-sharing
type of arrangement with tough bargaining on the part of the government
provides the only signal of Ford's true priority on the Stirling. Also,
without other teams in the competition, the federal R&D agencv has
greater difficulty in accounting -- even after the fact -- for the degree
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of technical success of the program. We have here the potential for a
classic situation of "moral hazard": the R&D agency cannot distinguish
between outcomes deriving from chance events and those dependent on
particular decisions by Ford (4-10).
Fourth, it is difficult to interpret Ford's statement that it will
run the same Stirling program, but over a longer time horizon, if it does
not receive government support. Surely, even with the uncertainty of
events a decade into the future, planners must have different targets for
the attributes of an engine introduced in the late 1980s rather than the
middle 1990s. Planners must expect a steadily improving baseline engine
and must accommodate advanced engine programs to the best estimate of
baseline programs.
Yet there are some close parallels between the Stirling and gas
turbine engines. The Stirling engine faces the same critical
attributes. Emissions standards can probably be satisfactorily met.
Fuel economy should be improved significantly above the current ICE
(estimates are between 15% and 30%), with the additional possibility of
using lower grade fuels than gasoline. The cost of manufacturing --
particularly the heater head -- is expected to be a major problem in
developing the engine for commercial use.
The proposed plans for Stirling engine programs resemble those for
the gas turbine. In the first version a "metal" Stirling engine using
ceramics only in the pre-heater would be developed. A brief design
review would be followed by a components and full system programs.
In the case of the Stirling, program reviews become critical because
of the negative signals given by both General Motors and Chrysler as to
their estimates of the estimates of the likelihood of commercial success
185
for the engine. Ford and the R&D agency need strong evidence for
allocating a large expenditure for final development of the improved
engine not supported by other firms.
In the second Stirling option, an "advanced" engine, using extensive
ceramic parts -- in the heater head and elsewhere -- would be developed.
The Stirling engine, like the gas turbine, would perform considerably
better, especially in fuel economy, with the increased operating
temperature allowed by ceramics. Currently a program designed to develop
ceramic components, as opposed to an entire system, would appear most
useful. However, there are several different configuration options for
the Stirling which are not as well understood as those of the gas
turbine. This uncertainty may be reduced given increased familiarity of
engineers with the engine. Still, a metal Stirling -- developed as a
full system -- might prove to be a necessary step to an "advanced"
Stirling engine. Finally, there would be some technical crossover
between the advanced component programs for the Stirling and gas turbine
engines.
Models for Combined Strategies
In this third part, we will attempt to combine our discussions of
options for the gas turbine and Stirling engines into proposals for
strategies for the federal R&D agency. We might provide here a quick
review of the available options. First there is the metallic gas
turbine, nearly read for possible introduction by Chrysler. Second,
there is the "intermediate" gas turbine (in single- and double-shaft
versions) ready for final development by all of the Big Three. Third,
the advanced gas turbine is available now as a components program.
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Fourth, the "metal" Stirling could enter final development by Ford.
Fifth, the "advanced" Stirling engine could begin as a components
program, again by Ford.
The government must obviously accommodate its strategy to those of
the Big Three firms. Therefore we will begin with a quick overview of
what appear to be the company strategies at the current time. As always,
there are problems in determining company intentions with and without
government support. Generally, a company's priorities will be reflected
in the relative allocations of its own dollars to different projects.
Yet some of the firms may be happy to substitute government dollars
for their own even in high priority projects.
Chrysler appears to have the easiest strategy to pin down. All its
efforts to date have focused on the gas turbine engine. It has nearly
completed development on the metallic gas turbine and seems eager to work
on "intermediate" and subsequently advanced gas engines. Chrysler
appears willing to bet only on the advanced gas turbine for commercial
introduction. Yet its strategy, while definitely that of a "specialist"
ready to introduce a successful engine, would apparently not be pursued
atall without government funding. Chrysler will not and cannot match on
its own the efforts of other firms on different engines.
General Motors has a strategy which is somewhat more difficult to
define. Significantly, its large size and divisional structure allow for
quasi-independent actions within different parts of the firm. Its funds
are currently supporting work, in the Engineering Staff, on a metallic
free-shaft engine. Detroit Diesel Allison is interested in developing a
single-shaft intermediate engine -- with some government support. Prior
to its decision in 1970 to curtail the program, the company had extensive
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experience with the Stirling. Altogether, its strategy appears to be one
of maintaining protection against another firm's introduction of the
engine. GM is matching other firms' efforts (relying on its past
experience in the case of the Stirling). The diversification of efforts
within GM on the gas turbine, although focusing on different approaches,
shows evidence of its interest in competing head to head with other teams
on technical developments. Only in ceramic components does GM not
anticipate matching efforts.
Ford's strategy is most difficult to place in a single category.
Players now anticipate a lot of shared development dollars between Ford
and the federal R&D agency, obscuring to some degree Ford's priorities.
Obviously the firm appears aggressive both on its own account in
developing the engine and in acquiring government dollars to support its
efforts. Ford distinguishes itself from the other firms in its
development of the Stirling engine. In allocating most of its own
dollars to this area Ford appears to be pursuing a "specialist" strategy,
although with a different bet from the other firms. Yet the company,
perhaps as hedges against favorable outcomes for other firms' engines,
appears interested in developing (with government dollars) an
intermediate gas turbine and advanced ceramic components.
To pursue its concrete goals of increasing technical options,
avoiding substitution of government for company dollars, and increasing
the likelihood of commercial introduction of an engine with improved
social attributes, the government could pursue one of several
strategies. We will present four strategies, executed through government
funding (at least in part) of one or more of the program options for the
gas turbine and Stirling engines. We have not set an arbitrary budget to
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which each strategy must conform. Rather, we take as an assumption that
government spending will be adequate but not wasteful given its
intentions. We cannot pretend here to specify exact levels of
expenditures, precise timing of projects, or the appropriate share of
government support for all options. These are obviously the concerns of
contract negotiators.
In the first "specialist" strategy, the government supports
development by one firm on a single engine program most likely to achieve
successful introduction. The R&D agency conceivably could choose to
support the immediate introduction of the metallic gas turbine. Yet the
government very likely may find no company willing to place its own money
on such a project, even with government funding. The most likely
candidate, Chrysler, has stated no commitment to introducing this
engine. General Motors, using technology in its Engineering Staff, the
other possible candidate, has showed no willingness to receive any
government support at all. This project has the political attractiveness
of a near-term commercial demonstration but the financial prospects of a
failure.
In pursuing a "specialist" strategy, though, the government would
more likely have to choose between the intermediate gas turbine and the
metal Stirling engine. Again there is disagreement about the ability of
the intermediate turbine to offer substantial enough improvement in
engine attributes, particularly fuel economy. Still, Chrysler, Detroit
Diesel Allison, and Ford might be very interested in an intermediate gas
turbine development program. Again, two of the Big Three are currently
voting against the Stirling. Yet the government's dollar may go further
with the Stirling toward adding a new technical option for the industry.
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With either the choice of the intermediate gas turbine or metallic
Stirling, the government must be accountable, in supporting a leading
firm, to arguments concerning fairness in funding. Also, there may be no
means for the agency to accelerate the program of a firm already
specializing in a given area. Finally, this strategy offers no
additional hedges against the failure of even the "best" approach.
In the second strategy the R&D agency supports each of several
duplicate efforts to develop the same engine. The obvious candidate is a
final development program for the intermediate gas turbine. A less
obvious alternative is a components program for the advanced gas
turbine. Unfortunately, the Stirling engine does not afford at present
another team to compete with Ford.
If the government does decide to support (not necessarily requiring
large government funding shares) two or three efforts on the intermediate
turbine, it would presumably be operating under certain assumptions.
First, it must perceive "technical" competition, independent teams
simultaneously working on similar engine designs, as a crucial force in
advanced engine development. Second, it must assume either that the
intermediate gas turbine can achieve successful commercial introduction
or that the intermediate engine must precede development of the advanced
engine. Third, it must believe that duplicate efforts will create a
better design. In particular, one could be able to select as obviously
superior either the single- or free-shaft configuration for final
development and later introduction. Clearly the attractiveness of this
strategy weakens when expenditures increase and several firms do not show
active interest. We will delay the discussion of duplicate efforts on
advanced gas turbine components.
190
In the third strategy, the government supports diversified efforts on
different engines. This strategy depends on the assumption that
"business" competition drives the developmental process. Firms examine
the total portfolio of projects within the industry in determining their
actions. This strategy offers the best hedge against failure of all the
advanced engine programs, as many of the outcomes will be independent of
one another. Any program not currently funded internally by one of the
Big Three would be a good candidate for government funding under this
strategy. Again, the agency must avoid hopeless projects rejected for
sound reasons by the Big Three, and must resist substituting its own
dollars for those of the companies. Under this strategy the metallic
Stirling would very likely receive at least partial funding and the
intermediate gas turbine would not. An advanced components program
either for the gas turbine or Stirling might also be considered. This
program would offer diversification "across time," insuring that
preliminary work would continue on sophisticated ceramics technology.
Clearly the logical extension of a "diversified" government strategy
is funding by the government of all conceivable advanced engine
programs. Without any restrictions on government expenditures, the
agency could pursue an "all out" strategy -- supporting introduction of
the metallic gas turbine, final development of several intermediate gas
turbines and the metallic Stirling, and initial development of advanced
gas turbines and advanced Stirling engines.
In the fourth and final proposed strategy, the federal R&D agency
supports advanced cermic component efforts, on either or both the gas
turbine and Stirling engine(s). In this area, there would be little
possibility that the government would substitute its dollars for those of
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the Big Three. None of these firms is in fact pursuing an exclusively
advanced strategy. Because this type of development is close to basic
research, there is a greater potential for crossover use of the technical
results and greater difficulty for the individual firm to appropriate the
benefits. The government could fund several Big Three firms (Chrysler,
Ford, and the Detroit Diesel Allison Division of GM all appear
interested) and several other experienced ceramic firms (such as
Westinghouse, General Electric, and Corning Glass). Since this program
does not necessarily require the immediate development of a complete
engine system, the government could fund several duplicate efforts rather
inexpensively.
This approach places the federal R&D agency and the Big Three firms
into a "wait and see" position. More complete information could be
provided about critical components for decisions on all of the advanced
engines. There are other attractive features of this approach.
Government support could be spread farilv across firms. This strategy
definitely appears most complementary to those of the Big Three firms.
It does stress the expansions of technical options and promises large
economic payoffs if successful. Finally, this approach prevents the
government from making large, premature investments in the final
development of advanced engines that are unlikely to succeed at
introduction.
4
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